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This study examines the history of marital rape and related topics in the United
States within the broader context of women’s legal and political rights. The project
demonstrates the interplay between women’s activists, legislators, the criminal justice
system, and an involved public necessary to change both societal and legal views on
spousal rape, and eventually its criminalization in all fifty states.
Chief Justice Matthew Hale first announced the legal impossibility of rape in
marriage in a seventeenth-century treatise in which he established the irrevocable consent
theory, which argued that men had an absolute right to sexual relations within the bonds of
marriage, and provided the foundation for a marital rape exemption. While modern case
law and legal commentary questioned the veracity of Hale’s presumption, it remained the
basis for successful arguments against spousal rape laws for centuries in both Great Britain
and the United States.
Concentrating on approaches to criminalizing marital rape in three of the fifty
states, this dissertation provides a reasonable representation of the existence of the
marital rape exemption in America, arguments used to maintain the exemption, and
various methods used to end this form of gendered violence and gender discrimination
accepted in this country until the 1970s. It explores key issues relevant to the social and

legal history of spousal rape in the United States: the rise of domestic violence and sexual
assault movements that began in the late 1970s and the promulgation of rape shield laws,
which provided evidentiary protections for rape victims during trial.
Ultimately, this project demonstrates several of the important victories that women
made in areas of personal autonomy over their bodies, which led to the criminalization of
rape in marriage. Over the course of nearly one hundred and fifty years, social and legal
attitudes toward spousal rape – actually, sexual assault in general – resulted in greater legal
protection for the rights of married women. The elimination of the marital rape exemption,
better trained law enforcement, increased services provided by advocates, and a more
informed public all contributed to increased visibility about the existence of marital rape
and active responses to that crime.
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A NOTE ABOUT LEGAL TERMS
Because state law governs crimes related to sexual assault, each state has the
authority to select the phraseology it will use to describe those criminal offenses.
Throughout this dissertation, seemingly different terms may appear to describe similar
offenses. For instance, California uses the term “spousal rape,” while South Carolina uses
“spousal sexual battery.” While there might be a slight variation in the elements of those
crimes, they refer to virtually the same offense. Three times, the phrase “forcible rape”
appears. In those instances, I follow the definition provided by the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Reporting (UCR) Program: “the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her
will.” Attempts or assaults to commit rape by force or threat of force are also included
within this definition; however, statutory rape (without force) and other sex offenses are
not. Finally, some states use the term marital rape, while other states use spousal rape to
describe criminalized sexual actions between married partners. I use the terms
interchangeably.
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1
INTRODUCTION
“LEGITIMIZING” MARITAL RAPE: CHANGING SOCIAL AND LEGAL
ATTITUDES ABOUT SEXUAL ASSAULT IN MARRIAGE
On October 10, 1978, Greta Rideout called the Salem Women’s Crisis Service of
Salem, Oregon, to report that her husband, John, had raped her. The crisis worker advised
Greta to call the police. When the police arrived, Greta reiterated her claim that her
husband had raped her. On October 18, the State charged John with violating Oregon’s
recently revised rape law, which did not provide an exemption for men accused of raping
their wives. In 1978, Oregon was one of only three states whose rape laws did not include
the common law exemption for husbands accused of raping their wives. The resulting
trial was the first in the United States in which a husband faced charges of raping his wife
while the couple was still living together. Held in December 1978, the trial lasted only six
days; deliberations by the jury took only two-and-a-half hours. The jury of eight women
and four men acquitted John Rideout because they did not feel that there was adequate
evidence to support a verdict of “guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”1
Despite the verdict, the Rideout case holds a unique position in the history of
marital rape in America. Irene Frieze explained that prior to Rideout, “there was little
discussion of marital rape by the general public or by researchers and counselors skilled
in dealing with other types of rape cases.”2 The Rideout trial changed that. The media
paid significant attention to the Rideout case because of the novel issue it presented: was
rape in marriage a legitimate crime? The case received national news coverage in print
and on television. Walter Cronkite, the avuncular news anchor hailed as “the most trusted

Melissa Anne Bazhaw, “For Better or for Worse? Media Coverage of Marital Rape in the 1978 Rideout
Trial,” Master’s thesis, Georgia State University (2008), 2-3.
2
Irene Hanson Frieze, “Investigating the Causes and Consequences of Marital Rape,” Signs 8, no. 3 (1983),
532.
1
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man in America,” discussed the trial on The CBS Evening News. National newspaper
coverage included the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, the Washington Post, and
the Los Angeles Times.3
While many articles mentioned Oregon’s revised rape law, very few addressed the
legal reasoning undergirding it. For example, Rideout revolved around such legal issues
as equal protection, and yet media coverage rarely explained that equal protection for
wives required the elimination of the marital rape exemption.4 One article, purportedly
offering to explain the “background” to the trial, made only brief reference to the
underlying statute, noting that the original bill included a spousal exemption, but that
legislators amended it to allow prosecution of husbands. The article, however, did quote
State Senator Vern Cook, who had voted against the bill.5 According to Cook, his main
objection to the bill was that it absolved women of “their responsibility to avoid a
situation . . . by moving out of the house” and that resulting trials would amount to
nothing more than “a swearing contest between husband and wife” that would be difficult
for a court to resolve.6 Such arguments engaged in victim blaming and suggested that
rape in marriage was nothing more than a squabble between husband and wife that did
not require intervention by the criminal justice system.
Media coverage generally focused on witness testimony regarding Greta’s
character, rather than offering legal commentary. Even before the trial began, headlines
referenced her sexual history, her motivations for bringing the charge, and her
Bazhaw, “For Better or for Worse,” 3, 50.
Lisa M. Cuklanz, Rape on Trial: How the Mass Media Construct Legal Reform and Social Change
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 53, 56.
5
Robert Vernon “Vern” Cook served in the Oregon House of Representatives from 1956 until 1960 when
voters elected him to the Oregon Senate. He remained in the Senate until he was defeated in the 1980
election.
6
Cuklanz, Rape on Trial, 56.
3
4
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“propensity” for lying. The trial followed a similar path. District Attorney Gary
Gortmaker described the harsh reality of many rape cases: despite the perception that the
defendant is on trial, “we’re going to try the victim first, the law second, and the
defendant third.”7 Demonstrating the attitude of many prosecutors at the time, Gortmaker
openly expressed his lack of sympathy with victims of spousal rape. At the beginning of
the trial, Gortmaker stated: “if it had happened in the bedroom and he didn’t beat her up,
I’d agree with the other side.”8 The transparency of Gortmaker’s statement illustrated the
ongoing argument of domestic violence and sexual assault advocates: simply passing a
law against marital rape did not instantaneously change public opinion about the
wrongfulness of forced sex in marriage. Additionally, it reflected a widespread belief that
to constitute rape, the victim must suffer physical injury that is observable.
As Franklin E. Zimring noted: “More than novelty made the Rideout trial . . . one
of the premier media events of its time. Public reaction was heightened by the prospect of
forcible sex in marriage being treated as forcible rape because the majority of the
population [did] not accept the moral equivalence of the two behaviors.”9 The jury’s
verdict underscored the incongruity between public perception of rape and spousal rape.
Editorials following the verdict attempted to explain the jury’s decision. One author
stated: “The idea that marriage implies or requires perpetual consent, under all
circumstances, to sex is grotesque. And a partner in a marriage must have resource [sic]
to the law when the other partner resorts to violence.” 10 At the same time, he and others

7

Ibid., 53.
Susan Barry, “Spousal Rape: The Uncommon Law,” American Bar Association Journal 66, no. 9 (1980),
1091.
9
Franklin E. Zimring, “Legal Perspectives on Family Violence,” California Law Review 75, no. 1 (1987),
537.
10
Bazhaw, “For Better or for Worse,” 63-64; G. F. Will, “When Custom Doesn’t Work Anymore,”
Washington Post (December 28, 1978).
8

4
recognized that John Rideout faced up to 20 years behind bars if the jury found him
guilty and questioned the appropriateness of such a sentence. The conflict was evident:
recognizing the immorality of spousal rape, how does one determine what punishment is
appropriate? Evidently, the jurors believed that a twenty-year sentence was too severe for
the crime of spousal rape.11 Another journalist took a varied, but related, approach,
suggesting that a charge of assault and battery would have netted a very different result.
She reasoned that a jury would be more likely to convict if they knew the defendant was
facing six months rather than twenty years.12 By focusing on relative sentencing for rape
and assault and battery, both articles allude to a perception that spousal rape was not as
damaging as stranger rape. Further analysis by scholar Lisa Kivett concluded: “The
reluctance to punish spousal rape with penalties commensurate with other types of rape
showed the continuing uncertainty that rape was, in law, even possible between husband
and wife.”13 Thus, members of the jury, and by extension the community at large,
acknowledged the possibility of forced intimacy in marriage, but were uncertain whether
it was an appropriate matter to bring before the court.
During the trial, journalists rarely approached feminist reformers for their
opinions on violence in marriage. While publications on domestic violence and rape in
marriage were available in the years leading up to Rideout, the mainstream had not
accepted the arguments raised by those texts as a way to understand the dynamics of

11

The jury was not in a position to consider a sentence less than twenty years. All that they knew was that
the “judge called for an acquittal or a minimum conviction of first-degree rape, with a 20-year sentence,
without instructing the jury how much of the sentence the defendant would actually serve.” Barry, “Spousal
Rape: The Uncommon Law,” 1091.
12
Bazhaw, “For Better or for Worse,” 64; Judy Mann, “Jury in Oregon Ducked Constitutional Questions,”
Washington Post (December 29, 1978).
13
Lisa Kivett, “Sexual Assault: The Case for Removing the Spousal Exemption from Texas Law,” Baylor
Law Review 38 (1986), 1047.
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family violence. However, when given the opportunity, feminists expressed views on
violence, within marriage, including rape. One woman presented an equal protection
argument, explain that prior to the 1977 adoption of Oregon’s revised rape statute, the
law presented a problem for married women since only women separated from their
husbands could bring a charge of [marital] rape. Another noted the importance of the
Rideout trial: “We women have been taught that we have no choice, that [sexual
submission] is our role in life, what we’re supposed to do. . . . This trial is so important to
make women aware they’re not property, that they have choices” – the choice to say no
to unwanted intimacy with their husbands, and the choice to seek legal recourse if their
refusal is overcome.14
The Rideout story did not end with John’s acquittal. The couple briefly
reconciled, but divorced in 1979. As is common in cases of domestic violence, John’s
attention to Greta did not cease when their marriage legally ended. Later that year, he
pled guilty to criminal trespass for breaking into Greta’s home and the court sentenced
John to probation. The court eventually revoked his probation, finding that John had
repeatedly violated the terms that strictly prohibited further threatening communications
with his ex-wife.15
Despite John Rideout’s acquittal, his trial raised several issues that persisted in
subsequent marital rape trials. As states passed laws that eliminated the spousal
exemption to rape, legislators had to overcome the argument that current assault and
battery statutes were sufficient to address cases of marital rape. When Oregon revised its

Cuklanz, Rape on Trial, 63. See, Diana Russell, The Politics of Rape: The Victim’s Perspective (New
York: Stein and Day, 1975); Del Martin, Battered Wives (San Francisco: Glide Publications, 1976).
15
Barry, “Spousal Rape: The Uncommon Law,” 1091.
14
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rape law in 1977, it faced opposition within and outside of the legislature. The original
bill would have allowed prosecution when married couples lived apart or when unmarried
couples lived together; however, “the Senate Judiciary Committee amended the proposed
bill to allow prosecutions regardless of marital or residential status.”16 This change
caused a few of the bill’s original supporters to vote against it. One state senator
explained his opposition: “We don’t need another law to make assault and battery a
crime. They’re confusing assault and battery with rape.”17 Charles Burt, defense attorney
for John Rideout, was one of the most outspoken opponents to Oregon’s rape statute.
Burt addressed the issue of marital privacy when he argued that it was “a waste of the
criminal court’s time to get into [the] area of [marital intimacy].” In an inflammatory
remark, Burt insisted: “a woman who’s still in a marriage is presumably consenting to
sex. . . . Maybe this is the risk of being married, you know?”18 The Oregon legal
community was quite familiar with Burt’s opposition to marital rape laws. At a dinner for
the State Bar Board of Governors, attendees presented Burt with a T-shirt that read
“Rapists Need Love Too.”19
As noted above, Greta’s sexual history was a primary concern throughout the
trial. At the time of the Rideout trial, it was common for defense attorneys to use the
victim’s sexual history to attack her credibility and the truthfulness of her claim. As a
result, many victims were reluctant to report the crime or to take the case to trial. Rideout
was no exception. The judge ruled that the defense could introduce evidence of Greta’s

Bazhaw, “For Better or for Worse,” 52.
Ibid., 52-53.
18
Barry, “Spousal Rape: The Uncommon Law,” 1090.
19
Ibid.
16
17
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dishonesty and sexual history during the trial.20 Thus, the jury heard that Greta Rideout
had “sexual problems,” a topic of great interest reported by the media. The defense
focused on Greta’s past abortions and a previous accusation of rape that she later
recanted. The jury also heard that Greta told John that she was sexually interested in other
women, although she later explained that talk of a lesbian fantasy was just to get a rise
out of her husband. Burt used Greta’s recanting of the prior rape claim and the lesbian
fantasy incident to challenge Greta’s truthfulness, suggesting that she was dishonest and
was lying about her husband raping her.21
Because rape by a husband did not fit the cultural image of a stranger in a dark
alley assaulting and raping a woman, Rideout also emphasized the question of whether
forced sex in marriage constituted “real rape.” Perceptions of marital rape have been the
subject of many studies, which gauge participant attitudes about the severity of marital
rape. Many have shown that the doubts about appropriate sentencing as seen in the
Rideout trial were common. A study conducted in 1999 found that eighty percent of the
general population believed that husbands used force often or somewhat often to have sex
with their wives, yet significantly fewer categorized such action as rape. Researchers
attributed this cultural invalidation to the participants being less likely to categorize
behavior as rape when there was greater evidence of prior sexual intimacy between the
victim and the accused. One of the first studies used to evaluate the perceived seriousness
of marital rape asked participants to evaluate the severity of a variety of crimes. Overall,
participants ranked forcible rape by a former spouse as nearly equivalent to blackmail

20
21

Bazhaw, “For Better or for Worse,” 39.
Bazhaw, “For Better or for Worse,” 38.
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and the use of LSD, once again suggesting the perception that rape by a current or former
intimate partner was not as traumatizing as stranger rape.22
Lisa Cuklanz, professor of Communication Studies at Boston College, has closely
evaluated the Rideout trial and has provided commentary on why the acquittal was the
only verdict that the public could have reasonably expected. To reach another verdict
would have required the court, jury, and mainstream culture to move beyond traditional
beliefs about rape and marriage. According to Cuklanz: “they would have had to believe
that wife battering syndrome existed, that there was no significant motivation for a wife
to concoct a false story of rape, that juries were no less able to decide who was telling the
truth in a rape case than any other case, and that rapists were not only violent strangers
but also ‘loving’ husbands.”23 Evidently, the media, jury, and public at large were not
willing to accept these assertions in 1978 when the Rideout case went to trial in an
Oregon courtroom and, via the media, in the court of public opinion.
In 2015, debates still exist about what actions constitute “legitimate” rape and
whether circumstances exist which should insulate a man from charges of raping his wife.
In recent years, two politicians in Missouri found themselves in the national spotlight for
comments made about “legitimate rape.” In 2012, then United States Representative
Todd Akin sabotaged his bid for a seat in the Senate when he used the term “legitimate
rape” in a discussion about abortion laws, specifically whether he believed that abortion
was justified in the case of a rape resulting in pregnancy. Akin demonstrated his

22

The early study ranking the severity of crimes occurred in 1974, prior to the criminalization of marital
rape. Therefore, participants ranked rape by a former rather than a current spouse. Jennifer A. Bennice and
Patricia A. Resick, “Marital Rape: History, Research, and Practice,” Trauma, Violence, & Abuse 4, no. 3
(2003), 323.
23
Cuklanz, Rape on Trial, 55.
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ignorance of the female reproductive system when he suggested that a woman cannot get
pregnant after being raped because “women’s bodies can tell when rape has occurred and
‘shut the whole thing down,’” thereby preventing conception. Akin’s comments raised
alarms for those who interpreted his statement as victim-blaming.24 Two years later, the
concept of legitimate rape was still alive and well in the Show-Me State. State
Representative Rick Brattin introduced a bill that would require a woman seeking an
abortion to first get written permission from the father unless the pregnancy was the
result of “legitimate rape.” While Brattin argued that he was not using the term in the
same vein as Akin, his statement illustrated his limited understanding of rape victim
behavior. Mother Jones was the first to quote Brattin as saying: “If there was a legitimate
rape, you’re going to make a police report, just as if you were robbed. . . That’s just
common sense.” Brattin’s view of “common sense” fails to acknowledge the various
reasons that women fail to report rape, which include a fear of not being believed,
concern about retribution from an abuser, and public notoriety if the case proceeds to
trial.25 The examples above demonstrate a continuing lack of consensus within the United
States about what acts constitute “legitimate rape” and whether that view of “legitimacy”
is broad enough to include sexual assault within the union of matrimony.
This dissertation examines the history of marital rape and related topics in the
United States, placing it in the broader context of women’s legal and political rights.
With origins in the 1960s, there is today a growing body of literature that focuses on the

Lori Moore, “The Statement and the Reaction,” New York Times, August 21, 2012; Charlotte Alter,
“Todd Akin Still Doesn’t Get What’s Wrong With Saying ‘Legitimate Rape,’” Time, July 17, 2014.
25
Molly Redden, “This GOP Lawmaker Wants a Woman to Get Permission From the Father Before
Having an Abortion Unless it was ‘Legitimate Rape,’” Mother Jones, December 17, 2014, accessed June
21, 2015, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/12/republican-wants-women-get-permission-fatherhaving-abortion.
24
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legal and political rights of women in America. Similarly, since the 1970s, there has been
an increase in scholarship that addresses women’s rights to bodily autonomy, dealing
with domestic abuse and rape. By the late 1980s and 1990s, academics began to focus on
the confluence of these issues: rape in marriage. As states began to address marital rape,
legislators, jurists, law enforcement, prosecutors and defense attorneys, special interest
groups, and individual parties of interest engaged in sometimes-tempestuous dialogues
about the meaning of marriage, power and authority within such unions, equal protection
of the law, bodily integrity, and human rights. Using three states as case studies, this
project will evaluate the interaction of community actors, legislators, and the judiciary to
explore three different paths by which states have addressed the marital rape exemption
amid shifting social attitudes about women’s right to bodily autonomy.
There is a significant and growing body of literature available today on marriage,
domestic violence, and rape. Less common, but no less important, is a hybrid of these
issues: scholarship that addresses the history of rape within the bonds of marriage. Much
of this literature has come from the disciplines of sociology, social work, and psychology.
Additionally, the marital rape exemption has been the topic of narrowly focused law
review articles that highlight a particular state law or court decision. What is absent from
this scholarship, however, is a manuscript-length work that moves from the historical
underpinnings of the marital rape exemption to a modern, multi-state review of
legislative history, campaigns by women’s groups, judicial activism, and public reaction.
Recent publications addressing rape have not discussed marital rape with any
detail. Danielle McGuire’s award winning At the Dark End of the Street (2011) interprets
anew underpinnings of the civil rights movement. McGuire masterfully argues that the

11
sexual assault of African American women by white men, often not prosecuted in a court
of law, motivated the activism of Rosa Parks long before the iconic day in which she
refused to give up her seat on a Montgomery bus. As an investigator for the NAACP,
Parks was responsible for looking into cases involving the rape of African American
women. Given the focus of At the Dark End of the Street, marital rape did not have a
place in McGuire’s argument. 26 In 2013, Estelle Freedman’s Redefining Rape addressed
the fluidity of the term rape in America. Her narrative focused on the period from the
1870s until the 1930s, a time in which racial segregation, lynching, and the women’s
suffrage movement coexisted. Freedman demonstrated how white and African American
activists challenged the traditional view of rape: “a brutal attack on a chaste white woman
by a male stranger, usually an African American.” 27 They sought a broader and more
realistic definition of the term. Ultimately, Freedman concluded that contemporary
definitions of rape are reliant upon political power and social privilege. In the closing
pages of Redefining Rape, Freedman draws her arguments about rape to the present. In
that discussion, she devotes two paragraphs to the criminalization of marital rape that
began in the 1970s. The upcoming release of Sarah Deer’s The Beginning and End of
Rape: Confronting Sexual Violence in Native America will provide scholars another lens
through which to evaluate the gendered and political nature of rape in American society.
According to advance material, Deer’s critique of federal law argues that the destruction
of tribal legal systems has drastically limited the possibility of legal redress for Native

26

Danielle L. McGuire, At the Dark End of the Street: Black Women, Rape, and Resistance – a New
History of the Civil Rights Movement from Rosa Parks to the Rise of Black Power (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2010).
27
Estelle B. Freedman, Redefining Rape: Sexual Violence in The Era of Suffrage and Segregation
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).
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American rape victims. Her solutions call for the intersectionality of tribal law and
feminist advocacy to address this inequality in policies regarding sexual assault.28
Although concentrating on only three of the fifty states – Nebraska, California,
and South Carolina – this dissertation will provide a reasonable representation of the
existence of the marital rape exemption in America, the arguments used to maintain the
exemption, and the various methods used to end this form of gender discrimination
accepted in this country for over two centuries. Additionally, it will explore key issues to
understanding the social, political, and legal history of rape in marriage in the United
States.
In order to understand the evolution of Western and American law on the matter
of marital rape, it is necessary to reflect on global historical patterns of gendered
sexuality, specifically male interests in female bodies. In her discussion of women’s
bodies, Rose Weitz, Professor of Women and Gender Studies at Arizona State
University, proposed that since the time of Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (c. 1754
B.C.) and nearly to the present, “western law typically has defined women’s bodies as
men’s property. In ancient societies, women who were not slaves belonged to their
fathers before marriage and to their husbands thereafter. For this reason, Babylonian law,
for example, treated rape as a form of property damage, requiring a rapist to pay a fine to
the husband or father of the raped woman, but nothing to the woman herself.”29
In discussing men as being sexually proprietary, Margo Wilson and Martin Daly
have noted, “Men exhibit a tendency to think of women as sexual and reproductive

28

Sara Deer, The Beginning and End of Rape: Confronting Sexual Violence in Native America
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).
29
Rose Weitz, “A History of Women’s Bodies,” in Rose Weitz, ed. The Politics of Women’s Bodies:
Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior, Third Edition (Oxford University Press, 2010), 4.
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‘property’ that they can own and exchange. . . . [In this context], proprietariness implies a
more encompassing mind-set [than sexual jealousy], referring not just to the emotional
force of one’s own feelings of entitlement but to a more pervasive attitude toward social
relationships.” As such, Wilson and Daly explained: “Proprietary entitlements in people
have been conceived and institutionalized as identical to proprietary entitlements to land,
chattels, and other economic resources. Historically and cross-culturally, the owners of
slaves, servants, wives, and children have been entitled to enjoy the benefits of ownership
without interference, to modify their property, and to buy and sell, while the property had
little or no legal or political status in ‘its’ own right.”30 This absolute privilege of (white)
men to control their “property” with virtually no oversight from outside authority
promoted a culture in which men had unrestricted sexual access to their wives and slaves
without the fear of legal intervention. In Anglo-American countries, the implications of
this culture would be felt for centuries to come until marital rape was politicized in the
1970s.
Evidence of men’s proprietary view of female sexuality is pervasive in Western
cultural practices. For instance:
Anglo-American law is replete with examples of men’s proprietary entitlement
over the sexuality and reproductive capacity of wives and daughters. Since before
the time of William the Conqueror there has been a continual elaboration of legal
devices enabling men to seek monetary redress for the theft or damage of their
women’s sexuality and reproductive capacity. These torts, all of which have been
sexually asymmetrical until very recently, include “loss of consortium,”
“enticement,” “criminal conversation,” “alienation of affection,” “seduction,” and
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“abduction.” In all of these tort actions the person entitled to seek redress was the
owner of the woman, whose virtue or chastity was fundamental.31

This gender-based entitlement to redress persisted in medieval English criminal courts,
tempered only moderately in cases of rape.
Courts accorded a woman a strong legal voice in only two types of cases: a case
involving the murder of her husband and a lawsuit involving her own rape. In both cases,
she was able to narrate the events of the case and name the alleged perpetrator. Yet,
history bears out the fact that rape cases were not evenly balanced in the search for
justice. Not all women stood equally before the law. The men responsible for making the
law believed that true felony rape, punishable by “life and member,” was an appropriate
charge only when a virgin had been the victim.32 A man convicted of raping a married
woman or a widow was only subject to corporal punishment. Further complicating this
system was the inaccurate medical belief, still apparently held by Todd Akin in 2012, that
a woman could not conceive if she did not consent to intercourse. Thus, if a child resulted
from the union, the law would not view the rape as a felonious action.33 A further
Wilson and Daly, “Till Death Us Do Part,” 332. For more on the cultural and legal structures supporting
male proprietary entitlement over women’s bodies in Western tradition, see F. L. Attenborough, The Laws
of the Earliest English Kings (New York: Russell and Russell, 1963); C. Backhouse, “The Tort of
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inequity was the fact that trials generally followed formal procedures strictly rather than
adapting to the substance of each case. In this sense, a woman who failed to use
appropriate language in petitions and testimony risked having the case dismissed and she
herself held liable for bringing a false claim.34
Another quagmire for women was rape in marriage. Upon marriage, a man
acquired the right to exercise control over his wife’s sexuality, which generally meant
that he retained sexual access for himself. As noted by Wilson and Daly, “Not only have
husbands been entitled to exclusive sexual access to their wives, but they have been
entitled to use force to get it. The criminalization of rape within marriage, and hence the
wife’s legal entitlement to refuse sex, has been established only recently.”35 Lord Chief
Justice Matthew Hale (1609-1676) gave legal precedence to this idea in a seventeenthcentury treatise. Published posthumously in 1736, History of the Pleas of the Crown
argued the impossibility of spousal rape.36 The marital rape exemption that he presented
stated that a “husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful
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wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given herself in
this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.”37 While modern case law and legal
commentary question the veracity of this statement, it would remain the basis for
successful arguments against spousal rape laws for centuries to come in both Great
Britain and the United States. For example, in the United States, Massachusetts was the
first state to invoke Hale’s view, doing so in the 1857 case Commonwealth v. Fogerty;
Massachusetts, joined by the other forty-nine states, adhered to the irrevocable consent
theory until the 1970s.38
Notably, Hale was writing at a time when marriage irrevocably bound a wife to
her husband as his property. Over a period of centuries, English jurists established the
legal fiction of marital unity, which asserted that at marriage, husband and wife became
one legal entity in the eyes of the law, and that entity took the form of the husband. The
common law tradition, as transferred to the American colonies in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, perpetuated this legal fiction as a convenient term by which to
understand the relationship of the couple to the outside world, their families, and each
other. As a direct result, a woman came to be legally under the protection of her husband
in a legal status known as coverture.39 Coverture was the system of law that transferred a
woman’s legal and “civic identity to her husband, giving him use and direction of her
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property throughout the marriage.”40 In this condition of dependency, she could neither
sue or be sued in her own right, nor could she enter into contracts or make a will.41 Such
legal invisibility was, of course, incompatible with the ideology of the revolutionary
period and the early republic. There were exceptions to the rule of marital unity;
however, they were limited and applied capriciously, resulting in a class-based and racebased system that favored the wealthy and legally sophisticated.42
Contemporary law often wrote of the unity of marriage, in which the husband was
supreme and the wife invisible. At that time, married women could not own property or
enter into contracts in their own right. If this legal incapacity was the justification for the
marital rape exemption, it should not have survived outside the nineteenth century when
legislation in both England and America established Married Women’s Property Acts.
Gradually, these statutes gave married women, like single women, control over their
individual real and personal property. Such property in time would be considered
separate, immune from their husbands’ debts. Married women also eventually gained
control of all their wages earned outside of the home, were able to enter into legally
binding contracts, and could sue and be sued in courts of law.43 Nevertheless, rape –
specifically the debate surrounding rape in marriage – prevailed into the late twentieth
century as an issue that was both within and influenced by the larger elements of the
women’s rights movement in Anglo-American culture.
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As the following chapters will demonstrate, women’s activism led to changes in
both societal and legal views on spousal rape. Chapter One, “‘All Men and Women are
Created Equal’: The Long Journey toward Personal Autonomy for Married Women in
America,” chronicles women’s activism from the nineteenth-century women’s rights
movement to the feminist efforts at the end of the twentieth century. Particular attention
is given to women’s activism surrounding marital property laws; bodily integrity,
including voluntary motherhood; and changing awareness about rape and domestic
violence.
Chapters two through four will illustrate the independence that each state
maintains when deciding issues relating to marital relations and criminal laws and
sanctions. Each study will critically analyze the interplay between lawmakers, jurists,
prosecutors and defense attorneys, women’s interest groups, and the public at large
during the period in which the states reevaluated and rescinded the marital rape
exemption. Due to the discretion that each state possesses, change did not happen at the
same rate or even in the same manner in these three states. These examples present a
representative picture of the arguments made by supporters and opponents of the
exemption across the United States, the use of legislation and common law to bring about
change, the importance of interest groups in calling for change, and the value of having
support from both law enforcement and the judicial system in ensuring that new laws are
enforced.
Collectively, these chapters present three distinct approaches that states across the
country employed to address the marital rape exemption. They provide especially rich
examples of case law and legislative history that illustrate the intricacies of changing
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social and legal attitudes toward spousal rape. They also provide critical insight about
social issues related to sexual assault: the rise of domestic violence and sexual assault
movements and the promulgation of rape shield laws. While the states are geographically
removed from one another, their stories provide a representation not of regional
differences, but rather differences in methods utilized to address rape in marriage.
Chapter Two, “‘Invading the Domestic Forum and Going behind the Curtain’:
Nebraska’s Elimination of the Marital Rape Exemption and the Development of
Coordinated Victim’s Services,” serves two purposes. Initially, it assesses the decision by
Nebraska’s unicameral legislature to lead the nation by eliminating spousal immunity for
the crime of rape. A 1975 bill revised Nebraska’s rape statute, providing a more inclusive
definition of sexual assault and eliminating legal protection for husbands accused of
raping their wives. A single legal challenge in 1986 solidified the constitutionality of
Nebraska’s elimination of the spousal rape exemption. Building on this approach, the
latter half of the chapter discusses the rise of the domestic violence and sexual assault
movements and how those movements responded to changing legal attitudes about rape
in marriage. Activism in Nebraska serves as an illustration of coordinated response
efforts to sexual assault beginning in the late 1970s.
The ease by which Nebraska addressed marital rape stands in stark contrast to the
complexity legislators faced in California. Chapter Three, “The Burden of Married
Women in the Golden State: California’s Struggle with Spousal Rape Laws, 1979-2006”
analyzes legislative efforts in the twenty-seven years between California’s promulgation
of its first spousal rape law in 1979 and the 2006 amendment which brought that law into
alignment with the state’s general rape statute. The discussion recounts periods when
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amendments were unopposed, as well as those plagued by dissension both within the
state assembly and from interest groups within the state.
Despite early efforts by some states to follow the examples set by Nebraska or
California, others were reluctant to disregard the common law exemption. The final
chapter, “Sex, Lies, and Videotape: Getting Away with Rape in Marriage in South
Carolina,” provides such an example. When South Carolina passed its spousal sexual
battery law in 1991, the statute established a crime with elements quite distinct from the
general sexual battery law. The latter provided marital rape victims less legal protection
than non-spousal rape victims. Chapter Four traces the passage of South Carolina’s
spousal sexual battery law and highlights the first case brought under the new statute. The
chapter further discusses revisions to South Carolina’s rape shield laws, evaluating such
evidentiary protections for rape victims in relation to those promulgated in other states
and those provided under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Together, the chapters offer a historical analysis of the marital rape exemption
and related topics within the United States as they represent changing social and legal
attitudes about women’s autonomy. As a result of those changing attitudes, if prosecutors
tried John Rideout today instead of 1978, the jury may have reached a different
conclusion – and so, too, may have the public.
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CHAPTER 1
“ALL MEN AND WOMEN ARE CREATED EQUAL”: THE LONG JOURNEY
TOWARD PERSONAL AUTONOMY FOR MARRIED WOMEN IN AMERICA
On April 26, 1857, several men raped Agnes O’Connor in Chicopee,
Massachusetts, and subsequently faced criminal charges for that crime. The indictment
alleged that the defendants acted “violently and against her will [to] feloniously . . .
ravish and carnally know” the victim.44 Following their conviction, the defendants
appealed the judgment on the grounds that: “it is not alleged in the indictment, that said
Agnes O’Connor was ravished, &c. by force, as required by law,” and “because it is not
alleged but that said Agnes O’Connor was the wife of one of the defendants, or which
defendant, if any.”45 The court upheld the convictions, dismissing both arguments raised
by the defendants. Writing for the court, Justice Bigelow explained that the indictment set
forth all of the elements necessary to constitute the offense of rape despite the omission
of the words “by force” because the word ravish “of itself imports the use of force.”46
Similarly, Bigelow reasoned, no precedent in the United States or England had ever
required an indictment for rape to include an averment that the victim was not the wife of
one of the defendants.
The significance of Commonwealth v. Fogerty is threefold. The elements of the
crime used to convict the defendants of rape – the use of force, carnal knowledge of the
victim, and the act accomplished against the will of the victim – would define rape
statutes across the United States without successful challenge for the next one hundred
twenty years. Fogerty was the first documented case in the United States in which a court
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recognized the legal impossibility of a man raping his wife, acknowledging that marriage
to the victim was a defense to a charge of rape. This marital rape exemption would
remain in all fifty states until the mid-1970s. The legal protection for a husband was not
absolute, however, as Fogerty made clear. While the state could not convict a man for the
rape of his wife if he acted alone, in many states, the law allowed the prosecution of a
man who acted in concert with another to commit rape upon his wife.47
The controversy about a husband’s license to rape was not new when laws began
to change in the 1970s and 1980s. The women of first-wave feminism, who championed
for women’s rights in the second half of the nineteenth century, decried marital rape. To
understand the underpinning of this activism, however, one must start by looking at
women’s rights activists in the late eighteenth century.
The infant stage of the American women’s rights movement began to take form
among elite women by the eighteenth century, as noted by the March 31, 1776 letter from
Abigail Adams to her husband John Adams, asking that he “Remember the Ladies,” act
more favorably than his ancestors, and arrest the traditional (one might say natural)
tyranny of men in society.48 The French woman who came to be known as Olympe de
Gouges, took up a similar struggle, publishing pamphlets and giving public speeches in
favor of rights for women – the right to divorce, control of property, and maternal
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welfare. In 1791, she issued Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen,
her most celebrated work and the first official document in support of women’s rights
written by a woman in Western Europe. While not well-received by social critics at the
time, de Gouges’ work advocated for a system of gender-neutral meritocracy, in which
one’s advancement in society would be based, not on gender or familial connections, but
on one’s abilities and talents. The next year, in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman
(1792), British writer Mary Wollstonecraft blamed contemporary political, educational,
and religious institutions for the systematic subjugation of women, demanding equal
education, civil, and political rights for all human beings.
Well-read American women like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, best
known as leaders of the American suffrage movement, would have been familiar with the
work of de Gouges and Wollstonecraft, perhaps finding inspiration from those and other
women who demanded an end to the second-class status imposed on women.49 As one of
their first priorities, Stanton, Mott, and others in the early women’s rights movement
addressed property rights for married women, an issue causing contention across the
nation. The passage of married women’s property acts was anything but straightforward;
however, it was a step toward the advancement of equality for women in marriage. By
recognizing married women’s property rights, the resulting legislation challenged marital
unity, the system of coverture, and a husband’s property interest in his wife.
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Resentment to this two-tiered system came to a head in the Jacksonian era,
challenging the legal understanding of man and wife. Arguments utilized economic
reasoning as well. Coverture had arisen when the economy relied upon land ownership
and agricultural production; yet, this system no longer seemed as viable when the
economy shifted in favor of an urban commercial market. The rise of a female labor
force, the advent of life insurance, and the growth of savings banks all called for a
reassessment of the role of the wife in society. Between 1820 and 1860, such arguments
justified the passing of legislation to protect married women’s property. The first wave of
Married Women’s Property Acts, passed in the 1830s, arose in part because of the
decade’s banking crisis, which culminated in the Panic of 1837.50 Enacted first in
southern states, these laws found support from male legislators out of a desire to
empower their daughters against spendthrift sons-in-law, specifically to protect their
daughters’ property from their husbands’ creditors.51 Beginning in 1848 New York, the
second wave of marital property legislation resulted from similar motivation: wealthy
fathers wanted to ensure that their sons-in-law would be unable to gain access to their
daughters’ inheritances. Yet, as these laws passed, they did not provide universal
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protection for women, as state legislators fumbled with piecemeal affirmative rights for
women, and jurists limited the application of these new laws.52
Mississippi, the first state to adopt a Married Women’s Property Act in 1839, is
illustrative of the limited benefits granted to married women by such legislation.53
Mississippi Senator Thomas B. J. Hadley introduced the marital property legislation. In
its original form, the bill was visionary, yet well beyond the comfort level of most
lawmakers. Had it passed, Hadley’s bill would have given married women nearly the
same property rights as men and single women:
[E]very free woman who got married in Mississippi would be allowed to retain
whatever possessions she owned on her wedding day, along with all the money
she earned and all the gifts she received afterward. And the income generated by
these assets would be hers to dispose of as she pleased.54
Additionally, the bill would have given Mississippi the distinction as the first common
law state to provide married women the right to draft a last will and testament. Less than
one month after Hadley introduced his bill, Governor Alexander G. McNutt signed it into
law, albeit in an almost unrecognizable incarnation. The new law provided that brides
would retain ownership over only one type of property brought into a marriage – slaves.55
Even then, married women had only limited possessory rights over their slave property in
the same way the law allowed them rights over their own land. Management of the slaves
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would rest with their husbands, who would also receive any income the slaves generated.
Amendments to the bill also removed clauses that guaranteed married women the right to
wages earned outside the home and the right to write wills. Such changes undermined
what would have been a significant stride toward marital equality.56
In the four decades beginning in 1840, legislators expanded early laws providing
only debt protection to include “the right of married women to manage, enjoy the profits,
sell, and will personal and real property that they had owned prior to marriage or had
been given or inherited from a third party during marriage.”57 Even so, married women
could not count on automatic or absolute protection from these expanded laws. In the
decades when married women’s property legislation faced revisions, courts were asked to
rule on disputes concerning the appropriate definition of a married woman’s estate
separate from that of her husband. The language of many state statutes was vague enough
to leave room for argument and therefore litigation.58
Whenever possible, judges tended to resolve conflict in a way that would uphold
economic patriarchy within the family unit, often imposing additional burdens on married
women who chose to maintain property separate from their husbands. Courts refused to
apply the laws retroactively; thus, women married prior to the law’s enactment would not
gain protection granted under the legislation. Some courts applied the law only to
property women acquired after the law went into effect, regardless of their marriage date.
Regarding the right to contract, some jurisdictions required married women to specify
that their separate estate would be responsible for any debts that arose because of the
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business relationship created under the contract, in order for the contract to be
enforceable. Married women who chose to claim earnings as part of a separate estate
often faced court-imposed obstacles. In New York, for instance, “the earnings had to be
paid by a third party, the services had to be unconnected to household activities (e.g.,
boarding, sale of eggs and butter), and the woman had to specify that she was operating
under a separate account.”59 Despite early limitations, contemporary feminists viewed
married women’s property acts as a great victory, perhaps even the most significant
change in the legal status of women in Anglo-American society in seven hundred years of
common law.60 Nineteenth-century feminists, including Elizabeth Cady Stanton and
Lucretia Mott, attacked the legal fiction of marital unity, arguing that it was an antiquated
example of patriarchal values that no longer seemed appropriate in modern society.61
Many in the nineteenth-century women’s rights movement believed a woman’s loss of
legal personhood at marriage was a more pressing problem than the absence of suffrage.
Feminists attacked laws that allowed a man to control his “wife’s property, collect and
use her wages, [and] select the food and clothing for herself and children.”62 This initial
step toward property ownership was a catalyst for women gaining the right of personal
autonomy.
As white activists like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott concerned
themselves with the legal fiction of marital unity and married women’s property acts,
activist African Americans turned their attention to discourses of rape and lynching, two
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issues that “have historically influenced understandings of race, gender, and sexuality
within American society.”63 Both forms of violence address the power dynamic of
control over the body of another. As Sociology Professor Patricia Hill Collins has
described, sexual violence has served as a method by which to control marginalized or
non-dominant groups – African Americans, women, the poor, as well as gays and
lesbians.
Prior to the Civil War, slave owners had unlimited sexual access to their slaves.
As Missouri v. Celia (1855) demonstrated, legally sanctioned white male privilege
granted sexual access to slave women. Robert Newsom purchased Celia when she was
fourteen years old. For the next five years as Celia worked on Newsom’s farm, he raped
her regularly and fathered two children by her. In 1855, when she was again pregnant,
Celia requested that Newsom refrain from future instances of sexual force. When he
refused, she killed him and disposed of his body. She was subsequently charged with his
murder. A Missouri rape law enacted in 1845 made it a crime “to take any woman
unlawfully against her will and by force, menace or duress, compel her to be defiled.”64
At trial, the defense attorney argued that Celia had acted in self-defense, fearing
imminent sexual assault. After the prosecution and defense had presented their respective
arguments, the judge, relying on the Missouri Slave Code of 1804 that made no
distinction between slaves and other personal property, explained to the jury that Celia,
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being a slave, was her master’s property. As property, the judge reasoned, the rape law
did not apply to Celia, despite the fact that the statute referred to “any woman.” Further,
because Celia was “property” and not a “woman,” the judge held that she could not raise
the argument of self-defense with respect to rape.65 He instructed the jury to consider
only whether Celia had murdered Newsom. Found guilty by a jury of twelve white men,
and after the exhaustion of appeals to stay her execution, Celia hanged for the crime of
murder.66
In the post-emancipation South, Collins asserted, the institutionalization of
“lynching and rape served as gender-specific mechanisms of sexual violence whereby
men were victimized by lynching and women by rape. Wide-scale lynching occurred in
tandem with the rise of the myth of the Black man as rapist who set his eyes upon White
women. Quite often, lynching was a public affair, sanctioned, and ritualized to “install a
hegemonic White masculinity over a subordinated Black masculinity.”67 As such, the
lynching of African American men connotes the emasculation of both the victim and
other Black men within the community. In contrast to public lynching, the rape of Black
women occurred in private and their suffering personal an invisible within society. Just as
the myth of the Black rapist justified violence against men, the myth of the
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hypersexualized Black woman served to blame victims for their own rapes. Collins
recognized the incongruity of the solution raised by Black male leaders: “their political
solution of installing a Black male patriarchy in which Black men would protect ‘their’
women from sexual assault inadvertently supported ideas about women’s bodies and
sexuality as men’s property. . . . Black women’s suffering under racism would be
eliminated by encouraging versions of Black masculinity whereby Black men had the
same powers that White men had long enjoyed.”68 While such actions would elevate the
position of Black men, African American women continued to find themselves at the
mercy of men.
The activism of many African American women parallels their personal
experiences. For instance, Ida B. Wells, journalist, women’s rights advocate, and antilynching crusader, rejected the myths of the Black male rapist and the immoral, licentious
Black woman. The lynching of several of her friends influenced Wells’ worldview;
thereafter, she devoted much of her life to the anti-lynching crusade. Similarly, Anna
Julia Cooper, one of the first four African American women to earn a doctorate degree,
promoted the cause of Black women’s education. Her book, A Voice from the South,
represented not only her political activism, but also an early example of Black
feminism.69
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Despite a divergence of guiding issues, both white and African American women
activists promoted greater gender equality in American society. Legislation passed in
New York certainly served as encouragement for the emergence of the modern American
women’s rights movement. In April 1848, after more than ten years of debate, New York
enacted a married women’s property act, granting married women control over property
they brought into a marriage or received after they wed.70 Three months later, Elizabeth
Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott organized the now legendary meeting at Seneca Falls,
New York. The convention attracted three hundred men and women, some skilled
activists, many Quakers, and nearly all abolitionist.71 It was there that they issued the
Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions, which called for complete
equality and treatment in all areas of women’s lives. Patterned on the Declaration of
Independence, the language of and emotion elicited by the Declaration of Sentiments was
instantly recognizable: “all men and women are created equal; that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.”72 The purposeful imitation also advanced the belief that the rights
asked for were justified by the American traditions of equality and rebellion. While the
founding fathers set blame at the foot of King George III, the authors of the Declaration

70

Sara M. Evans, Born for Liberty: A History of Women in America (New York: Free Press Paperbacks,
1997), 93-95; Judith Wellman, “The Seneca Falls Women’s Rights Convention: A Study of Social
Networks,” Journal of Women’s History 3, no. 1 (1991), 9-37. As Wellman explains, New York
experienced economic and social changes in the 1840s as a result of urbanization, the industrial revolution,
and the movement of commercial agriculture to regions further to the west. These changes, at least in part,
spurred legal discussions of married women’s property rights and women’s suffrage throughout the decade.
71
Lori D. Ginzberg, Elizabeth Cady Stanton: An American Life (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009), 56-7.
One issue that prompted the Seneca Falls Convention was the imposed limitations on women’s
participation in the anti-slavery movement. More than a century later, similar exclusion provided
momentum for the rise of the women's movement in the 1960s and 1970s, as women felt dismissed from
the civil rights movement and the anti-war movement.
72
“Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions Woman's Rights Convention, Held at Seneca Falls, 19-20
July 1848,” The Elizabeth Cady Stanton & Susan B. Anthony Papers Project,
http://ecssba.rutgers.edu/docs/seneca.html (Emphasis added).

32
of Sentiments asserted that the subjugation of women resulted from the historical and
absolute tyranny of men over women.73 The bold, radical demand for full citizenship
made an argument for women “in a way that claimed republicanism for women not as
mothers responsible for rearing good little citizens but as autonomous individuals
deserving of that right.”74 In doing so, the signatories challenged the Victorian ideal of
gender-based separate spheres by asserting a public role for women.75 While almost
unanimously denounced by the male establishment – publishers, politicians, and
clergymen alike – the Declaration of Sentiments prompted more meetings in other cities
and states, and the U.S. women’s movement was born, paving the way for the first steps
in addressing marital rape.76
Another key issue in the legal address of marital rape was divorce, or the lack
thereof, which prevented women from leaving abusive marriages. The liberalization of
divorce laws did serve as a leveling force in American society. The right to attain a
divorce was also a legal disability of women for many years in the United States. In
England, divorce was relatively nonexistent until 1857; marriage was a divine institution
and a sacrament that fell under the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts.77 English law did
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recognize an action called divorce a mensa et thoro, in which the parties might live apart
if one was guilty of adultery or extreme cruelty. Most American colonies, however, did
not transport this strict prohibition on divorce. In fact, the earliest reported divorce in the
colonies was in Massachusetts in 1661. That is not to say that the colonies – or later states
– provided liberally for divorce.78 Notably, South Carolina did not provide for divorce
until 1942, and in New York State, adultery was the only grounds for divorce until 1966.
The states saw marriage in contractual terms, where each party had fixed rights
and obligations; it was up to the state to promote and preserve marriage. To succeed in a
divorce proceeding, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant had irrevocably broken
the terms of the marriage contract. The most common form of evidence supported claims
of adultery, desertion, or sexual incapacity.79 Between 1820 and 1860, states revised their
divorce statutes, making the termination of marriage easier: as expected, as grounds for
divorce expanded, divorce rates increased.80 By the 1960s, fault-based divorce became
legally routine, as couples seeking to dissolve their marriages claimed wrongs that
closely followed the letter of the law, demonstrating “the exact minimum requirements
and even the precise legal phrases needed for a fault-based divorce.”81 In time, divorce
laws shortened residency requirements for filing, reacting to “migratory divorces,” in
which one party to the marriage would take up residence in a state that had a shorter
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residency requirement or more liberal grounds for filing.82 Similarly, by 1985 all fifty
states offered no-fault divorce for couples claiming irreconcilable differences.83 Each of
these changes to divorce laws provided women greater opportunity to leave abusive
marriages.
Scholars in a variety of fields have studied the implications of more liberal
divorce laws, specifically those that allow one spouse to decide unilaterally to end the
marriage. Such laws provide an important escape route in a troubled marriage, but the
benefits may be more significant. Studies have shown that access to unilateral divorce has
led to a significant reduction in domestic violence and a drop in the number of married
women who attempt suicide. Higher separation and divorce rates also result in lower
homicide rates among intimate partners.84 At the same time, however, no-fault divorce
laws could prove detrimental to a partner who did not want to end the marriage by
reducing his or her bargaining power. This was particularly true for full-time
homemakers who were economically vulnerable. A new cohort of women emerged who
found themselves among the ranks of the poor as divorce rates doubled between 1965 and

82

In a series of decisions between 1942 and 1957, the United States Supreme Court moved toward
acceptance of migratory divorce, thereby requiring states to honor such out-of-state divorces. Future Court
decisions provided national policy for post-divorce situations involving alimony and child support, granting
jurisdiction over such matters to the state in which the divorced individuals lived, and allowing the pursuit
of a nonpaying former spouse over state lines.
82
Cott, Public Vows, 195.
83
No-fault divorce was not a new phenomenon when California instituted the practice. As Stephanie Coontz
has noted, a form of no-fault divorce was evident in the Middle Ages “when a couple swore that ‘discord
reigns between us and communal life has become impossible.’” Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, a History, 104105.
84
Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, a History, 293. To review the sources Coontz relied on, see Betsey
Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress,”
National Bureau Economic Research Working Paper 10175 (2003),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10175.pdf; William Bailey and Ruth Peterson, “Gender Inequality and
Violence Against Women,” in John Hagan and Ruth Peterson, eds., Crime and Inequality (Palo Alto, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1995); and Leonard Paulozzi et al., “Surveillance for Homicide Among Intimate
Partners – United States, 1981-1998,” Centers for Disease Control, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
50 (October 21, 2001).

35
1978. Diana Pearce coined the phrase “the feminization of poverty” to describe this
gendered, economic shift.85
While divorce was more accessible in the era of no-fault, the government
maintained its interest in the family unit: how to define “family” or “marriage”; the
division of obligations when divorce divided a family; and the financial implications
divorce had for women and children. By more liberally reforming divorce laws, state
legislatures and courts contributed to and reflected changing moral and legal definitions
of marriage. As no-fault replaced fault-based divorce, petitioners no longer had to
demonstrate that the other spouse had broken the state-defined terms of the marriage
contract. Rather, no-fault statutes suggested that the state should refrain from deciding if
one party to the marriage had failed to live up to the marriage agreement. If the couple
determined the marriage was not meeting their expectations for the union, one or the
other could seek legal dissolution.86 Divorce reforms in the no-fault era moved toward
gender-neutrality regarding child custody, child support and alimony, viewing both men
and women as income earners and caregivers.
Then in the 1976 case Marvin v. Marvin, the California Supreme Court
acknowledged the “substantial increase in the number of couples living together without
marrying,” resulting in the first cohabitating non-married partner receiving “palimony”
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when the couple separated.87 Recognizing the prevalence of nonmarital relationships as
indicative of changing mores of society, the Court explained its decision:
The judicial barriers that may stand in the way of a policy based upon the
fulfillment of the reasonable expectations of the parties to a nonmarital
relationship should be removed. The courts now hold that express agreements will
be enforced unless they rest on an unlawful meretricious consideration. We add
that in the absence of an express agreement, the court may look to a variety of
other remedies in order to protect the parties’ lawful expectations.88
This landmark decision influenced the economic aspect of cohabitating relationships
across the nation as courts in one state after another addressed the validity of palimony
and contracts for cohabitation. While some states were reluctant to adopt the Marvin
standard, the legal principle that emerged was that “sex outside marriage could no longer
be labeled illicit in any simple sense.”89 Reflective of this change in legal and social
mores, the number of unmarried-cohabitant households increased almost ten-fold
between 1970 and 2000, reaching nearly five million by the dawn of the twenty-first
century.90 Ultimately, the effect of divorce reforms and the creation of economic rights
for cohabitating partners was to expand individual rights outside of the traditional marital
state that favored male interests.91
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While legal access to divorce increased for women over the course of the
twentieth century, these changes did not automatically eliminate the exemptions in the
law that protected husbands who raped their wives. Activists who challenged the marital
rape exemption in the mid- to late-twentieth century faced the difficulty of overcoming
both historical and modern justifications for the legal protection granted to husbands. As
noted in the Introduction, spousal immunity sprang from the opinion forwarded by
Matthew Hale’s seventeenth-century treatise, History of the Pleas of the Crown. Notably,
Hale did not base his assertion on any supporting authority; despite this legal deficiency,
his contention came to be the legal standard in England and the United States. Justice
William Ventris Field, in a 1889 dissenting opinion, brought this deficiency to light and
proposed that there were circumstances under which a wife could refuse intercourse (and
thereby a husband could be guilty of rape). His commentary went virtually unnoticed and
the marital exemption remained.92
Temperance workers, abolitionists, social purity crusaders, and other advocates
for women’s rights addressed sexual coercion publicly during the early nineteenth
century. However, barring evidence of significant violence, rape in marriage was nearly
invisible in Victorian America “since it seldom found its way into public discourse,
private correspondence, the dockets of criminal courts, or the transcripts of divorce
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trials.”93 By the mid-nineteenth century, some advocates began to extend their concern
with sexual coercion to include actions that occurred between husband and wife. Most
vocal and direct in their outcry against rape in marriage were individuals who society
held to be more radical or anarchist – members of groups like the Free Lovers. Victoria
Woodhull and Tennessee Claflin, sisters who published the newspaper Woodhull and
Claflin’s Weekly, boldly blamed married women’s inability to refuse the sexual advances
of their husbands for collective maladies women faced. According to one 1871 editorial
in that newspaper: “Women, in short, were beginning to feel that access to their bodies
should be ‘theirs to grant or refuse.’ The conflict between women’s desire for selfownership and their subjection to ‘undesired sexual relations’ was generating internal
‘antagonism’ that was ultimately responsible for the destruction of their physical wellbeing.”94 Additional issues of Woodhull and Claflin’s Weekly mirrored this sentiment, as

Jesse F. Battan, “‘In the Marriage Bed Women’s Sex Has Been Enslaved and Abused’: Defining and
Exposing Marital Rape in Late-Nineteenth-Century America,” in Sex Without Consent: Rape and Sexual
Coercion in America (New York University Press, 2001), 206-207. For more on nineteenth and early
twentieth-century moral reform campaigns against seduction, prostitution, and sexual assault, see Mary
Frances Berry, “Judging Morality: Sexual Behavior and Legal Consequences in the Late NineteenthCentury South,” Journal of American History 78, no. 3 (1991); Pamela Haag, Consent: Sexual Rights and
the Transformation of American Liberalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); John D’Emilio
and Estelle Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America, second edition (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1999); Peggy Pascoe, Relations of Rescue: The Search for Female Authority
in the American West, 1874-1939 (Oxford University Press, 1993); and Lori D. Ginzberg, Women and the
Work of Benevolence: Morality, Politics, and Class in Nineteenth-Century United States (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1990).
94
Battan, “In the Marriage Bed,” 205. As Battan has noted, one important thing that distinguished the Free
Lovers and other, more aggressive activists from the more “moderate” women’s rights activists is the
language they used. They actually called unwanted sexual intimacy (forced and coerced) between spouses
“rape,” rather than using euphemisms like “forced maternity” and “voluntary motherhood,” which focused
on the result rather than the sexual act itself. Battan, “In the Marriage Bed,” 209; Linda Gordon, Woman’s
Body, Woman’s Right: A Social History of Birth Control in America (New York: Penguin Books, 1983);
Barbara Leslie Epstein, The Politics of Domesticity: Women, Evangelism, and Temperance in NineteenthCentury America (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1981). At the same time, such language used in
public forums subjected these individuals to arrest and incarceration for violating the Comstock Act. In
fact, Woodhull faced arrest for violating the Comstock Act when she published an article discussing an
adulterous relationship between a minister and his parishioner, after Comstock himself found the article
obscene in content. In addition to Woodhull and Claflin’s Weekly, sentiments of Free Lovers in relation to
rape in marriage can be found in editions of Lucifer the Light-Bearer, a journal published by Moses
Harman in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One purpose of Lucifer, according to Harman,
93

39
contributing writers relayed the testimony of women who complained of sexual abuse
within marriage.
In newspapers, pamphlets, and novels, Free Lovers spoke of different forms of
sexual coercion within marriage: physical, economic, and psychological. Their writing
and speeches spoke of the resulting consequences women suffered because of this abuse,
which included physical and emotional injury, and even death.95 While limited in scope,
such efforts drew on “the sexual ideology of the radical Enlightenment and the
abolitionist movement,” using terms such as “‘prostitution’ and ‘slavery’ to describe the
emotional condition and legal position of the married woman,” highlighting the
importance of consenting to sexual relations.96
In contrast, most suffragists and moral reformers, highly concerned about
maintaining social respectability and garnering mass support, generally did not “advance
very far beyond prevalent standards of propriety in discussing sexual matters
publically.”97 Furthermore, reformers addressing the politics of marriage focused on
alcoholism and unrestrained male sexuality as the root cause of sexual violence within
marriage, thereby avoiding any direct attack on the institution of marriage itself.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and other writers of the era made a case against many oppressive
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conditions within the state of marriage; they singled out obligatory sex for particular
condemnation. Such women identified the law as complicit in such atrocities, holding the
legal system responsible for women’s oppression. Stanton once wrote: “What father
could rest at home by night, knowing that his lovely daughter was at the mercy of a
strong man drunk with wine and passion and that, do what he might, he was backed up by
law and public sentiment?”98 Pauline Wright Davis, in an address to the National Woman
Suffrage Association in 1871, spoke out against the laws that made “obligatory the
rendering of marital rights and compulsory maternity.”99 While nineteenth-century
feminists did make strides related to the legal foundation of marriage, laws protecting a
woman from sexual coercion by her spouse was not one of them.100
Closely related to sexual coercion within marriage were the ideas of involuntary
motherhood and childrearing, as they contributed to the oppression of women. The late
nineteenth century saw the rise of the voluntary motherhood movement, which advocated
reproductive self-determination that would allow women to “make pregnancy, childbirth,
and motherhood matters of conscious choice.”101 According to Linda Gordon, those who
advocated for voluntary motherhood were either suffragists, part of the moral reform
movement, or members of Free Love groups. Both suffragists and Free Lovers viewed
reproduction in the context of social changes, which they hoped included “a decline in
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patriarchal power within the family.”102 At the same time, neither group – nor the
women’s rights movement as a whole in the nineteenth century – supported contraception
as a way to limit family size, as birth control advocates in the early 20th century would.
Despite the reluctance of the feminist movement to embrace the use of abortion or
contraception as methods of limiting family size: “Abortionist and sellers of
abortifacients and contraceptive methods had been advertising extensively, if subtly, for
decades, their main clients being married women. . . . Both abortion and the market for
contraceptive aids such as condoms, pessaries, and douches gave unmistakable signs that
men and women, married and not, wanted to limit pregnancies.”103
Despite their widespread use, many women’s rights activists in American society
viewed contraceptive devices as unnatural and their use raised the fear of sexual
promiscuity, which in turn threatened the very fabric of society by undermining the
family unit.104 Nevertheless, nineteenth-century reformers wanted women to be able to
limit pregnancy if it was physically or psychologically in their best interest. Toward this
end, they advocated abstinence, either by mutual consent of the married couple or as a
unilateral decision by the wife to refuse her husband. While law and custom promoted
sexual intimacy as a wife’s responsibility, voluntary motherhood promoted a woman’s
right to refuse as representing “her independence and personal integrity.”105
In the years following the Civil War, many women publicly advocated for a
woman’s inherent right to control the number of children she bore, while also demanding
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recognition of female sexuality. Notable examples include Pauline Davis Wright, Isabella
Beecher Hooker, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton.106 Perhaps the most extreme supporter of a
woman’s right to her own body at that time was Eliza B. Duffey, who promoted the idea
that women had no obligation to bear children, but rather had the right to avoid
motherhood entirely if they so desired. Duffey went further, criticizing women who did
not limit their family size and concluding that unlimited reproduction would result in
premature aging and senility.107
Voluntary motherhood emphasized the physical dangers intercourse and resulting
pregnancy posed to women in the nineteenth century. Pregnancy, childbirth, and even
abortions were dangerous and could lead to permanent injury or death for a woman. Yet
only a few in the voluntary motherhood movement favored the use of contraceptive
devices to limit conception. Dr. J. Soule argued:
No woman shall hereafter be compelled to bear children against her wishes. God
knows it is bad enough [emphasis in the original] for a woman to bear children
when she consents to it, without being compelled, time after time, to bear them
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when she does not want them . . . [Birth control places women] in a freer, a
happier, and more independent position.108
At the same time, Frederick Hollick, author of several medical advice books, promoted
the benefits of birth control for women’s health as preferable to abortion. Dr. George
Napheys argued that a woman’s independence required control over her own fertility.
Napheys reasoned:
Religion might tell woman . . . that “it is her duty to bear all the children she can. .
. . if a woman has a right to decide on any question . . . it certainly is how many
children she shall bear. . . . Certainly . . . wives have a right to demand of their
husbands at least the same consideration which a breeder extends to his stock.”109
Despite these efforts to promote voluntary motherhood, at the end of the nineteenth
century the majority within the women’s rights community had not embraced the use of
contraceptive devices to prevent conception.
In the early twentieth century, some radical women’s rights activists embraced
contraception. As women became convinced that relief from enforced childbearing could
come through birth control, they subordinated the issue of forced sex within marriage to
the struggle for contraception and abortion rights.110 The primary focus of the birth
control movement was to promote a woman’s right to decide when and if she wanted to
become pregnant.111 At the center of the movement, Margaret Sanger “viewed birth
control as a means to women’s autonomy,” voicing her belief: “It is none of society’s
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business what a woman shall do with her body.”112 In 1912, Sanger began to advocate for
the use of contraceptives, both in writing and at speaking engagements. She saw birth
control as a way for women to enjoy sexual intimacy free from the fear of unwanted
pregnancies. Two objectives guided Sanger’s actions: “sexual freedom for middle-class
women” and eradicating “the misery of working-class women who had virtually no
control over their own fertility, and bore child after child despite grinding poverty.”113
Initially intent on providing poor women with contraceptives to control their fertility,
Sanger changed her focus when stymied by conservative opposition to birth control
clinics. Thereafter, “she began to target elite and middle-class audiences and to
emphasize the erotic potential for women by separating sex from reproduction.”114 The
Comstock law thwarted her efforts, as the federal obscenity laws included prohibitions
against information about contraception.115 Facing forty-five years in prison if convicted
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of violating the law, Sanger fled to Europe where she gained access to contraceptive
devices, which she would later sneak into the country, more information about birth
control, and an international following. When she returned to the United States, she
demanded a trial, but the federal prosecutor decided to drop the pending charges against
Sanger. Thereafter, she embarked on a national speaking tour before settling in Brooklyn,
New York, and opening the first birth control clinic in the United States. Sanger once
again faced arrest, a trial, and possible conviction, this time for disseminating information
on birth control without a physician present. The government’s actions against Sanger
provided the birth control cause with significant publicity and drew attention to a shift in
the sexual norms that had governed the middle class for more than fifty years. Further:
To advocate fertility control among women through access to contraceptive
devices rather than through abstinence implied an unequivocal acceptance of
female sexual expression. It weakened the link between sexual activity and
procreation, altered the meaning of the marriage bond, and opened the way for
more extensive premarital sexual behavior among women.116
This was certainly a consequence never anticipated or intended by the government as it
enforced the laws governing the distribution of information about contraceptives.
The birth control movement was above all things fluid and adaptive. Across time
and regional boundaries, tactics adapted to the political, economic, and social interests of
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the population.117 In the 1920s, for instance, two very different impulses motivated the
birth control movement: the move toward sexual liberalism and eugenics. Sexual
liberalism, represented by sexual freedom in Hollywood films, promoted companionate
marriage characterized by mutual sexual satisfaction and even sexual expression outside
the confines of marriage. The use of contraceptives would reduce the possibility of
pregnancy and increase personal satisfaction during intimacy. Eugenics rhetoric
promoted restricted reproduction by “undesirables” for whom birth control was a
necessity. According to D’Emilio and Freedman, because of her single-minded goal of
making birth control a major political issue, Sanger “was willing to play to nativist and
middle-class fears of immigrants, blacks, and the poor.”118 Sanger promoted the eugenics
agenda and played on the rhetoric of nativists, when she “defined the purpose of birth
control as ‘more children from the fit, less from the unfit.’ It was ‘nothing more or less
than the facilitation of the process of weeding out the unfit, or preventing the birth of
defectives.’”119
Sanger and her followers adjusted their tactics to address the economic crisis of
the 1930s. Increased poverty caused by the depression meant that couples had difficulty
supporting large families. Activists “trumpeted fertility limitations for the poor as an
‘important relief measure,’” thereby reducing the size of families receiving government
aid.120 As the decade progressed, the number of family planning clinics increased
nationwide: there were twenty-eight clinics in 1929, one hundred fifty-eight by 1935, and
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five hundred forty-nine by the beginning of 1940.121 As Norman Hines noted there was
an uneven distribution of these clinics across the country. Clinics were more likely to
appear in areas of higher population, particularly in the North. In contrast, facilities were
more limited in “the South and in the sparsely settled areas of the West.”122
For the birth control movement to succeed, it was necessary to separate birth
control from obscenity laws. Advocates were able to accomplish this by reframing birth
control as a scientific, medical issue rather than a form of pornography. Promoting this
new definition, the American Birth Control League “emphasized how birth control
prevented the cycle of poverty, untimely deaths, and unwanted children.”123 A significant
first step toward the legalization of birth control came in 1936 with United States v. One
Package of Japanese Pessaries.124 The case challenged the provision of the Tariff Act of
1930 that had incorporated the anti-contraception element of the Comstock Law. The
federal appellate court that heard the case held that the Tariff Act did not apply to
physicians who were importing contraceptive devices in order to use them to protect the
health of their patients.
By the end of the 1930s, the climate toward birth control had changed enough
among politicians, physicians, and the public, that contraception was more acceptable.125
The birth control movement gained further legitimacy with the formation of Planned
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Parenthood of America in 1942.126 Once again in the late 1940s and 1950s, the message
of advocates changed to suit the realities of American life. During the postwar baby
boom, when women were marrying earlier and having children sooner and more often,
Planned Parenthood emphasized the right of couples “to continue their sexual
relationship without doubling the size of their families,” and spacing children.127 Fertility
studies demonstrated that despite the baby boom, eighty-one percent of married women
utilized some form of contraception in the years 1955 to 1960.128
The birth control pill, commercially available in 1960, further challenged
historical views of contraception. Premarital sex had been increasing steadily, albeit
gradually, since the 1920s, but the introduction of the birth control pill weakened the link
between sex and marriage as “growing numbers of . . . women began to stake out their
right to enjoy sex for pleasure rather than for procreation.”129 The decade “witnessed a
profound shift in attitudes toward female premarital sex.”130 Women in the post-pill era
could enjoy physical intimacy while avoiding pregnancy, a shotgun wedding, a prolonged
stay at a home for unwed mothers, an illegal or dangerous abortion, or a damaged
reputation. Realistically, each of these consequences was still a possibility, but with
greater access to reliable birth control, the probability of any of them coming to fruition
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dropped dramatically. Thus, changing social attitudes in the 1960s, accompanied by
pharmaceutical advancements, gave way to greater sexual autonomy, which would lay
the groundwork for the anti-rape movement and discussions about marital rape.
It would be the second-wave feminists, beginning in the late 1960s, who would
revive the issue of forced sex in marriage and make it a subject of public debate. The
feminist movement that emerged in the 1960s found inspiration from many sources,
including Simone de Beauvoir, Betty Friedan, and Kate Millett, as well as the
experiences women gained from their participation in the civil rights movement, the
antiwar movement, and other movements of the New Left.
First published in 1949 as Le Deuxième Sexe, Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second
Sex elicited a discussion about the historical status of women that scholars still debate
today. Some have referred to the text as a “feminist bible,” despite the underlying
religious connotation and de Beauvoir self-identifying as an atheist. One writer boldly
called The Second Sex “an act of Promethean audacity – a theft of Olympian fire – from
which there is no turning back. It is not the last word on ‘the problem of women,’ . . . but
it marks the place in history where an enlightenment begins.”131 Beauvoir posited a selfother relationship between man and woman, where man was the self/subject and woman
the other/object, understood only in relation to man.132 Women, like minority groups such
as Blacks and Jews, de Beauvoir concluded, were “objectified as the Other in ways that
were both overtly despotic and insidious,” subjugated merely for belonging to the
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particular group into which they were born.133 Beauvoir illustrated this self-other
relationship with repeated discussions of sex between males and females, where men
were generally the actors and women those acted upon.134
While The Second Sex was not primarily a book that admonished men for
sexually assaulting women, de Beauvoir did make recurring reference to rape. She used
rape imagery to describe women’s first experiences with sex. Whether within or outside
of marriage, de Beauvoir explained that such experiences could be traumatizing for
women. For instance, de Beauvoir asserted:
The woman is penetrated and impregnated through the vagina; it becomes an
erotic center uniquely through the intervention of the male, and this always
constitutes a kind of rape. In the past, a woman was snatched from her childhood
universe and thrown into her life as a wife by a real or simulated rape; this was an
act of violence that changed the girl into a woman: it is also referred to as
“ravishing” a girl’s virginity or “taking” her flower. This deflowering is not the
harmonious outcome of a continuous development; it is an abrupt rupture with the
past.135
The language of this passage delineates male from female, actor from subject. The man
penetrates, impregnates, and snatches the woman, throwing her into her new life. The
woman on the other hand is ravished, taken, and deflowered by the man, and as such, her
passive involvement is subordinated to his. Through this example and the many others
provided in The Second Sex, de Beauvoir created the framework of “women as other,”
marginalized and subjected to the dominance of males in society. Later feminists would
utilize this structure to discuss how that gender disparity created situations that promoted
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– or at least condoned – violence against women. Ultimately, it is de Beauvoir’s views on
sex as rape that foreshadow future arguments women’s disempowerment in
heteronormative relationships, especially marriage.
Beauvoir’s most notable, some might say subversive, challenge to the status quo
asserted: “One is not born, but rather one becomes a woman: no biological, psychological
or economic fate determines the figure that the human female presents in society.”136
These twenty-six powerful words challenged the social construct that defined “woman”
in contemporary society, and they disparaged the myth of blissful domesticity and
sentimental motherhood. In addressing women’s subordination, de Beauvoir emphasized
the dilemma of modern women: they had basic political rights, yet still “suffered from
extreme cultural, social, and economic marginality.”137 While promoting equality for
women, she also acknowledged that equality could coexist with difference. Women,
particularly with access to contraceptives and paid employment, could emerge with new,
individual personal identities independent of men. For de Beauvoir, equality between
men and women would result from the eradication of women’s oppression. While largely
ignored in the United States and England until the 1970s, thereafter, The Second Sex was
a foundational work underscoring second-wave feminist activism.138
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In her best-selling book, The Feminine Mystique, Betty Friedan argued that the
strict gender division promoted in post-World War II America stunted the lives of many
women, resulting in extremely high levels of female dissatisfaction, boredom, and even
psychosomatic complaints. The problem, Friedan postulated, arose from the societal
expectation that women would find contentment in the home, raising children and taking
care of their husbands, tasks made easier with the modern, timesaving appliances that
were more widely available in 1950s America. To move beyond the resulting malaise that
suburban domesticity caused, Friedan encouraged women to pursue their passions outside
the home, whether in education or employment.139 While The Feminine Mystique often
receives credit for jumpstarting second-wave feminism, the text is not without its
detractors.140 Critics have argued that the “problem” Friedan identified and her solutions
were applicable only to upper and middle-class, white women. Contrary to Freidan’s
assertions, not all housewives were unhappy. Many women embraced their new roles as
homemakers; unlike their mothers and unmarried sisters, they were not compelled to take
low-paid employment outside the home. Additionally, not all Americans could or did live
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by the norms of suburban domesticity, ideals that were out of reach for many racial
minorities, inner city residents, recent immigrants, and rural Americans. In fact, at the
height of the postwar period, more than one-third of American women held jobs outside
the home. By the 1960s, one worker in three were women, and three of five working
women were married. Nevertheless, Friedan and her “problem without a name” did
breathe life into the nascent women’s movement of the 1960s, setting the stage for
substantive progress in criminalizing marital rape.141
Particularly interesting is the influence that Friedan had on public perception
regarding topics she only lightly covered or did not show up in her book. When Stephanie
Coontz agreed to write a book on the influence of the Feminine Mystique on American
society, she interviewed a wide variety of women, some of whom had read the book and
some who merely thought they had. One notable commonality that emerged was the
conflation of Friedan’s message with a wide swath of issues related to the women’s
movement. Coontz notes that one respondent insisted that “The Feminine Mystique
documented how women in the 1950s were excluded from many legal rights and paid
much less than men – although in fact the book spends very little time discussing legal
and economic discrimination against women.”142 Another woman interviewed swore that
Feminine Mystique encouraged women to burn their bras, while others assured Coontz
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“that Friedan had called for the end to marital rape and sexual harassment – ideas that do
not appear anywhere” within the book.143
Kate Millett took up the feminist cause with Sexual Politics, published in 1970.144
Like the rhetoric of Friedan, Anne Koedt, and Shulamith Firestone, Millett’s writing
interrogated the intersection between identity and sexuality for women.145 Millett
acknowledged the legal success of first-wave feminists in achieving suffrage, while
simultaneously addressing what she saw as the noxious, yet subtle, lingering influence of
patriarchy in sexual relations. In Sexual Politics, Millett unabashedly analyzed the
misogyny she found in American and British literature. D. H. Lawrence, Henry Miller,
and William Burroughs were particular targets. As Ruth Rosen has observed: “Through a
close reading of their texts, Millett demonstrated how much cruelty and hatred these
misogynist authors had directed at women.”146 Women within the pages of the novels
Millett analyzed “never seemed to mind male acts of rape, violence, or mutilation. The
moment a man penetrated a woman, she invariably experienced sublime heights of
orgasmic bliss. In fact, the crueler the male character was, the greater her sexual
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satisfaction seemed to be.”147 Sexual Politics, in its early days as a dissertation and later
as a published text, broke ground in its departure from traditional thesis writing, opening
the field of feminist literary criticism and giving a new voice to feminist theory. 148
Millett’s assertions, as well as the arguments presented by other feminist scholars
and novelists, led many women to evaluate just how liberating the Sexual Revolution had
been for them. While the birth control pill, and later the intrauterine device, separated
sexual intimacy from conception, emancipation from earlier sexual norms diminished
perceptions of intercourse outside of marriage as deviant. Still, this sexual liberation did
not free all women from the guilt of intimacy separate from marriage, nor did such
encounters result in fulfilling experiences for all involved.
Throughout the 1970s, feminist activism addressed the gender inequalities that
remained in society – those areas where political, economic, and social distinctions still
separated women from men. One significant area of concern was women’s ability to
exercise control over their bodies. “Although the American women’s movement began by
emphasizing women’s ‘sameness,’ the focus on women’s autonomy over their bodies
“refocused attention on those female experiences that made women unique.”149
Consciousness-raising sessions led to discussions about dismissive and condescending
treatment from the male-dominated medical community, sexual harassment that stemmed
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from the sexual objectification of women, the illegality of abortion and its consequences,
and the legal difficulties women faced with regard to rape and domestic violence.150
Facing a medical establishment that continued to treat women “as ignorant or
hysterical patients,” in a manner that was humiliating, dismissive, and woefully ignorant
of the “female biological experience,” feminists “sparked a campaign to train more
women doctors, to reeducate male physicians, and to create a women-oriented health
movement.”151 At the forefront of this movement was a group of activists from Boston
that emerged from Bread and Roses, a women’s liberation organization in existence from
1969 through 1971, which later identified itself as the Boston Women’s Health
Collective. Members, none of whom were physicians, became experts on the topic of
women’s bodies, studying female “anatomy, physiology, sexuality, venereal disease,
birth control, abortion, pregnancy, and childbirth,” before publishing their findings in
pamphlet form and then in the greatly expanded book Our Bodies, Ourselves in 1973.152
Illustrating the self-help theme of second-wave feminism, Our Bodies, Ourselves, written
in language accessible to the layperson, discussed medical information as well as
previously taboo topics like lesbianism and sexual violence.153 Health activists addressed
a wide range of issues facing women and their reproductive health, questioning why
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physicians – not patients – had power over health decisions. Encouraging women to be
active medical consumers rather than passive patients at the mercy of patriarchal medical
structures, health activists challenged everything from decisions about contraception and
abortion to radical mastectomies and coercive sterilization.
While feminists were encouraging women to seize control of their reproductive
health, activists were also spearheading the domestic violence movement. The
development of the domestic violence movement was not the result of a singular event,
but rather the culmination of a series of continuous events evolving around the nation
beginning in the 1970s. Victims of domestic violence found themselves isolated from
friends, family, and community resources. Early calls for change were hardly outrageous.
Advocates asked only that the legal system treat battered women fairly and equitably,
questioning “why a woman beaten in her own home by her husband was denied . . .
justice, while someone assaulted in the street was recognized as a legitimate victim of a
crime.”154 Those within the domestic violence movement believed that treating domestic
violence as seriously as other forms of violent crime would convey to the public that such
behavior was no longer socially or legally acceptable.155 Yet this change in opinion
would not come easily.
At the forefront of the movement, feminist scholars both chronicled and advanced
the agenda of domestic violence activism. Del Martin’s 1976 publication of Battered
Wives was the first general text to introduce the problem of domestic abuse.156 An
informative source on domestic violence in the United States, it critically analyzed the
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legal and political status of women abused by their husbands. Battered Wives also served
to validate the view held by many feminist members of the movement: domestic violence
was the result of institutional misogyny. Martin described society as a patriarchal one in
which males defined and then confined women to inferior roles by means of intimidation,
threats, and the use of force. Two years later while she chaired a meeting sponsored by
the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Martin contended that the condition of
battered women was a matter of national concern.157
Susan Schechter published Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles
of the Battered Women’s Movement in 1982. Reflecting on her motivation for writing the
text, Schechter explained: “I hoped to tell a story about feminist, grassroots organizing
and about the hard work required to build organizations, change law and social policy,
and at the same time sustain a social movement. I wanted to brag about and document the
accomplishments but also describe the hard, complicated work almost invisible
underneath our new buildings and laws.”158 In doing so, Schechter acted as both historian
of and visionary for the battered women’s movement. Through her writing and public
speaking, she promoted the fundamental assertion of the feminist movement that “women
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had a right to control their own bodies and lives.”159 Women and Male Violence, credited
with framing “the issues of intimate violence in a way that helped shape every subsequent
analysis of domestic violence, its causes and solutions,” extolled activists to do more.160
In 1979, psychologist Lenore Walker released The Battered Woman, the book that
introduced the theory of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS). Walker’s controversial
theory suggested that women who endure repeated physical or psychological acts at the
hands of their husbands might suffer from a form of post-traumatic stress disorder, which
would impair their ability to think rationally and make reasonable decisions.161 Cyclical
behavior between the woman and her abusive partner, characterized by three distinct
phases – tension-building, acute battering, and calm respite – might result in a pattern of
psychological and behavioral symptoms. An individual suffering from BWS usually
presents four common ideations: she believes that the violence was somehow her fault;
she does not have the ability to place responsibility for the violence elsewhere; she fears
for her life or the lives of her children; and she holds an irrational belief that her abuser is
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omniscient. Physical symptoms might include headaches, chest pains, anxiety, insomnia,
panic attacks, and agitation.162
Since the release of The Battered Woman, female defendants have raised BWS as
a defense in criminal cases to justify violent acts committed against their abusive
husbands. While not all jurisdictions will allow a defendant to raise the defense of BWS,
the majority of states have allowed expert testimony on BWS. The watershed case
involving BWS was State v. Kelly, involving a 1984 appeal before the New Jersey
Supreme Court. In Kelly, the defendant faced the charge of stabbing her husband to death
with a pair of scissors. She claimed to have acted in self-defense, fearing for her life after
seven years in an abusive marriage. The trial court had prevented the testimony of an
expert on BWS and the defendant appealed. The New Jersey Supreme Court held: “the
battered-woman’s syndrome is an appropriate subject for expert testimony; . . . the
expert’s conclusions, despite the relative newness of the field, are sufficiently reliable
under New Jerseys standards for scientific testimony; and that defendant’s expert was
sufficiently qualified” to testify at trial.163
One commonality addressed by Martin, Schechter, Walker, and other scholars,
was that there was a ubiquitous sentiment across America that what happened in the
home was private and personal, and therefore not to be shared in public or addressed by
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governmental entities.164 This code of silence also hid the fact that domestic violence
often included sexual assault.165 In the 1970s and 1980s, women organized politically
against the all-too-common violence that influenced their lives, transforming the way that
society viewed violence against women. For instance, “battering and rape, once seen as
private (family matters) and aberrational (errant sexual aggression), are now largely
recognized as part of a broad-scale system of domination that affects women as a
class.”166
The feminists of the 1970s, largely white and middle-class, characterized
women’s oppression as universal, overlooking ways in which other forms of oppression
and hierarchy intersected with gender. The recognition of gendered violence as social
and systemic, however, gave way to the development of identity politics, a construct that
helps to explain the oppression experienced by members of a particular group, whether
defined by race, class, sexual orientation, or some other characteristic, and “serves as a
source of strength, community, and intellectual development.”167 However, as Kimberlé
Crenshaw cautioned, “The problem with identity politics is that it frequently conflates or
ignores intragroup differences. In the context of violence against women, this elision of
difference is problematic because the violence that many women experience is often
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shaped by other dimensions of their identities, such as race, class, and sexual orientation.
Moreover, ignoring difference within groups contributes to tension among groups,
another problem of identity politics that bears on efforts to politicize violence against
women.”168 For example, both feminist efforts to address gender discrimination and antiracist activism that highlights the experience of people of color may operate as though the
issues are mutually exclusive. While sexism and racism often intersect in the lives of
women of color, the exclusivity issue may result in an either/or situation in which the
individual has to choose which characteristic of her identity she will elevate – i.e. gender,
race, or sexual orientation.169
Nevertheless, identity politics and intersectionality provided cohesion for women
of color who organized activist efforts that often operated independently of those led by
white activists. At the same time, women of color engaged in the development of
additional theoretical paradigms that addressed concerns unique to minority women.
Notable within this group are two scholars noted earlier in this chapter: Kimberlé
Crenshaw, one of the founders of critical race theory, and Patricia Hill Collins, whose
work addresses the intersectionality of race, class, gender, and nation. Other African
American scholars have added to the growing body of literature on the intersection of
race and gender in American society. In Women, Race, & Class, Angela Davis evaluated
women’s struggles, both Black and white, to remove economic, social, and sexual
barriers that prevented gender equality. Davis addressed racism in the woman’s suffrage
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movement and analyzed the myth of the Black rapist. In a chapter on the birth control
movement, Davis was critical of contraception and sterilization as applied to women of
color, linking it to the eugenics movement and identifying it as a form of racial/ethnic
genocide.170 Johnnetta Betsch Cole and Beverly Guy-Sheftall addressed the role of
gender and sexuality in racism in Gender Talk: The Struggle for Women’s Equality in
African American Communities. Cole and Guy-Sheftall spoke equally to the racist
exploitation of Black bodies and the sexist oppression of Black women. They called upon
Black men to “acknowledge their gender privileges and [to] . . . publicly disavow sexist
attitudes and behaviors . . . [and replace] patriarchy with partnerships.”171
Such activism took hold in the 1970s and 1980s, as white and African American
women began meeting in small groups, engaging in quiet, intimate conversations that
broke the silence of domestic abuse and provided evidence that these women were not
alone in their experiences.172 They spoke of a lack of assistance for women who lived in
abusive households. When responding to reports of domestic violence, police officers
generally acted with grave caution. Even when there was evidence of physical assault or
a court issued protective order, rarely did the police make an arrest.173 In fact, most police
forces across the United States followed a no-arrest policy, in which police officers
would not arrest the physical aggressor in a domestic dispute. During the 1970s, for
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example, Michigan police officers were under orders to “avoid arrest if possible” in
domestic violence situations. In Oakland, California, police officers learned to respond to
domestic disputes as peacemakers rather than enforcers of the law.174
In the mid-1970s, women working domestic violence hotlines realized that the
battered women calling were in need of a place of refuge if they were ever going to leave
their abusers. To meet the initial need, some advocates opened their homes to those in
need. Similarly, as explained by Barbara J. Hart of the Pennsylvania Coalition against
Domestic Violence, selected churches offered asylum to women escaping domestic
violence in much the same way they offered sanctuary to draft evaders during the era of
the Vietnam War.175 For those women who did escape, there was a need greater than
simply a safe location. The emergence of shelters as safe havens also made available
clothing, food, and other personal items that the women had left behind.176 From their
inception, shelters relied on donations to assist with operating costs and services offered
to clients.
The tireless work of activists began to pay off. Across the country, support and
understanding was more prevalent. Still, it was not an easy transition. Police officers still
hesitated to arrest men during domestic violence call outs. Doctors who treated patients
with recurring injuries were generally ineffective allies. Many ignored signs of domestic
violence, embraced the belief that it was a private, family matter, or believed that social
workers were best poised to handle these conflicts.177 Even potential allies within the
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criminal justice system were ineffectual, primarily because there was a lack of
communication between the different components of that system. Candace Mosley, a
professional in the areas of domestic violence and crimes against women, explained that a
variety of individuals from law enforcement and criminal, civil, and juvenile courts may
have interacted with a particular family, but rarely did they make the connections that
would have brought their disparate interests together.178
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, many laws changed to reflect the
criminalization of battering. Legal changes in New York between 1970 and 1983 provide
a great example of the gradual criminalization of domestic violence. In 1970, New York
police officers received the authority to make warrantless arrests when there was a
reasonable belief that a crime had been committed. This discretion allowed an arrest in
the case of domestic violence, even if the crime had occurred outside the observation of
the police officer. In 1977, New York granted married women the right to have abusive
husbands prosecuted. Jurisdiction over first-degree assaults became the purview of the
criminal court rather than family court in 1980, another step by the legal system in
acknowledging the seriousness of the offense. Then a significant policy shift occurred
within the family court: the original purpose of keeping the family together was amended
to reflect the goal of ending family violence. Finally, in 1983, an amendment to the state
law “made abuse victims eligible for compensation to the same extent as other crime
victims.”179
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The momentum behind these changes stemmed largely from the efforts of
domestic violence advocates; however, there were other noteworthy influences as well.
Civil lawsuits filed against police departments increased significantly, focusing on the
constitutional issues of due process and equal protection under the law. The 1984 case,
Thurman v. City of Torrington, was a turning point for department no-arrest policies and
attitudes toward domestic violence in general. The Thurman court held that “official
behavior that reflects an ongoing pattern of deliberate indifference to victims of domestic
assault violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”180
Tracey Thurman’s marriage to her husband, Charles “Buck” Thurman, was a
tempestuous one. Three times, she attempted to leave him, but she always returned after
he promised to change his abusive ways. In October 1982, she escaped a fourth time,
returning to her hometown of Torrington, Connecticut. Tracking her down, Buck arrived
in the small New England town and settled into a pattern of tormenting Tracey,
sometimes calling her as many as twenty-five times a day, demanding to see her and their
son, C.J.181 Tracey obtained a restraining order, but without enforcement by the
Torrington Police Department, the restraining order did no good. Buck’s harassment
continued. He repeatedly showed up at Tracey’s house; in the presence of police officers,
Buck smashed in the window of Tracey’s car while she was in it; and he threatened to kill
Tracey and C.J. She called the Torrington Police many times, but received little or no
relief.
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Police charged Buck with breach of the peace for breaking the car window, but
when convicted he received a suspended sentence. In another instance, the police told
Tracey that they would need to see Buck violate the restraining order for them to act. On
yet another occasion, police officers told Tracey that the only officer able to assist her
was on vacation, so there was nothing they could do. Still, Tracey continued to report
violations of the restraining order to the police and asked for assistance when Buck
continued to threaten her. However, as Mahlon Sabo, the Torrington Police Chief, told
Tracey, the situation would be easier if Buck was not her husband since the city police
officers followed department policy of not making arrests when husbands and wives were
involved, a practice that was quiet common among law enforcement at the time.182
On June 10, 1983, Buck tracked Tracey to the home of a girlfriend she was
visiting. Tracey once again called the police to ask for assistance. By the time an officer
arrived on the scene twenty-five minutes later, Buck had stabbed Tracey thirteen times in
the face, neck, and shoulders. While Buck stood over Tracey’s body holding a bloody
knife, the police officer failed to arrest Buck for another twenty minutes, allowing time
for Buck to kick Tracey in the head, breaking her neck. The attack left Tracey paralyzed
on her right side and without feeling on her left. After seven months in the hospital,
Tracey testified at her husband’s trial and filed a lawsuit against the Torrington Police
Department and twenty-four of its police officers who failed to act on her behalf,
claiming that their reluctance to intervene violated her constitutional right to equal
protection.183
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In Thurman v. City of Torrington, the district court explained that the police
policy of not arresting men who battered their wives reflected an impermissible
stereotypic view that husbands may physically abuse their wives. The court held:
A man is not allowed to physically abuse or endanger a woman merely because he
is her husband. Concommitantly [sic], a police officer may not knowingly refrain
from interference in such violence, and may not automatically decline to make an
arrest simply because the assaulter and his victim are married to each other. Such
inaction on the part of the officer is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.184
The court found the Torrington police negligent and awarded Tracey nearly two million
dollars in damages.185 The State of Connecticut thereafter instituted a mandatory arrest
policy in cases of domestic violence.186 Following Connecticut’s example, other police
departments changed their policies to include mandatory intervention in domestic
violence cases.
As the domestic violence movement moved into the 1980s and 1990s, societal
awareness was evident throughout the nation. Expanded media exposure helped bring an
increase to public attention regarding the plight of victims. 60 Minutes, one of the
nation’s most notable prime time, televised newsmagazines, aired a segment in 1982
titled “A Place to Go,” which promoted sensitivity and support for domestic violence
victims. The segment, which focused on domestic violence shelters in Austin, Texas, was
part of the most watched episode of the season.187
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The domestic violence movement gained more public attention in June 1990,
when then-Senator Joseph Biden introduced the bill that would become the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA). Biden explained that the bill had three broad goals: “to
make streets safer for women; to make homes safer for women; and to protect women’s
civil rights.”188 The provisions of the bill were expansive, covering all types of genderbased violence, whether domestic violence, stalking, rape, or homicide. Initially, Biden’s
bill seemed to face more opposition than support from women’s groups and civil rights
groups: “One group claimed the bill would violate the First Amendment, another that its
rape penalties were too high, and still another that it would detract from efforts to pass
legislation addressing other more important women’s issues.”189
Undeterred by the opposition, Biden brought together women leaders who, under
the leadership of the NOW Legal Defense Fund, would create a coalition of “grassroots
providers, shelters, religious organizations, survivors, mental health providers,
prosecutors, and victims’ rights advocates” to combat objections to VAWA legislation.190
Notable opposition arose in the Department of Justice under President George Herbert
Walker Bush, and within the federal judiciary. Particularly caustic was the opposition by
then-Chief Justice William Rehnquist who publicly denounced VAWA for its open-ended
criminal provisions and civil rights provision that Rehnquist predicted would force federal
courts into resolving ordinary family disputes. Biden and the grassroots coalition were up to
the challenge and pushed forward, finally gaining the support necessary for the bill to pass in
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1994. When VAWA went into effect, it authorized “$1.8 billion to aid police, prosecutors,

and victim advocates in combatting crime against women.”191
That same year, the Ad Council and the Family Violence Prevention Fund
(FVPF) launched a domestic violence prevention campaign using the tagline “There’s no
excuse for domestic violence.” Public service advertisements highlighted “an effort to
reduce domestic violence by making it socially unacceptable.”192 According to the
American Medical Association, at that time, domestic violence was the number one
health threat for women.193 The campaign, which encouraged people to get involved in
prevention efforts, spread like wildfire, as anti-domestic violence literature and publicity
materials adorned walls in city hall buildings, doctors’ offices, shelters, hospitals, and
courthouses. Two and a half months after the campaign launch, FVPF workers had
responded to requests for over ten thousand domestic violence prevention action kits.194
Despite the forward momentum brought on by VAWA, advocates realized that as
long as domestic violence was still occurring, there was room to do more. Advocates
promoted a two-pronged strategy: reactive measures to assist victims and proactive
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tactics to prevent future violence.195 Achieving this goal would require a collaborated
effort among community-based groups, where each contributor understood and respected
the knowledge and skills that the others brought to the association. Law enforcement,
lawyers, physicians, and other professionals would need to listen to and learn from
survivors and advocates who had become the experts on domestic violence.196
Educational programs promoted the training for those encountering victims and their
families; simply going through the mechanics of taking a victim statement, providing
emergency room treatment, or helping a victim acquire an order of protection was not
enough. These professionals needed to learn to act with compassion, to understand the
interpersonal dynamics within the violent family, to provide services for the children of
female victims, and to provide structural support that would allow victims to become
survivors.
Closely related to the domestic violence movement was the call for women’s
sexual autonomy. Recognizing a threat to that sexual self-sovereignty, consciousnessraising discussions delineated a path from the sexual objectification of women to their
vulnerability in public to sexual assault.197 Beginning in the radical arm of the women’s
rights movement, “organizers reframed sexual violence not merely as a private trauma
but also as a nexus of power relations and a public policy concern,” clearly associating
the problem of sexual violence with male privilege.198 At the time, victims rarely reported
sexual assault, victim blaming was common, and society perpetuated the belief that rape
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was a rare event. Armed with the motto “the personal is political,” activists sought to
change laws and public opinion.199
One strategy used to change public opinion and influence legal revision was to
provide “open public forums in which victims and survivors of crimes against women
could speak out.”200 Issues debated in the forums included weak rape laws and enduring
myths about rape, both of which brought wife abuse and rape into public discourse.
Advocates also used marches and conventions to bring woman/wife abuse to the attention
of the public, often garnering state and national exposure for their cause. As Susan
Schechter explained: “lawyers, therapists, women’s crisis and anti-rape workers were
reporting numerous calls and visits from abused women desperately in need of housing
and legal assistance,” thereby demonstrating the pervasiveness of the problem.201
In her 1971 essay, “Rape: The All-American Crime,” Susan Griffin challenged
the notion that rape was an act of sexual desire, instead referring to it as an act of
violence in which “a man attempted to gain complete control over a woman.”202 Estelle
Freedman described the significance of Griffin’s work: “She exploded each of the myths
about rape in American culture, addressed the legal obstacles to prosecuting sexual
violence, named white male privilege as the heart of the problem, and recognized the
particular vulnerability of women of color and the costs of the myth of the black
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rapist.”203 Journalist Susan Brownmiller advanced the ideas introduced by Griffin in
Against Our Will, a groundbreaking text that discussed the universality of rape.204
According to Brownmiller, rape had occurred throughout time in parts of the world under
a variety of circumstances, including the act of conquest when sexual assault is an
acceptable part of the spoils of war. Echoing Griffin’s assertion that rape was about
power, Brownmiller pronounced in the book’s introduction:
Man’s discovery that his genitalia could serve as a weapon to generate fear must
rank as one of the most important discoveries of prehistoric times, along with the
use of fire and the first crude stone axe. From prehistoric times to the present, I
believe, rape has played a critical function. It is nothing more or less than a
conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of
fear.205
It was this fear, Brownmiller noted, that sustained female subordination. Throughout the
nearly four hundred pages of the text, Brownmiller explored the power dynamics
represented by rape, proposed changes to the laws governing sexual assault, and
introduced her reader to the emerging feminist anti-rape movement.206
Emboldened by the works of Griffin and Brownmiller, feminists identified rape as
a problem that law enforcement and women’s groups needed to address. Advocates
established rape crisis hot lines and rape crisis centers to provide victims with
counselling, legal aid, help in dealing with the police and hospital personnel, and
assistance in the form of support groups. By the mid-1970s, more than four hundred
centers were operating in towns and cities across the United States.207 Concurrently,
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activists advocated for changes in the way that police officers and the court system
treated sexual assault victims, maintaining that this treatment was tantamount to being
victimized a second time. “Feminists called for training police, emergency room staff,
and court personnel to make them more sympathetic to women reporting rape. . . [and]
have insisted on the reform of legal procedures as well.”208 Since the 1970s, states have
changed their sexual assault statutes and court procedures in alignment with many of the
concerns raised by second-wave advocates. The testimony of a corroborating witness is
no longer required for a conviction, and in the majority of states, the law no longer
requires that a victim establish that she resisted to prove that an assault occurred. Gone,
too, in the majority of jurisdictions are questions about what the victim was wearing,
whether she knew her attacker, and testimony about the victim’s prior sexual experiences,
all vestiges of myths about rape.209
Susan Brinson, Professor of Mass Communication at Auburn University, posited
that in “societies in which justice and the right to physical integrity are championed, a
fundamental conflict occurs among cultural values” when confronting issues of rape.
Such conflict may be resolved through the development of rape myths by allowing
society to rationalize the prevalence of the crime by offering explanations [or excuses]
for its occurrence.210 In fact, myths associated with rape long influenced social and legal
attitudes about sexual assault. Overcoming these myths was necessary if anti-rape
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advocates hoped to educate the public and convince legislators to change sexual assault
laws.
Martha Burt, researcher at the Urban Institute in Washington, D.C., identified four
recurring rape myths: the victim asked for it, the victim wanted it, the victim lied about it,
and the victim was not really hurt.211 Each of these explanations turn the focus from the
rapist to the victim, suggesting victim culpability. The first myth suggested that the
victim provoked the sexual attention because of her behavior, the clothing she was
wearing, or her choice to be in the “wrong” place. This, of course, presupposes that there
is a “right” way for a woman to dress or behave, that there is a “right” place for them to
be, and that a woman who transgresses from this model has asked to be sexually violated.
Closely related is the “victim wanted it” myth, which proposed that the victim
enjoyed rough/forced sex. Once again, her clothing, behavior, and location served as
evidence of her desire. Evidence of promiscuity on the victim’s part further supported the
contention that “she wanted it,” and negated the possibility that a rape actually
occurred.212 The supposition that women want forced sex opens the door to two other,
equally pervasive myths: a woman cannot be raped against her will, and women never
really mean no. As Brinson explained:
The former suggest that any healthy woman can get away from her attacker if she
really wants to, thus insinuating that many rape victims wanted to be attacked.
The later asserts women may say no, but they really do want to be raped. . . .
[These myths] return us to patriarchal notions of women desiring male
domination, as well as the belief that rape is an act of sex rather than violence.213
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Each argument turns the focus back on the desires of the victim, making her responsible
for the attack and denying any injury.
A third myth noted by Burt, the “rape lie,” argued that a victim, who had
consented to sex, later changed her mind or regretted the action. To alleviate guilt the
victim claimed rape, implying that she did not want the sex in the first place. This myth,
like the others, shifts responsibility from the rapist to the victim. Additionally, it focuses
on the untruthful woman who vindictively blames an innocent man.214
During their efforts to revise public opinion about rape, feminists became more
outspoken about dispelling the myth that sexual violence occurs only between strangers,
while in fact, some husbands raped their wives. Yet the laws of every state in the country
spoke to the legal impossibility of spousal rape. Sociologist Diana Russell laid the
foundation for the activism that followed in her books The Politics of Rape and Rape in
Marriage.215 Russell conducted the largest and most thorough empirical study of marital
rape, interviewing a random sample of over nine hundred women in San Francisco,
California, in 1978. For the purpose of her study, Russell defined rape as “rape by force,
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rape by threat of force, and rape when the wife is in no position to consent because she is
unconscious, drugged, asleep, or in some other way helpless.”216 About fourteen percent
of all married respondents revealed that their husbands had raped them or attempted to
rape them. Russell proposed that the actual number might have been higher since many
wives she encountered did not view themselves as rape victims and believed they had a
duty to submit to their husband’s desires for sex, even when they were not interested.217
Armed with these statistics, Russell posited that spousal rape might be the most
prevalent form of rape. She further proposed that despite public opinion to the contrary,
rape in marriage might be more traumatic than stranger rape. She explained:
Wife rape can be as terrifying and life-threatening to the victim as stranger rape.
In addition, it often evokes a powerful sense of betrayal, deep disillusionment,
and total isolation. . . . Much more is at stake for a victim of wife rape than for a
woman who is raped by a stranger. When a woman has been raped by her
husband she cannot seek comfort and safety at home. She can decide to leave the
marriage or to live with what happened. Either choice can be devastating. Leaving
involves all the trauma and readjustment of divorce, economically, social, and
psychologically, including feeling responsible for the suffering of the children, if
there are any. But staying with someone who has raped you . . . usually means
being raped again, often repeatedly.218
Russell went on to say that the general public, feminists, and even workers in the
domestic violence movement, had failed to make rape in marriage a pressing concern,
instead largely ignoring the realities surrounding the crime. Her goal in writing Rape in
Marriage was, in part, to provide empirical data on wife rape to facilitate legal and social
change. Ultimately, Russell’s research on marital rape dispelled the societal myths that
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rape in marriage is rare, that marital rape is less traumatic than other kinds of rape, and
that by simply avoiding strangers and dark alleys women can avoid rape.219
Thereafter, women’s rights advocates began calling for social recognition of rape
in marriage and legal prohibitions against that act. Such action would require society to
overcome not only the traditional justifications for spousal immunity, but also the modern
justifications for the retention of the marital rape exemption. By the middle of the
twentieth century, support for the marital rape exemption was based on several rationales:
marital privacy, marital reconciliation, fear of false allegations, the difficulty of proving
rape, and the belief that rape within marriage was less severe than rape outside of
marriage.220
Proponents of the concept of marital privacy advocated that the right was so
fundamental that the outside world – i.e. the government – should be prevented from
defining or interfering with the activities therein.221 Since the mid-1960s, courts have
countered the argument of marital privacy as it relates to spousal rape by suggesting that
the protection of privacy within marriage only applied to consensual acts, not to violent
unilateral ones. Thus, states must balance the right to privacy with their obligation to
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protect the right of an individual’s bodily integrity. Other courts have argued that to
sustain the justification of marital privacy, the court would be endorsing a husband’s
legal control over his wife’s body.222
The rationale of marital reconciliation was really an extension of the marital
privacy argument, in which a figurative closed curtain keeps out the public. By keeping
the public out, the couple within the home would resolve their differences independent of
external forces. Some theorized that this resolution process would foster greater mutual
respect between the parties, leading to a greater likelihood of reconciliation. In contrast, if
a woman brought the law into the marriage by bringing criminal charges against her
husband, such action would exacerbate the marital discord, making reconciliation
unlikely. Opponents of this rationale, including most jurists, refuted the argument
suggesting that if the marriage had deteriorated to the level of rape there was little in the
marriage left to reconcile.223
The third arena of justification for spousal immunity is the “fear-based argument.”
There was the fear that fabricated claims by vindictive women would result in the
conviction of innocent men. Closely related to this was the floodgate argument, which
proposed that permitting women to come forward and seek the prosecution of their
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husbands for rape would open the floodgates for spousal rape prosecutions, thus
overloading the court system. Opponents of this reason claimed that fabricated rape
allegations would be unlikely, not only because they are traditionally difficult to prove,
but also as Susan Brownmiller rightfully noted, because prosecution for those crimes is
often more shameful for the female victim than the male defendant.224
The final modern justification argued that marital rape was less serious than other
rapes. One rationale behind this position is that a married person maintains a reduced
expectation of personal autonomy than a single person, and therefore, the violation to a
marital rape victim is less harmful than that to non-marital rape victims. Opponents of
this argument claimed just the opposite, arguing that marital rape carried with it a
stronger sense of betrayal, disillusionment, and even self-blame.225
The efforts of second-wave feminists brought about legislative changes to protect
women. However, these changes were not always immediate, nor were they absolute.
Activists argued for women’s rights to bodily autonomy, which they believed should
include the power to refuse sexual intimacy with one’s husband. Gradually, courts began
to support the unilateral right of women to decide to use birth control, to procure an
abortion, to undergo a hysterectomy, and to select sterilization procedures.226 Using this
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success as a foundation, women’s rights advocates pushed for further court-recognized
liberties, such as freedom from forced intercourse with their husbands.
Changes to the marital rape exemption have been as varied as the states in the
nation. State statutes, not federal law, generally regulate domestic relations and most
crimes against the body. Therefore, each state has the authority to pass, alter, or abolish
regulations in these areas independently of the other forty-nine. The laws relating to
spousal immunity from rape charges are no exception. There are a few general trends
visible when evaluating the history of state governance of rape in marriage. The absolute
exemption, evident in all fifty states before the mid-1970s, was addressed in a variety of
ways. Court-made law and legislative changes are the basic way that any legal change
occurs; however, in the latter category, those changes completely eliminated the
exemption, denied the exemption if certain statutory conditions existed, expanded the
exemption to include cohabitating boyfriends, or expanded the realm of immunity to
apply to voluntary social (sexual) companions.
State courts used their power of judicial review to find marital exemptions
unconstitutional. Generally in doing so, they explained their decisions using Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection analysis, although in a few cases jurists based their opinions

which the Supreme Court articulated that the privacy right introduced in Griswold was broad enough to
cover a woman’s right to decide on having an abortion; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), in which the trimester framework set forth in Roe was replaced with the
viability standard; Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), where challenges
were brought against Missouri’s abortion law, specifically as it addressed fetal viability, and consent – the
woman’s informed consent, consent of a woman’s husband unless her life was in jeopardy, and consent of a
parent or one serving in loco parentis for a female under the age of eighteen; and Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914 (2000), in which the Court held a Nebraska law prohibiting “partial birth abortions” unless the
mother’s life was in danger violated the liberty protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Cases in which courts have addressed a woman’s unilateral decision separate from her
husband to undergo a hysterectomy or other sterilization procedures include Murray v. Vandevander, 522
P.2d 302 (Okla. Ct. App, 1974) and Ponter v. Ponter, 135 N.J. Super. 50, 342 A.2d 574 (1975), both of
which referred to the abortion cases decided on privacy and personal autonomy grounds.

82
on First Amendment grounds relating to freedom of association and privacy. In one case,
the New York Court of Appeals held that there was no “rational basis to distinguish
between marital and non-marital rape, noting the ‘various rationales which have been
asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the
consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even
the slightest scrutiny.’”227 The Supreme Court of New Jersey made direct reference to
changes in legal and social conditions since Matthew Hale first issued his opinion on
spousal immunity. The court noted, “The rule, formulated under vastly different
conditions, need not prevail when those conditions have changed.”228 Noting several
changes since Hale’s pronouncement, the New Jersey court held that the state’s rape laws
aimed at protecting the safety of the women involved, not the property rights of fathers
and husbands. Furthermore, with the demise of the legal fiction of marital unity and the
advent of married women’s property laws, the court concluded in 1981 that the marital
rape exemption had no place in contemporary New Jersey law.229
The year 1985 falls nearly at the halfway point between the first state addressing
the marital rape exemption and the year in which the final state did so. As such, exploring
the status of changes to the exemption at that time is particularly illuminative. In January
1985, twenty-seven states exempted husbands from prosecution for the rape of a wife if
the couple were living together; at the same time, twenty states that could, by virtue of
legislation, prosecute a cohabitating husband for raping his wife.230 In other states,
however, legislators placed obstacles in the way of the absolute elimination of the
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exemption. Other states required the occurrence of certain circumstances before
immunity was broken. The most absolute or severe conditions occasionally required the
exemption to remain in place until a divorce decree legally ended the marriage. In such a
situation, even if the couple had separated for a significant period and the wife had made
it perfectly clear by her actions that she no longer wished to be married, the man was
immune from prosecution for rape until the day the divorce was final. This situation
appeared to present the injustice of unequal protection for women who would have no
real protection until the slow-moving divorce process was final.231
Some states enacted partial exemption statutes that put limitations on the spousal
exemption, which went into effect once the marriage had reached a point of no return.
Thus, a wife could terminate her consent prior to divorce if she indicated to officials that
she no longer wanted to be married. These provisions varied, covering situations where
the couple was living apart (the most protective for the woman), where the couple was
living apart and the woman had filed a petition for separation, annulment, or divorce
(intermediate protection), or where the couple was legally separated under a court order
(providing the least protection for the woman).232 These conditions all presupposed that
the woman had access to the means of leaving and a safe place to go if she did leave.
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Finally, there were the jurisdictions that considered rape by a spouse to be a lesser
degree of sexual assault, crimes that carried less social stigma and less prison time if
convicted. This was the approach taken by California and South Carolina, as will be seen
in later chapters.233
While the general trend in the 1980s and 1990s was to limit or eliminate the
exemption, in eleven jurisdictions, legislators expanded the protection granted to married
men to cover cohabitating boyfriends.234 If a man in one of those states raped his
girlfriend, he could raise the affirmative defense that they were living together, thereby
avoiding prosecution. Legislators may have believed that they were bringing the law up
to date with modern trends. Unfortunately, the reality was that this style of legislation
increased the number of men who could rape women with impunity and increased the
number of women who might find themselves unprotected by the law.235 Interrogating
these gender-based legislative distinctions presents an even more troubling reality when
one considers that legislators have been reluctant to extend marital protections to women
in cohabitating situations. As Joanne Schulman has reported:
While men in these unmarried cohabitating relationships are increasingly granted
the “marital privilege” of rape, women in these relationships have fared far worse
in their attempts to obtain privileges of marriage such as spousal support
(“palimony”), division of the couple’s property or civil orders of protection. In the
few states where unmarried women are accorded these rights, courts have first
required an express or implied agreement between the parties. No such
requirement is made with respect to the expansion of the marital rape
exemption.236
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Viewed in this light, it is difficult to evaluate the legislative motives behind such actions
as anything other than gender-biased.
A second type of expansion of the marital rape exemption emerged in the form of
protection for voluntary social companions. In the limited cases where such laws existed,
men benefitted from partial immunity if they had previously had consensual sexual
contact with women they later raped. In such a case, the perpetrator would be immune
from the charge of first-degree rape. In effect, this dangerous expansion legally
sanctioned date rape.237 A final way in which the marital rape exemption remained was
through statutes that provided protection to husbands who engage in sex with their wives
when those women are drugged, incapacitated, unconscious, or mentally handicapped,
clearly all situations in which an individual cannot grant consent.
The women’s activism discussed in this chapter spans more than 150 years, but
the longevity of that activism eventually led to the criminalization of spousal rape in all
fifty states. The efforts of first and second-wave feminists, who conquered issues like
property and citizenship rights for married women, female suffrage, divorce, reproductive
rights, and sexual autonomy, prepared American society to refute traditional ideas of
marital unity and the impossibility of rape in marriage. As subsequent chapters will
demonstrate, even at the height of the women’s movement, the elimination of male
privilege and sexual entitlement within marriage was not a foregone conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2
‘INVADING THE DOMESTIC FORUM AND GOING BEHIND THE CURTAIN’:
NEBRASKA’S ELIMINATION OF THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COORDINATED VICTIM’S SERVICES238
Diana Willis and her estranged husband Charles separated in January 1985. On
the evening of March 1 of that year, Charles stopped by Diana’s home in Custer County,
noticeably intoxicated. When Diana asked him to leave, he departed but not for long.
Frightened by his appearance, she called a friend. She soon heard Charles return; he
began ringing the bell and pounding on the door. After instructing the friend to call the
police, she hung up and went toward the door. Before she made it that far, Charles
forcibly entered the apartment and started to undress. Fearing for her safety, Diana
backed away, stating “You’re not gunna [sic] do this to me, I won’t let you do this.”239
Despite her protest, Charles followed her and tore off her pajamas. He threw her on the
“couch and subjected her to sexual penetration.”240 As Diana struggled and cried out,
Charles “threatened to sodomize her if she didn’t shut up.”241 When he was finished, he
released her, all the while taunting her and making vulgar remarks. Diana fled the
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apartment. When she was unable to gain assistance from a neighbor, she drove herself to
the police department to report the crime.242
In the meantime, Officer Steve Scott arrived at the scene, responding to the report
by Diana’s friend. Observing no disturbance from the residence, Scott returned to the
police department, where he found Diana “very hysterical” and “upset.” She explained
that Charles was at her home and asked the police to retrieve her children, who had been
at the residence during the attack.243 After Diana made a formal statement to the police,
they transported her to the hospital for a medical examination. The exam showed
evidence of sexual penetration and revealed bruises on Diana’s breasts. Later that day,
Charles admitted to a friend that he had been drinking before going to his wife’s house
and “molesting” her. Police later arrested and charged Charles with first-degree sexual
assault.244 In response to the charge, Charles filed a plea in abatement. Notably, this type
of pleading by a defendant does not dispute that the charged offense occurred, but rather
that there was something objectionable about the form of the charge. At the end of the
hearing, the trial court “ruled that at common law a husband could not be found guilty of
raping his wife and that the common law applied in Nebraska.”245 Therefore, since
Charles was still legally married to Diana at the time of the sexual assault, the court
quashed the evidence collected by the police and suspended the prosecution.
Incidents like the one involving Diana and Charles Willis have been too often a
reality for much of United States history. Beginning in the early 1970s, however, activists
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started calling into question American statutes and legal practices that embodied the
common law definition of rape, noting that the Common Law defined the crime too
narrowly. The classical image under both British and American law prior to feminist
challenges in the seventies was that rape was “a violent attack perpetrated on an
unsuspecting victim who was not acquainted with her attacker. The [rapist was] . . . an
evil criminal leaping out of the bushes with a knife in hand, grabbing a terrified woman
by the throat, and forcing her into submission in a dark corner.”246 Over the next two
decades, advocates demonstrated the falsity of this image, proving that stranger rape was
far less common than intimate partner and acquaintance rape. At the same time, state
legislators and jurists addressed the marital rape exemption in myriad ways. As noted in
Chapter One, since state statutes, not federal law, regulate domestic relations and most
crimes against the body, each state has the authority to pass, alter, or abolish regulations
in these areas independently of the other forty-nine. Such is the case with laws relating to
spousal immunity from rape charges.
Nebraska’s elimination of the marital rape exemption and its subsequent
development of a coordinated response to domestic violence and sexual assault serve as a
noteworthy case study. Nebraska was among the first states to eliminate the marital rape
exemption, a decision made by a nearly unanimous state legislature. When asked to
determine the validity of the state’s sexual assault statute, the Nebraska Supreme Court
firmly upheld the law regardless of the relationship between victim and perpetrator.
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Additionally, Nebraska demonstrated a progressive response to societal problems and
victim needs related to domestic violence and sexual assault, years before the federal
Violence Against Women Act, which was passed in 1994. Beginning in the early 1970s,
victim advocates worked tirelessly to promote their agenda before an activist Unicameral,
who willingly passed legislation that protected victims of sexual and physical violence.
Nebraska is the only state in the Union to have a unicameral form of state
legislature. In 1934, citizens passed an initiative to amend the state constitution, thereby
replacing the bicameral with a single-house legislature. The first session of the
unicameral legislature occurred in 1937. The Unicameral also has the distinction of being
the only nonpartisan legislature in the country. Election ballots do not list candidate party
affiliation. The two candidates who obtain the most votes in the primary election advance
to the general election. The 49 members of the Unicameral are known as Senators.247 It is
perhaps for this reason – a single-house, bipartisan legislature – that Nebraska Senators
were able to address the marital rape exemption with little controversy or opposition.
Nebraska first addressed the marital rape exemption in 1975. Prior to 1975, sexual
assault laws in Nebraska were governed by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-408, a rape law that
dated back to 1887. The elements of the law included carnal knowledge of a female
performed against the will of the victim. In addition, it included elements for statutory
rape where the male was over eighteen and his consenting female partner was under
eighteen, unless she was over fifteen and previously unchaste.248 For the purpose of this
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statute, a chaste female meant one who had never had unlawful sexual intercourse with a
male prior to the intercourse for which a defendant was charged.249 Nevertheless, while
chastity is often considered to be synonymous with virginity, Nebraska courts have held
that an act of sexual intercourse without a woman’s consent and against her will, if she is
capable of consent, does not destroy [a woman’s] chastity.250 The punishment for a crime
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-408 had been between three and twenty years; however, a
1969 amendment increased the range of penalty to three to fifty years.251
In 1975, Senator Wallace “Wally” Barnett, seeking to repeal both of the above
statutes and replace them with new legislation that used the term “sexual assault,”
introduced Legislative Bill (L.B.) 23 to the Unicameral. The legislative intent of this new
statute was:
to enact laws dealing with sexual assault and related criminal sexual offenses
which will protect the dignity of the victim at all stages of the judicial process,
which will insure that the alleged offender in a criminal sexual offense case have
[sic] preserved the constitutionally guaranteed due process of law procedures, and
which will establish a system of investigation, prosecution, punishment, and
rehabilitation for the welfare and benefit of the citizens of [the] state.252
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A further purpose of L.B. 23 was to “broaden the terms relating to criminal sexual acts
and to make testimony less personal to the victim,” encouraging more victims to report
the crime to authorities.253 During floor debates for L.B. 23 on April 8, 1975, Senator
Barnett acknowledged that Nebraska’s rape statute was out of date: “It was written in
1887 and it’s not been tampered with since that time so it might give you some idea of
how it’s out of time with the world.” The tireless efforts of women’s groups from across
the state, which included, but were not limited to, the Lincoln Coalition against Rape, the
Governor’s Commission on the Status of Women, and the Personal Crisis Service of
Lincoln, inspired Nebraska legislators to change the language used to describe the crime
of rape, using instead the term “criminal sexual assault.” The rationale for this change
was a broadening of the terms to include additional forms of offensive sexual contact and
to make testimony less personal for the victims of sexually based crimes.254
The 1975 bill created the offenses of first- and second-degree sexual assault. L.B.
23 defined sexual assault in the first degree as an occurrence where:
Any person subjects another person to sexual penetration and (a) overcomes the
victim by force, threat of force, express or implied, coercion, or deception, (b)
knew or should have known that the victim was mentally or physically incapable
of resisting or appraising the nature of his or her conduct, or (c) the actor is more
than eighteen years of age and the victim is less than sixteen years of age.
The penalty for a conviction was one to twenty-five years.255 L.B. 23 defined sexual
assault in the second degree as an occurrence where:
Any person subjects another person to sexual contact and (a) overcomes the
victim by force, threat of force, express or implied, coercion, or deception, or (b)
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knew or should have known that the victim was physically or mentally incapable
of resisting or appraising the nature of his or her conduct.
The penalty for a conviction was one to fifteen years.256
In passing such laws, Nebraska followed a path that many states took beginning in
the mid-1970s. Barnett acknowledged that society often refers to victims of sexual assault
as “she” because women are more often the victims of sex crimes than men.257
Nevertheless, L.B. 23 made the crime of sexual assault gender-neutral. It did away with
the female as victim, male as offender distinction, instead using the term actor to refer to
“a person accused of sexual assault,” and victim to identify “the person alleging to have
been sexually assaulted.”258 Additional word selection in the bill was very deliberate,
using language that was more inclusive, was more sensitive to victims, and revised
criminal statutes to reflect better the changing sexual culture of the era. The era
highlighted the influence of a complex interplay between the new sexual culture of the
1970s, the women’s liberation movement, and the influence of the gay rights movement,
while still supporting “the dominance of heterosexuality over other sexual orientations
and the subordination of women as objects of male desire.”259
The changes brought by the passage of L.B. 23 reflected the efforts of women
activists who hoped to make “positive contribution to the prevention of the crime [rape],
the support of the victim, society’s awareness of the crime, and the affected treatment of
the crime within a criminal justice system.”260 On January 22, 1975, five of these women
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testified before the Judiciary Committee, providing support for L.B. 23, using arguments
espoused by activists throughout the United States.
Karen Flowers, representing the Lincoln Coalition Against Rape, indicated that
the Coalition’s Police Law Group was responsible for laying the groundwork for what
became L.B. 23. Flowers noted that rape was the most under-reported violent crime in
America, in part because of “the victim’s unwillingness to go through the ordeal that is
presently a part of a rape prosecution.”261 She argued that the “ordeal” was a byproduct of
myths about rape that reflected suspicion and mistrust of victims: “That the rape is
primarily a crime of sex; that rape is a crime of impulse; that the rapist and the victim are
strangers; that no healthy woman capable of resisting can be raped; that the woman asked
for it; that women have a propensity to contrive false rape complaints; and that it can’t
happen to me.”262 Flowers then highlighted the elements of the proposed bill, focusing on
the gender-neutral language, the elimination of the marital rape exemption, and revised
evidentiary rules that protected victim privacy.263
While Flowers had briefly mentioned rape victims under-reporting, Kathy Smith
provided more context for that phenomenon. Smith was the coordinator of the Lincoln
Rape Line, a telephone crisis hotline. In discussing under-reporting, she used as an
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example the women who utilized the crisis hotline in the previous four months. 264 She
explained: “Of the fourteen rape victims who have contacted us since October 1, 1974,
only four of these women have chosen to report the crime to the Police Department.”265
Smith cited common reasons that the other ten had decided not to report the crimes: fear
of not being believed, fear of being blamed, a lack of physical evidence, and the fear of
relating past sexual history at a resulting trial. Victims in other cities commonly echoed
these reasons for not reporting their victimization to the police.
Dr. Frances Campbell, a psychiatrist employed by the Eastern Nebraska Human
Services Agency in Omaha, testified as the Chairperson of the Rape Committee of the
Omaha Mayor’s Commission on the Status of Women. According to Campbell, the Rape
Committee “was established in 1973 with a goal of influencing how a rape victim is
treated by sensitizing hospital personnel, police and attorneys to the needs and feelings of
a rape victim.”266 The Rape Committee also provided public education programming,
conducted research on the law regarding rape, and established a rape crisis line in Omaha,
the largest city in Nebraska. Campbell opposed a defense attorney’s use of a victim’s past
sexual history to establish consent, arguing: “what she did prior or since . . . has no
bearing on the charge of rape.”267 Campbell, therefore, supported the section of L.B. 23
that protected a victim from unnecessary intrusion into her private life.268 She also
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questioned the paradox of victim resistance: “If she fights and resists in order to show
bruises, she runs a great risk of being physically abused and seriously injured. If she does
not resist, and thus shows no injuries, it is often assumed that she consented and thus rape
did not occur.”269
A further issue covered at the hearing was the fear that passage of L.B. 23 “would
[make] it easy for woman to make a false report and to convict an innocent man of
rape.”270 Sherry Fairer, representing the Lincoln Police Department, responded to those
concerns. From her experience as a police officer who had investigated rape cases, Fairer
concluded that the procedural steps in an investigation of a rape complaint discourage
women from making false reports. The victim must undergo a physical exam and be
thoroughly questioned by the physician and then by the police. This process is lengthy
and involves intimate and often embarrassing questions. The victim may also need to
give a written statement, in which she recounts the details of her attack. Police officers
next attempt to verify all of the information provided by the victim. The police forward
their reports to the County Attorney’s Office, where attorneys may subject the victim to
yet another interview. Finally, the victim might need to testify at trial. At any point
during this process, the case may stall for lack of evidence, inconsistencies in the victim’s
statement, if facts are disproven, or if the victim refuses to testify. According to Fairer,
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the emotionally arduous nature of these procedures make it unlikely that women will file
false reports of rape.
Jean O’Hara, Executive Director of the Governor’s Commission on the Status of
Women, promoted a change in the range of sentencing for defendants convicted of sexual
assault. Rather than have a defendant face one to fifty years for a conviction, O’Hara
proposed one to twenty years. Her arguments foreshadowed the concerns raised by the
jury and public in the Rideout case that made national headlines as the first trial of a man
accused of raping his wife while they were still living together. Juries would be more
willing to convict a (marital) rape defendant if they believed the sentence was an
appropriate punishment for the crime. Here, O’Hara suggested that juries might find
anything over twenty years to be excessive punishment for the crime of rape.271
The arguments that Flowers, Campbell, Smith, Fairar, and O’Hara made were by
no means unique. Feminist activists across the country raised similar debates. What was
unique in Nebraska was that the legislature accepted the evidence and passed the 1975
sexual assault statute without a spousal rape exemption. Nearly twenty years would pass
before all of the other forty-nine states followed suit.
When Custer County prosecutors charged Charles Willis with first-degree sexual
assault of his wife in 1985, Willis’ behavior was not the only thing facing legal scrutiny.
Also called into question was whether the sexual assault law allowed a marital rape
exemption to remain in Nebraska. The case against Willis did not end with the district
court suspending the prosecution against him. In fact, George Rhodes, the County
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Attorney, appealed the case to the Supreme Court of Nebraska.272 In his application for
appeal and subsequent appellant brief, Rhodes based his argument on two main issues:
legislative intent and equal protection.
Rhodes first argued that “the intention of the Legislature in enacting [Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 28-319] was to protect all persons, including spouses, from being subject to sexual
penetration after having been overcome by force” and that the District Court had erred in
finding that spouses are not protected by that statute.273
In his brief, Rhodes spent nearly fourteen pages describing the intent of the
Legislature when it passed L.B. 23 in 1975. This argument sheds the most light on the
intent of the spousal rape exemption. When L.B. 23 reached the floor of the legislature,
its sixth section contained a provision that would exempt a spouse from the sexual assault
statute unless the couple was living apart or had filed for separation or divorce. Senator
John J. Cavanaugh moved for the adoption of an amendment that would remove the
provision for spousal immunity. As Cavanaugh explained it, “among and between
married partners sexual conduct is a matter of mutual consent and if either of the parties
fails to consent,” the other should not have the right to “infringe upon the freedom and
integrity of the other person. I don’t think that marriage should allow an immunity from
that natural protection.”274 Senator Ernest “Ernie” Chambers supported the motion,
explaining: “there is such a thing as integrity of your body. I don’t feel that you give that
up by entering a marriage contract.”275 Senator Chambers elaborated:
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If a man would take a woman who did not consent to his advances even if she is
called his wife, and beat her brutally into submission, then somebody would say
you can charge him with assault and battery. But there is something far more
fundamental involved in action of this kind. A person’s sexual [integrity] has a
particular standing and a sociological significance in this society. To degrade
somebody or to destroy them sexually . . . to keep somebody in that type of
bondage against their will and brutalize them, I think is immoral and it ought to be
made illegal by this state.276
Chambers’ sentiment echoes the belief that sexual assault is not only a heinous act, but
one that is distinct from the textbook definitions of assault and battery. As such, to charge
a rapist with assault and battery fails to acknowledge the crime committed or its longterm impact on the victim.
Only one member of the legislature supported the retention of the spousal
exemption, Senator Glenn A. Goodrich. The foundation of Senator Goodrich’s argument
was that if the couple was still living in the same house without a notice of separation or
divorce proceedings, the immunity should prevail. Goodrich asserted that as long as the
couple remained married, what happened in the privacy of their home, behind the marital
curtain, should be between them. He unabashedly argued that the state “shouldn’t be
sticking our nose into it unless he gets in a criminal way, violent, for example, which we
have statutes to cover.”277 The statutes Goodrich was advocating were those for assault
and battery. When questioned by Senator Cavanaugh if a husband has the right to
sexually assault his wife without legal sanction, Senator Goodrich did not seem to
recognize sexual assault as a violent act: “I’m not sure that a man can criminally assault,
unless he uses violence or something like that.”278 Senator Goodrich went on: “The fact,
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for example, that you sexually attack her, is between you and your wife until such time
she is separated from you, divorced from you or under separate maintenance
arrangements.”279 Such statements reflected a commonly held belief that domestic
violence (including sexual assault) was a private family matter exempt from interference
by the outside world – including law enforcement officers who had sworn to serve and
protect individual citizens.
Both Senators Warren R. Swigart and Chambers verbally attacked Goodrich’s
position, offering a number of reasons why an abused woman might stay in a marriage.
Senator Swigart, who had volunteered for personal crisis services for several years, spoke
of instances of inhumanity relating to marital discord. He recalled stories where a
husband used his superior strength “to make a slave of his wife,” beating her, knocking
out her teeth, leaving bruises and welts, all the while leaving his wife penniless and
without resources to leave.280 Senator Chambers’ reaction was even stronger:
There are a number of reasons if you know the fact of life Senator Goodrich why
a woman may stay with a man even though she can’t stand him. There could be
children involved. Because she has lived with him a certain period of time, she
may not have gone to school while he went to school and she has no saleable
skills or the ability to make a living for herself or her children on her own. Her
health could have been destroyed. There are a thousand and one reasons why a
woman may remain in a home and not file for divorce, seperate [sic] maintenance
or be seperated [sic] from this beast that you say has the right to [do] anything he
want[s] to a woman and the law ought to endorse it.281
When the call for a vote on the bill came, “the legislature specifically voted 33-1 to
remove a spousal exemption so that the protection afforded by the state would be
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extended to wives.”282 Powerful though the legislative intent claim was in Willis, Rhodes
raised as a second argument a constitutional challenge to the District Court’s actions.
Rhodes contended that by sustaining the defendant’s plea in abatement on the grounds
that the defendant and victim were husband and wife, the District Court
“unconstitutionally deprive[d] spouses of equal protection of the law” since under that
ruling “spouses would not receive the protection from forcible assaults . . . afforded to
non-spouses.”283 Rhodes later argued that the Court, by supporting marital exemption for
rape, was effectively relegating “wives to a station in life lower than that of slaves.”284 In
support of this argument, Rhodes relied upon court decisions from New York and
Georgia. In the New York case, People v. De Stefano, the Court declared a statutory
spousal rape exemption unconstitutional. After dismissing several rationales for
maintaining the exemption, Justice Kenneth K. Rohl quoted John Stuart Mill:
A female slave has (in Christian countries) an admitted right . . . to refuse her
master the last familiarity. Not so the wife . . . he can claim her and enforce the
lowest degradation of a human being, that of being made the instrument of an
animal function contrary to her inclination.285
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Justice Rohl then concluded: “No rule or statute granting a spouse immunity can in
today’s world withstand any of the tests associated with equal protection, to wit,
‘reasonable basis,’ ‘middle tier,’ or ‘strict scrutiny.’” 286 Therefore, the provision of the
New York law that granted a husband immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife
was violative of the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions. Similarly, in
Warren v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court dismissed the medieval wives-as-chattel
theory, reasoning women’s rights have changed significantly since the medieval period.
Those rights were protected by the due process and equal protection provisions in the
federal and individual state constitutions to uphold rights of all persons within their
territory.287
In rebuttal to Rhodes’ claims, Carlos E. Schaper and Gregory Anderson, lawyers
for Charles Willis, filed an appellee or respondent brief that presented two main
arguments. Their first proposition was that it was inappropriate for the State to reference
“the statements and opinions of legislators . . . where the language of a statute is
unambiguous.”288 Schaper and Anderson suggested that the sexual assault statutes were
not ambiguous and therefore the language of the statutes should be taken at face value.
Notably, the Supreme Court ignored this proposition in its opinion. The second argument
was that Nebraska had adopted the Common Law exemption, and since neither the rape
nor sexual assault statutes explicitly stated that the criminal code would apply to spousal
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rape, the common law exemption should apply.289 This argument referenced three prior
Nebraska cases, Hanks v. State, Jump v. State, and State v. Holloman.290 Unfortunately
for Willis, the Nebraska cases offered in defense of this position all related to the pre1975 rape statutes, not the current sexual assault law that Willis faced. Furthermore,
while those cases involved charges of rape, none of them involved a defendant charged
with the rape of his wife. The Supreme Court addressed this “oversight” early in its
decision:
In each of these cases it was never the contention of the defendant that the victim
of the rape was his wife. The defendants were, instead, complaining that the State
had offered insufficient evidence to prove an essential element of the type of rape
with which the defendant had been charged; that being rape upon a female other
than the defendant's daughter or sister. Thus, the [current defendant’s] addition of
the word “wife” into the statutory list of sister and daughter was gratuitous at best
and does not convince this court that we ever adopted the common-law spousal
exclusion to rape.291
The Court then spent the next four pages explaining why they would not read the
common law exemption into the Nebraska sexual assault statute.
One effect of the Court’s decision was to refute the historical justifications for
spousal immunity: irrevocable consent, marital unity, and women as chattel.292 The
judges of the Nebraska Court joined with other jurists in dismissing Hale’s contention of
irrevocable consent. The Court agreed with the Supreme Court of New Jersey that noted:
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Hale cited no authority for this proposition and we have found none in earlier
writers. Thus the marital exemption rule expressly adopted by many of our sister
states has its source in a bare, extra-judicial declaration made some 300 years ago.
Such a declaration cannot itself be considered a definitive and binding statement
of the common law, although legal commentators have often restated the rule
since the time of Hale without evaluating its merits.293
The State of Florida took a similar position, also referenced by the Nebraska Court. In
State v. Rider, the Florida Appellate Court noted: “That this single sentence, which stands
alone, naked of citation to any authority judicial or otherwise, could be considered
sufficient precedent to allow a husband to rape with impunity his wife baffles all sense of
logic.”294
The Nebraska Court further acknowledged that Hale delivered his theory at a time
when marriages were essentially permanent, ending only at the death of a spouse or an
act of Parliament. Since the vows of marriage were not retractable, perhaps Hale believed
that consent to intimacy was not either. Since that time, however, “attitudes towards the
permanency of marriage have changed and divorce has become far easier to obtain.”295
For this reason, the Court concluded that a rule created “under vastly different conditions,
need not prevail when those conditions have changed.”296
The Willis court also dismissed Blackstone’s unity in marriage argument and the
women-as-chattel theory in one fell swoop, stating: “both of these theories no longer
support the spousal exclusion.”297 Citing a United States Supreme Court case, the
Nebraska Supreme Court noted: “Nowhere in the common-law world – indeed in any
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modern society – is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of separate legal
identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being.”298 The
State of Nebraska itself had in effect done away with these legal disabilities for women in
1871 when it passed its version of the Married Woman’s Property Act, granting married
women the right to own and maintain separate property, contract, carry out business, and
earn wages on their own.299
The Court acknowledged another theory supporting spousal exclusion from rape
prosecution – the use of signifying language. For instance, California’s penal code to this
day defines rape as “sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the
perpetrator” [emphasis added].300 Similarly, “the use of the word ‘unlawful’ in rape
statutes [often] signifies the incorporation of the common law spousal exclusion.”301
While the word “unlawful” can be used in different ways, in the context of rape, it
generally connotes “not authorized by law.” However, since “sexual intercourse between
husband and wife is sanctioned by law,” standard judicial reasoning holds that the state
could not prosecute a spouse for behavior that would otherwise be rape.302 As the Court
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explained, however, since the Nebraska rape statute never included the term “unlawful,”
there was no basis for believing the spousal exclusion was the law in Nebraska.303
After concluding that the spousal exclusion had never been a part of Nebraska’s
earlier rape law, the Court said such a conclusion was immaterial since the legislature had
repealed the rape statute in 1975 when it passed the first-degree sexual assault law. At
that point, the language of the new statute became the focus of the Court’s rationale –
since it was, after all, the statute that Willis had been charged with violating. As a review,
the new law declared a person guilty of sexual assault in the first degree if he or she
subjected another to sexual penetration by force or threat of force.304 The Court
concluded that there was sufficient difference in wording between the old rape statute and
the new sexual assault law to abrogate any common-law inter-spousal exemption.305
The Court elaborated, providing evidence of several differences between the
statutes. First, the Court acknowledged the position first articulated by 1970s feminist
anti-rape activists – that rape was a crime of violence, not an act of sexual passion. “First
degree sexual assault,” the Court noted, “is not a ‘sexual [act] of an ardent husband
performed upon an initially apathetic wife, [it is an act] of violence that [is] accompanied
with physical and mental abuse and often leave[s] the victim with physical and
psychological damage that is almost always long lasting.”306 The Court’s statement was
significant in that it echoed the “most important element of feminists’ anti-rape ideology
of the 1970s: ‘The assertion that rape is violence provided feminists with a whole new
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framework in which to analyze rape, to remove blame from the victims, and to develop a
convincing argument to gain acceptance for their claims.’”307 Nebraska’s highest court
acknowledged that reality in Willis. The second major distinction the Court highlighted
was that the former rape statute required the sexual intercourse be the result of force.
Under the sexual assault statute, a perpetrator could overcome a victim in several ways
short of force, including express or implied threat of force, coercion, or deception. The
new law was more expansive by including additional sexual acts: any form of sexual
penetration would be sufficient for an arrest, not just the traditional element of penilevaginal intercourse.
The decision in Willis stands as the definitive note on a marital rape exemption in
Nebraska. The Willis court explained that since the passage of the 1975 sexual assault
statute, there is no spousal immunity for rape in Nebraska. Since the Nebraska Supreme
Court published the 1986 opinion, there have been fifty-seven appellate decisions related
to Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-319, the sexual assault statute. As of September 2015, none of those
appeals challenged the standard established in Willis.308
In addition to being a notable example for its legal approach to marital rape,
Nebraska’s approach to the domestic violence and sexual assault (DV/SA) movements
stands out among other states in the nation. Since the 1970s, the domestic violence and
sexual assault movements have generally operated independent of one another. Nebraska
is among the minority of states that has dual programming, meaning that DV/SA
programs operate in tandem rather than independently. Like the sexual assault statute that
does not differentiate between spousal and non-spousal sexual assault, DV/SA advocacy
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programs in Nebraska do not treat victims of intimate partner violence differently than
those who suffer at the hands of strangers. Therefore, it is appropriate to review
Nebraska’s DV/SA programs through a broad lens, rather than one that pinpoints spousal
rape victims.
Early efforts to address DV/SA in Nebraska illuminated the divide between the
criminal justice system and victim advocates. Their varied organizational histories and
differing roles when encountering sexual assault victims may help explain the conflict
between the two groups. Although more women are employed “in law enforcement
today, police departments are still generally male dominated, paramilitary
organizations.”309 In contrast, “most sexual assault coalitions and community-based rape
crisis centers were created as a result of the feminist movement, when women gathered
together to demand better treatment for rape victims.”310 According to the Office for
Victims of Crime, law enforcement have three primary responsibilities when responding
to sexual assault cases. Police officers: protect, interview, and support the victim;
investigate the crime with a view to apprehending the perpetrator; and collect and
preserve evidence that prosecutors may use if the case goes to trial.311 Police departments
and their officers did not always prioritize these duties equally, particularly since few
officers received training on how to interview and provide support to DV/SA victims.
The primary focus of victim advocacy has always been the physical and emotional
wellbeing of assault victims, as well as safeguarding victim’s legal rights. As such, an
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advocate would want to ensure that victims receive all of the services to which they are
entitled and that they have all the information they need to make sound decisions.
However, over the past four decades the Nebraska criminal justice system – law
enforcement, prosecutors, probation, and courts – and victim service providers have
worked to ease this tension and to apply collaborative methods to combat DV/SA.
Beginning as a grassroots movement in the 1970s, DV/SA advocacy in Nebraska
has employed a variety of tactics to bring about change, the most successful of which
employed collaborative efforts among advocates, law enforcement, court officials, and
medical personnel. Early efforts to confront sexual assault occurred on the campus of the
University of Nebraska.312 In 1974, VISTA workers on campus created a crisis line in
support of victims who needed help beyond what the police offered.313 Two years later,
operating under the name Lincoln Coalition against Rape, this group became part of
Lincoln’s Family Services Association, an umbrella organization that provided services
for those suffering from mental health and drug issues as well as rape crisis. While
advertised as a rape crisis program, those working the crisis line received many calls
from victims of domestic violence who did not self-identify as rape victims. As a result,
in 1978 the group added services that targeted domestic violence and renamed itself the
Rape and Spouse Abuse Crisis Center (RSACC).314 Both students and community
members participated in the early years of the crisis line and subsequent Coalition. Two
notable participants were Gina Washburn and Marcee Metzger, both of whom were
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actively involved in the women’s movement in the 1970s and 1980s. Washburn was an
early coordinator of the organization when it was the Lincoln Coalition Against Rape.
Metzger served as the Director of the University of Nebraska Women’s Resource Center
in the 1970s and is currently the Executive Director of Voices of Hope.
In 1989, the staff of RSACC decided to break away from the Family Services
Association, creating an independent non-profit corporation in order to focus more
exclusively on the issues of sexual assault, domestic violence, and incest. For the first six
months, RSACC operated out of the home of one of its volunteers, Elizabeth “Liz”
Kurtz.315 Thereafter, it took up office space in an old federal building. The office proved
to be inadequate and ill-suited to meet the needs of RSACC, however, and in 1992,
RSACC began operating out of its current location, a house turned office near the city’s
center. Following the passage of the Violence Against Women Act in 1994, RSACC
experienced greater acceptance within the community. This legitimacy, as well as its
larger facility, allowed the Center to expand its services. Able to operate around the
clock, RSACC offered daily walk-in services and a 24-hour crisis line, provided legal
advocacy to clients, and sponsored more support groups and educational programs.
Three pieces of legislation passed between 1969 and 1978 directly and indirectly
assisted the efforts of victim advocates. In 1969, the Nebraska Legislature created the
Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (Crime
Commission).316 The Crime Commission has the authority to “educate the community at
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large to the problems encountered by law enforcement authorities, promote respect for
law and encourage community involvement in the administration of criminal justice.”317
With the exception of a few statutorily required members, the rest of those serving on the
Crime Commission are gubernatorial appointees.318 The statute requires that at least one
on the members serving from the “public at large” be a woman. Since 1970, women have
filled between two and five seats on the Crime Commission. Accounting for fluctuating
membership levels, women represented between ten and twenty percent of those serving
on the Crime Commission between 1970 and 2013. While many held positions as
members of the public, others served because of their political role or connection to law
enforcement.319 According to current Director Darrell Fisher, until last year, there was no
seat reserved on the Crime Commission for a victim advocate. In 2014, a change to the
guidelines provided that one seat on the Crime Victim’s Reparation Committee should be
filled by a victim advocate.320
The legislature granted the Crime Commission, among other things, the power
and responsibility to plan and implement improvements in the administration of criminal
justice; to coordinate activities related to the administration of criminal justice; and to
accept and administer funds from the federal government, the state government, and other
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sources for carrying out its functions.321 The Crime Commission embraced its role as an
agency of state government, providing a forum for discussion and problem solving, and
as the state’s justice advocate, developing comprehensive plans to improve the criminal
justice system in Nebraska.322
In 1978, three years after the Nebraska legislature established the new guidelines
for its sexual assault statute, the Committee on the Judiciary introduced the Protection
from Domestic Abuse Act (L.B. 623).323 According to Senator Wally Barnett, who
introduced L.B. 623: “The purpose of this Act would be to channel welfare services to
the victims of domestic abuse. Such assistance would include emergency shelter and
intensive counseling services. This bill also [sought] to increase public and official
awareness of the problem in hopes that such maybe curtailed or at least controlled in the
future.”324
Recognizing that domestic violence was an ongoing problem in Nebraska, the
Committee held a series of public hearings across the state to gauge the extent of the
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problem and the attitudes of community members. A few common themes emerged from
the hearings. Both men and women were asking for assistance from the state to address
family conflict. Despite attempts to keep their families together, many women suffered
beatings at the hand of their husbands. Female victims were afraid to leave their abusive
homes because they feared physical reprisals that would be worse than what they had
already endured. Victims also feared for the safety of their children.325
On January 23, 1978, the Committee held an open hearing on L.B. 623 at the
Capitol Building in Lincoln. Individuals with a wide variety of experiences with domestic
violence victims gave testimony. Karen Waller, State Coordinator for the Domestic
Violence Project, testified in favor of L.B. 623. Waller was encouraged by the level of
attention the Judiciary Committee was giving to the problem of domestic violence. She
was proud that “Nebraska [was] one of the first states to attempt statewide coordination
of community involvement in the domestic violence issue.”326
Witnesses testified about the negative effects of domestic violence. Joseph Julian,
Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Nebraska, explained that despite
the misconception that domestic violence is a characteristic of impoverished families, it
occurs across all socioeconomic classes and geographic locations.327 Kappie Weber,
representing the League of Women Voters in Nebraska, supported Julian’s comment by
expressing the sobering reality that everyone on the room had some experience with
abuse, albeit some more remotely than others.328
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Witnesses provided testimony about the frequency at which domestic violence
occurred in communities of various sizes throughout the state. Robert Coupland, a lawyer
from the rural community of Valentine in north-central Nebraska, indicated that he had
twelve to sixteen abused women come into his office in the previous year. They suffered
from cracked ribs, lacerations near the eyes, knees twisted out of joints, and/or facial
bruises. The women found their way to his office only after they had received medical
treatment and their injuries had started to heal.329 Benny Kling, Police Chief of Syracuse,
Nebraska, indicated that his officers had responded to fifty-six domestic violence calls in
the past twelve months. While some of the calls were to the same residences, the number
seemed unusually high given that the population of Syracuse was about sixteen hundred
in 1978.330 Richard Dunning, City Prosecutor for Omaha, Nebraska, revealed that his
office regularly met with nearly one thousand domestic violence victims each year.
Dunning was quick to point out that the number did not include any cases involving
felonies, reasoning the total number of victims in Omaha was actually much higher. Of
the domestic violence victims Dunning saw, half filed a complaint, and only about fifteen
percent actually made it to trial. He also testified that he was aware of four or five women
in the previous three years who were murdered by their significant others after the
women had visited the City Prosecutor’s Office. Consequently, he said there was a real
need for L.B. 623.331
Others described marital rape as a form of domestic violence. Jan Kohl, Vice
President of the Lincoln Chapter of the National Organization for Women, indicated that
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historically marital rape was a condoned part of marriage. While legislation in many
states was criminalizing such behavior, Kohl asserted that it remained a form of domestic
violence.332 Senator Herbert Duis of Gothenburg publicly acknowledged that rape was an
intrinsic part of domestic violence during a March 2, 1978 session of the legislature. Such
public recognition by Kohl and Duis demonstrated Nebraska’s continued commitment to
hold spousal rapists accountable for their actions and provide assistance to their victims.
A concern raised by both law enforcement and prosecutors was a lack of training
related to domestic violence situations. Kling indicated that twenty-two percent of
injuries officers experienced occurred during domestic violence calls. When injury did
occur, it was generally at a home that police had visited multiple times. Kling argued that
law enforcement officers needed more training on responding to domestic violence calls.
On a related note, Kling supported the Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center, but
noted that it was understaffed, underfunded, and operating in too small of a facility.333
Dunning also raised concerns about lack of training for the employees in the Prosecutor’s
Office. He noted that the prosecutors in his office simply lacked the training to
successfully advise and assist battered women. They attempted to help the families work
out their problems, but the best they could do was file assault and battery charges against
the abusers. Even then, most of those cases did not go to trial because the victims were
too scared to show up to testify.334
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Multiple witnesses provided support for L.B. 623 because it would provide
necessary assistance to both victims and abusers. Marty Beach, representing the
American Association of University Women, strongly supported the preventive measures
in the bill. She explained that making people aware that violent behavior is not acceptable
is vitally important. She was pleased to see provisions in the bill for emergency housing
that would give victims a place of safety to go to when in crisis.335 Beach also referenced
the International Women’s Conference held in Houston, Texas in 1977. Of special note
was the Conference Resolution that concerned battered women. Participants at the
conference prioritized financial assistance to provide emergency shelter and support
services to battered women and their children. Pastor Richard Mintzlaff of Burwell,
Nebraska, supported L.B. 623 in its entirety, but focused his testimony on the value of
counseling for abusers. He promoted the inclusion of counseling as part of a probation
plan, positing that most abusive men will not voluntarily seek out assistance for their
behavior or underlying difficulties. On the other hand, many might benefit tremendously
from individual or group counseling.336 Debbie Reynolds, of the Lincoln Council on
Alcoholism and Drugs, proposed that both victims and abusers needed assistance and
counseling. Reynolds noted that she worked with women weekly who lived in abusive
situations where alcohol was involved. She believed the resolution of alcohol problems
would reduce domestic violence significantly. While most of the clients she saw were
female, Reynolds noted that more men were beginning to visit her office. The men
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acknowledged their alcoholism and abuse, and they shared stories of wives and
girlfriends who responded by becoming violent themselves.337
The Committee also heard from Eldin Ehrlich, the Director of the Department of
Public Welfare. Under the terms of L.B. 623, Welfare would administer the provisions of
the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act. Ehrlich acknowledged that some of the services
indicated in the bill were outside the current purview of Welfare. To implement the Act,
the Department would need an increase in staff, additional training for the current staff,
and the ability to outsource services to agencies and programs already equipped to assist
victims and their families.
Kurt Freibert, representing Dads of America, Inc., presented the only testimony in
opposition to L.B. 623. Referencing the Reverend Billy Graham, Freibert argued that
people needed to turn to God and churches rather than legislation and government
interference when they have “family difficulties.” A few moments later, the strength of
Freibert’s argument waned when he suggested that most clergy are not qualified with the
expertise necessary to help abused men and women. Freibert blamed no-fault divorce for
broken homes and, portrayed his gender-biased views when he claimed, “LB 623 gives
incentive to women to run away from home, break up marriages, promote divorces, [and]
destroy families.”338 The most controversial portion of Freibert’s testimony was his
assertion: “There are more abused and battered, mentally destroyed husbands, than
women.”339 Soon thereafter, the Committee ended Freibert’s testimony.
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Two months after the Committee hearing, then Governor J. James Exon signed
the bill into law. The bill was codified as Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-901 to 42-931. In passing
the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, the Nebraska Legislature publicly declared that
domestic violence, including sexual assault, was a statewide issue, and that the
government would join advocacy groups in confronting and working to end the cycle of
violence.
Another innovation was in the area of law enforcement training. Specifically,
lawmakers introduced legislation in 1969 that would require those interested in law
enforcement to receive standardized training prior to becoming fully certified officers.340
The legislature mandated that the newly established Nebraska Law Enforcement Training
Center (Training Center), under the supervision of the Police Standards Advisory Council
(Council):
(1) test all law enforcement candidates on behalf of the council to ensure that they
meet pre-certification and certification requirements, (2) oversee and monitor
other training schools and training academies to ensure that pre-certification and
certification requirements as set by the council are being met, and (3) conduct precertification programs, certification programs, and advanced law enforcement
training programs as directed by the council.341
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The Council and Training Center had primary responsibility for the curriculum that
candidates received. Nevertheless, when Nebraska senators passed the Protection from
Domestic Abuse Act, that legislation required all law enforcement employees attend a
training program on domestic violence. This program would “inform the officers of the
problems of domestic abuse, procedures to deal with such problems, the Protection from
Domestic Abuse Act, and the services and facilities available to abused family and
household members.”342
The Training Center took action to incorporate such material in their curriculum
for cadets. One of the challenges that instructors faced, even decades into the program,
was to convince cadets and veteran officers that domestic violence constituted criminal
behavior. Like many law enforcement personnel across the country, Nebraska officers
maintained the position that what happened among family members in the home was
private business.343 To combat this perspective, the Training Center modified lesson
plans to incorporate domestic violence education for cadets and veteran officers returning
for continuing education credits. Training Center personnel coordinated these efforts with
local victim advocates and the Nebraska Coalition to End Sexual and Domestic Violence
to present interactive lesson on the myths and realities of domestic violence and sexual
assault, best practices for questioning victims and investigating these crimes, and
enhanced safety measures that law enforcement should employ when encountering an
explosive situation.
Brenda Urbanek, Deputy Director of the Training Center, has spent more than
thirty years in Nebraska law enforcement. As a new police officer in the 1980s, Urbanek
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was among the minority of women who entered the profession.344 Because she was a
female officer, Urbanek was often the one to interview victims of domestic violence and
sexual assault. This paralleled the policy within the Lincoln Police Department beginning
in the mid-1970s, whereby female officers always performed the questioning of
victims.345 From Urbanek’s perspective, however, compassion for the victim is far more
important than the gender of the interviewer during domestic violence and sexual assault
cases. Urbanek was able to utilize this experience when she moved to a position as
instructor at the Training Center twenty-five years ago. Since that time, she has been
responsible for teaching the domestic violence/sexual assault segment of cadet training.
According to Urbanek, in recent years, program requirements have changed and
instructors have adapted the content of their lessons to reflect changes in the law, court
procedures, and social attitudes. To address these considerations, in-class and practical
training for cadets increased to include 605 hours of training and assessment. A small
fraction of those hours directly relate to issues involving domestic violence and sexual
assault, but earlier lessons on investigative practices, questioning witnesses, defusing
situations, and problem solving provide a foundation for those targeted discussions. In
addition to legal and procedural training related to domestic violence and sexual assault,
cadets learn about the impact these crimes have on children, the dynamics between
victims and attackers, and the gendered nature of these crimes. Cadets attend a lesson on
stalking and participate in mock trials that give them practical experience in providing
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testimony at trial. Working with victim advocates, cadets role-play different scenarios
that they may encounter at crime scenes and follow-up meetings with victims. This
interactive approach allows them to hone their interview skills while developing an
understanding of the different roles that members of the coordinated response team will
play with victims. Ultimately, this understanding can serve to soften the traditional
animosity that can exist between law enforcement, the criminal justice system, and victim
advocates.346
The role of the Crime Commission has also adapted in the last two decades. In
1995, then Governor Earl Benjamin “Ben” Nelson “designated the Crime Commission as
the state agency responsible for the administration of the federal STOP Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) Formula Block Grant Program.”347 Since that time, the Crime
Commission has been responsible for developing and administering Nebraska’s State
Implementation Plan that sets forth how the state will utilize VAWA funds that it
receives.348 The mission of the Implementation Plan is as follows:
The criminal justice system in Nebraska in collaboration with victim services and
other community agencies and individuals responding to all victims of domestic
violence, dating violence, sexual assault and stalking in a consistent, coordinated
and positive way that will make victims safer, hold offenders accountable and
work to STOP the violence.349
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Nebraska Implementation Plans going back to 2007 have identified seven primary areas
of need in the state’s efforts to improve the criminal justice system’s response to
DV/SA.350 With input from statewide community meetings, the Crime Commission
enumerated needs and solutions for problems that fell within those primary areas – those
gaps most in need of support from VAWA funding. It is possible to narrow those “gaps”
to three: a lack of consistent training, a lack of knowledge and understanding, and a lack
of services.
The Crime Commission identified a lack of consistent training for coordinated
response teams, “defined as a local group of representatives from law enforcement,
prosecution, probation, victim services and other agencies who work together in a
coordinated manner to improve the criminal justice system’s response to women who are
victims of domestic violence and sexual assault.”351 The Crime Commission also noted a
lack of knowledge about DV/SA and compassion for victims by government officials and
members of the public. The Implementation Plan noted a perception among the
legislature that DV/SA is not “violence against women,” but rather that “these [victims]
are just folks caught in incidents.” Another concern raised was that Child Protective
Services holds victims more accountable than offenders, a lingering example of victim
blaming. The Implementation Plan also identified a lack of public awareness regarding
the use of technology among school-age children leading to sexual assault and stalking;
male domestic violence victims; and elderly victims of domestic violence. Finally, the
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Crime Commission identified a lack of services, particularly for those victims from rural
areas and those within marginalized groups; for instance, members of the LGBT
community, the hearing impaired, victims with mental health issues, non-documented
immigrants, male victims, and victims living on tribal land.352
The Crime Commission recommended community-based and statewide
coordinated efforts to resolve these shortcomings. In addition to legislative changes that
would enhance penalties and consistent judicial response in dealing with offenders, the
Crime Commission recommended increased education programs, greater collaboration
between the criminal justice system and victim advocacy groups, and increased services
for victims and victim families.353 To achieve these goals, money from the STOP grant
would fund new and expand existing domestic violence and sexual assault programs.
Examples from three segments of society – legislative mandates regarding law
enforcement, efforts of victim advocacy groups, and prevention programs within
educational settings – serve as exemplars of collaborative endeavors to address and
eradicate domestic violence and sexual assault within Nebraska.
Like other DV/SA organizations across America, RSACC evolved to meet the
needs of victims in the community.354 In addition to rape and domestic violence services,
Voices of Hope provides assistance to others who have experienced relationship violence,
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harassment, and stalking. They engage in programs that address safety issues: acquisition
of restraining orders, changing locks, filing police reports, and anonymous reporting. The
connection to the University of Nebraska has come full circle as well. A campus
advocate, employed by Voices of Hope and contracted by the University of Nebraska,
operates out of the Women’s Center, providing campus-wide support: offering direct
assistance to victims; educating student groups, residence hall staff, and campus police
officers; and serving on the Campus Threat Assessment Group.355
In 2007, RSACC became Voices of Hope, believing that its name had become too
narrow to describe all of the services offered. The new name was a joint effort by board
members, staff, and clients. The board and staff selected the term “Voices” to identify
their multiple roles speaking on behalf of victims and advocating to the community
through educational programs. Clients added “Hope” as representative of the hope clients
derived from the center and its programs. The decision to change the name was not
unanimous. Critics of the new name argued that “Voices of Hope” did not clearly identify
what the services the organization provided; rather, they stressed that domestic violence
and sexual assault are still hidden crimes, and the new name cloaked the advocacy
provided. With the support of donors and outreach programs, the “hidden” purpose of
Voices of Hope never developed into a significant problem.356
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Voices of Hope is one of twenty community-based domestic violence/sexual
assault programs in Nebraska that receives support from the Nebraska Coalition to End
Sexual and Domestic Violence (Coalition).357 Like the organization that became Voices
of Hope, the origins of the Coalition trace back to the mid-1970s when it began as a
volunteer organization called the Nebraska Task Force on Domestic Violence. In 1987,
the Coalition hired its first director, symbolizing a move away from an all-volunteer staff.
It was during this period that the Task Force changed its name to the Nebraska Domestic
Violence and Sexual Assault Coalition, emphasizing a conscious restructuring to include
problems related to sexual assault. Reflecting a change in its mission statement, the
Coalition adopted its current name in 2014.358 The Coalition has several primary goals: to
create a world where there is no more sexual assault or domestic violence, which
involves changing the power structure that leads to domestic violence/sexual assault; to
provide victims/survivors access to safety and services; to improve coordination between
law enforcement, victim services, and hospital response teams; and to work with law
enforcement and the state Department of Health and Human Services to adopt policies
that will best serve victims and their families.359
Working to achieve these goals requires Coalition staff to collaborate with
community-based programs and other organizations throughout the state. The Coalition
provides statewide, regional, and local training for domestic violence/sexual assault
program staff and volunteers to ensure that consistent, quality services are available
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across the state. The Coalition also collaborates with agencies within the criminal justice
system such as the Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center, the Department of
Corrections, and the Department of Probation. As explained by Michelle Zinke, Training
and Resource Coordinator, the Coalition provides outreach assistance to other
organizations, particularly those targeting underserved or marginalized members of the
population. Currently, this includes the Nebraska Tribal Family Violence Coalition’s
housing/homelessness groups; Heartland Deaf Abuse Advocacy Services; three cultural
centers in Lincoln; Nebraska’s Court Appointed Special Advocate Association; and
Outlinc, an organization that supports the LGBTQ population in Lincoln.360 Additionally,
the Coalition supports prevention programs that target Nebraska's youth. The Step Up
and Speak Out campaign, for instance, seeks to reduce violence by “providing teens with
clear and accurate information on all forms of violence – including sexual harassment,
sexual assault, dating violence, and gender violence.”361 Collaboration with the Nebraska
Department of Health and Human Services allows Coalition staff to deliver intervention
and healthy relationship programming in Nebraska’s public schools.362 This level of
collaboration allows the deliverance of domestic violence/sexual assault programming in
communities across Nebraska that might otherwise not occur.
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While Nebraska’s dual-programming paradigm for domestic violence and sexual
assault advocacy represents a common structure for a minority of states, the level at
which its advocacy groups collaborate with community-based programs and other
organizations throughout the state exemplifies collaborative efforts across the nation in
the post-VAWA era. Nebraska’s elimination of the marital rape exemption also stands in
contrast to legislative action in other states. A nearly unanimous legislature rejected legal
immunity for spousal rapists with a single statutory amendment in 1975. In 1986, the
Nebraska Supreme Court definitively upheld the validity of that statute. Not all states
criminalized marital rape in such a straightforward manner. The following two chapters
will illustrate the alternate approaches utilized by California and South Carolina.
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CHAPTER 3
THE BURDEN OF MARRIED WOMEN IN THE GOLDEN STATE:
CALIFORNIA’S LONG STRUGGLE WITH SPOUSAL RAPE LAWS, 1979-2006
On September 30, 1979 Dianna Green, a twenty-year-old resident of Tustin,
California, was two weeks overdue with her first child. She and her Marine husband,
Kevin, were known to friends and neighbors as having a volatile relationship. The police
had responded to several previous requests to intervene at the Green residence. That
night, Dianna was attacked; she was strangled, struck in the head with a blunt object,
raped, and left for dead. At the hospital, doctors performed a Caesarean section only to
find the baby dead upon delivery. Because of the blow to her head, Dianna fell into a
coma.363
With little evidence discovered at the crime scene and no evidence of forced
entry, the police suspected Dianna’s husband. Green admitted during questioning that he
and his wife had a marriage fraught with difficulty, and that both had resorted to physical
confrontations. He conceded that earlier in the evening, Dianna had resisted his request
for sex, but he denied raping and beating her. His alibi, which a witness later confirmed,
was that he was across town purchasing burgers from a fast food restaurant. Green told
the detectives that he had seen a young black man near the apartment complex as he left
to get the take-out food, and that he saw this other man getting into a van and driving
away when he returned.364 While the police were confident that Green was guilty,
without solid evidence to support their theory, they could not move the case forward. The
Jennifer Donovan, “When A Husband Rapes His Wife,” San Francisco Chronicle, January 14, 1985;
Heather Buchanan, “The Unreliable Eyewitnesses,” Crime Magazine, September 16, 2013,
http://www.crimemagazine.com/unreliable-eyewitnesses, accessed February 28, 2015; The Innocence
Project: Kevin Green, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/kevin-green, accessed
February 28, 2015.
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case remained stalled until Dianna regained consciousness a month later. Doctors who
examined Dianna quickly observed residual effects from the head trauma. Dianna
suffered from amnesia and aphasia, a language impairment characterized by a loss of
ability to understand or express speech. Upon her release from the hospital, Dianna
moved in with her parents and began a lengthy period of speech rehabilitation.
Approximately three months later, she contacted the police to tell them that she
remembered that her husband was the one who attacked her.365
Green’s trial began in October 1980. Still declaring his innocence, Green was
convicted of second-degree murder for the death of the unborn child, the attempted
murder of his wife, and assault with a deadly weapon. He received a sentence of fifteen
years to life in prison.366 Noticeably absent from the charges Green faced was the specific
crime of rape or sexual assault. At least one account of the events reported that initially,
prosecutors wanted to charge Green with spousal rape, but this was not possible. In 1979
California, the rape statute excluded sexual crimes committed by a man against his wife.
Thus, the charge of assault with a deadly weapon covered the blow to the head,
strangulation, and the sexual assault.367 Green spent the next sixteen years in prison,
during which time he received a dishonorable discharge from the Marine Corps and faced
a civil suit brought by Dianna for the wrongful death of their unborn child.368
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While the introduction of new evidence exonerated Kevin Green, the value of this
case study as it played out between 1979 and 1996 helps to illustrate the state of the legal
system concerning marital rape in California at that time. Police, prosecutors, the victim,
and the public all believed that Green was guilty. The little evidence available and
Dianna’s testimony pointed to Green as the perpetrator. The attack occurred in 1979
when, due to a marital exemption in the law, spousal rape was not a crime in California.
Therefore, prosecutors could only charge Kevin Green for the sexual assault of his wife
under penal codes related to assault with a deadly weapon.
California has a complex history of policing and regulating those marginalized in
society. On the one hand, there is the perception of the West Coast state being more
liberal, forward thinking, accepting, and willing to provide equal protection to its
citizens.369 On the other hand, California – through law and public sentiment – has
historically discriminated against those seen as foreign, different, or simply outside the
dominant power structure. For instance, racism as a form of white, male hegemony was
present from the early years of California statehood. Conflict between white settlers and
Native Americans, Mexicans, and immigrants from China and Japan often related to
control of property, economic resources, and access of minority men to white women.370
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Male control of women also played a part in California history, as it did in other parts of
the country: men dominated the government, constructing laws related to citizenship,
employment, voting rights, and jury service that had the effect of making women secondclass citizens.
In the area of spousal rape laws, California has a complex history as well.
California’s legislative record with spousal rape stands in stark contrast to that of
Nebraska. Nebraska’s straightforward approach to eliminating distinctions between
spousal and non-spousal rape occurred with a single legislative revision in 1975 and a
single decision by the Nebraska Supreme Court in 1986.371 In contrast, California
legislators took twenty-seven years and eight amendments to reach virtually the same
result. While California passed a series of laws protecting women from domestic violence
and non-spousal rape during the height of the women’s movement, it consistently
hesitated to extend full protection to spousal rape victims. California was one of the
earliest states to pass a spousal rape law. However, there were exceptions built into the
statute that continued to distinguish spousal rape from non-spousal rape, resulting in
disparate consequences for those who violated the laws. Because of such exceptions, for
years California lagged behind other states in its protection of married women.
Nonetheless, California’s history of spousal rape legislation offers a valuable case study,
illustrating several of the thematic controversies surrounding rape in marriage that played
out across the nation in the last three decades of the twentieth century.
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Participants on both sides of the debate about spousal rape had to evaluate a series
of questions. Taken as pairs, an affirmative response to one meant that the answer to the
other necessarily had to be the negative. Did the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
clause require that marital rape victims receive the same legal protection as non-spousal
rape victims, or did the doctrine of marital privacy protect the marital bedroom from
intrusion by governmental influence? Did the criminalization of spousal rape provide
marital rape victims an appropriate remedy under the law or did marital rape laws
encourage false reporting by vindictive wives seeking better settlements in divorce and
child custody cases? Was the criminalization of rape in marriage necessary to protect the
bodily autonomy of married women or were current assault and battery statutes inclusive
enough to address sexual assault in marriage? The restricted options presented by such
questions represented the conflict between women’s advocates and anti-feminists whose
perspectives reflected the beliefs espoused by the Religious Right in California and the
rest of the nation.372 As women’s advocates promoted the criminalization of marital rape,
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anti-feminists presented both historical and modern justifications for maintaining the
marital rape exemption.
This chapter traces four major themes in the legislative history of those laws to
demonstrate that female victims of spousal rape, who because of their status as married
women, faced marginalization and a denial of equal protection. The first theme analyzes
California’s first spousal rape law passed in 1979, considering the competing interests
that surrounded the issue. Subsequent themes address a series of amendments regarding
different stages in the execution and prosecution of the crime of spousal rape: a showing
of a victim’s resistance or lack of consent; prosecutorial discretion to indict spousal rape
defendants on either misdemeanor or felony charges, an option not available in cases of
non-spousal rape who were always faced felony charges; and a reporting requirement that
effectively reduced the statute of limitations for spousal rape to thirty days, a mere
fraction of that for non-spousal victims.
In 1979, California Penal Code (P.C.) § 261 defined rape as “sexual intercourse
with a female not the wife of the perpetrator,” a fairly common definition utilized by
many states. That same year, Assemblyman S. Floyd Mori introduced Assembly Bill
(A.B.) 546, which would be codified as California Penal Code § 262, spousal rape.373 In
1979, Mori was serving his fourth of six years as a California State Assemblyman. The
child of Japanese immigrant parents, Mori was, and remains today, a strong supporter of
many civil rights organizations and has received awards for his extensive community
service.374
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Mori’s 1979 bill was not the state’s first attempt at spousal rape legislation. Two
years earlier, Mori had introduced spousal rape legislation that simply would have
deleted the phrase “not the wife of the perpetrator” from section 261, similar to the
philosophy Nebraska applied in its 1975 legislation. After Mori amended the bill to apply
only to spouses who had legally separated or had applied for dissolution, it passed to the
Assembly Criminal Justice Committee and was heard on the floor. The whole of the
Assembly, however, declared the bill too limited and referred it back to the Criminal
Justice Committee. Mori amended it back to its original form, only to have it die in
committee. Assemblyman Mori introduced a similar bill in 1978, but it also failed to
pass.
Assemblyman Mori summarized the need for the spousal rape law in his address
to the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee on April 23, 1979. Mori reasoned:
“marriage and the home should enhance the lives of the participants,” as a place of love
and security. However, he continued, the “incident of violence in the home is a major
problem.”375 He promoted A.B. 546 as a “positive statement that all spouses are
guaranteed protection against sexual pressure and abuse,” requiring spouses to respect
one another’s sexual autonomy. He went on to explain that A.B. 546 would assure the
public that the legislators of California would not tolerate abuse in marriage.376
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Mori made five substantive arguments in his address, each of which focuses on an
issue of morality and/or legality with the status of California’s laws. Mori’s first
argument reflected a time in early California history when racism prevailed, comparing
the disparate treatment of Chinese immigrants to that forced upon married women in
1979 California. He argued: “In early California history, Asian Americans had no civil
rights and were not recognized in courts of law. The attitude was, ‘If, you don’t like it, go
back to China.’ We now strip wives of their civil right to their own body and tell them, ‘If
you don’t like it, get a divorce.’”377 Through this comparison, Mori was arguing that the
previous behavior was, in time, deemed morally and legally wrong; as such, the
inequitable treatment of the spousal rape victim should also be recognized as morally and
legally unacceptable.
In his second argument, Mori put the spousal rape victim front and center,
challenging the male-centered nature of rape in Anglo-American history. Such a history
encompassed several realities: rape was often considered a crime against male interest in
a daughter or wife; to establish their innocence, male perpetrators often had a lower
burden than their female victims had to prove that a crime was actually committed; and to
date, married men had escaped prosecution for the sexual assault of their wives because
of the legal unity represented by that union. Mori challenged the members of the
Assembly to overcome this checkered past: “We are faced with a choice in which we can
either protect the rape victim or the rapist. It’s time we gave consideration to the victims
and potential victims and to the children who are often the witnesses of such abuse.”378
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Mori’s third argument suggested the marital rape exemption denied equal
protection under the law to married women.379 Mori explained: “There is no compelling
reason for a woman to give up her civil rights regarding sexual intercourse when she
marries, while a woman who lives with a man for ten years [without marriage] maintains
those rights.”380 Mori’s approach foreshadowed the equal protection arguments that
activists would raise in states across the country during the last two decades of the
twentieth century.
The fourth argument is also quite telling. While there was and still is a perception
of California being more liberal, forward thinking, and willing to provide equal
protection to its citizens than more conservative parts of the country, the spousal rape
statute provided an example of the Golden State trying to catch up with other states. Mori
explained: “Oregon and Nebraska have deleted the marital exemption. Twenty-two states
have partial exemptions addressing such circumstances as physical, mental or emotional
injury, living arrangements, and legal actions.” 381 This game of “keeping up with the
Joneses” would be used as a justification for later amendments to P.C. § 262 (spousal
rape).
Mori’s fifth and final argument touched on a reality in many states’ legal history.
While statutes across the country, like California’s, consistently defined rape as carnal

See, Robin West, “Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment,”
Florida Law Review 45 (1990), 45-79; Stuart M. Litoff, “The Husband’s Rape Exemption: An Equal
Protection Alternative,” Western New England Law Review 1 (1978), 409-427; Linda Jackson, “Marital
Rape: A Higher Standard Is in Order,” William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law 1 (1994), 183-216;
Jill Elaine Hasday, “Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape,” California Law Review 8, no.
5 (2000), 1373-1505.
380
In 1979, Mori could not know that a minority of states would later expand the exemption to include
cohabitating boyfriends or expand the realm of immunity to apply to voluntary social (sexual) companions.
See, Finklehor and Yllo, License to Rape.
381
For more about the Oregon law, please see the introduction. The Nebraska law is the focus of Chapter 2.
379

136
knowledge or sexual intercourse with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, many
states did provide for prosecution of a man who aided (or encouraged) another to rape his
wife.382 Mori reminded the members of the Assembly that under the 1979 “California
law, a husband can be guilty of rape if he aids and abets a third person in raping his wife
but not if he commits the crime himself.”383
Supporters of the 1979 bill spoke out against historical arguments like irrevocable
consent, women as property, and violence in marriage. One line of argument, irrevocable
consent, posited that “a woman does not give up her right to consent to sexual intercourse
by virtue of marriage, and that the existing definition of rape treats married women in an
unequal and unfair fashion.”384 As noted by the Senate Democratic Caucus, “under
present California law, even if a husband and wife separate, he can legally rape her. Yet
if the couple does not get a marriage license, but he and she simply live together as
husband and wife, she is protected by the rape law. This . . . is inequitable and insulting
to married women and the institution of marriage.”385 Assemblyman Mori furthered this
idea, stating: “In this day and age of our quest to protect civil liberties and to promote
equality under the law, it is an anachronism for the State to tell a woman that if she is
legally married she gives up her right to be free from humiliation and violence of her
personal being; yet, if she enters into a common-law marriage, she is treated as a firstclass citizen.”386 Each of these arguments highlights the disparate treatment that marital
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rape victims faced for no legally justifiable reason, but rather solely because they were
married to the man who raped them.
Another line of argument in favor of the new legislation was that the current law
reflected archaic notions that the wife was a man’s property to be used or abused as he
saw fit. In support of the bill, the California National Organization for Women
maintained that: “A.B. 546 . . . adds equity to California law; no longer could women be
considered ‘property’ of their husbands and thusly denied legal protection from spousal
rape.”387 Yet another line of reasoning in favor of the bill emphasized that rape is not
about sex, it is a crime of violence, even in marriage, which is an argument designed to
counter ideas about sex being an expectation in marriage. The San Francisco
Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation argued this point: “Rape is rape regardless of
the legal relationship of the persons involved. Often battered women suffer this type of
abuse in addition to other physical and psychological battering. By declaring such abuse a
crime, A.B. 546 states that our society will not tolerate or condone such violent
behavior.”388 The Los Angeles Section of the National Council on Jewish Women also
sent their views to the Senate Judiciary Committee and to Governor Jerry Brown, calling
for a statute that standardized the crime of rape, regardless of a relationship between
victim and perpetrator:
We believe that the nature of the crime of rape is the same no matter who
the perpetrator and victim are, and that a marriage contract should not be a
permit to commit violence. . . . Spousal rape is a fact, and victims should
have full recourse to law. Current law denies wives the protection given to
other women. It tells them that their only recourse from rape by their
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spouses is divorce. This new law would recognize that women do not
cease to be individuals with human rights when they become wives.389
Each of the above-noted supporters of the marital rape bill challenged a traditional
justification for insulating men from legal action if they had raped their wives. Supporters
argued that the law should protect women as victims regardless of their marital status.
Opposition to A.B. 546 was as plentiful as the support. One line of opposition
attempted to be sympathetic to the cause of domestic violence, but argued that it was an
issue best left to family courts, rather than criminal courts. The California Attorneys for
Criminal Justice (CACJ) took this approach: “The fundamental problem with deleting the
spousal exemption from the rape statute is that it thrusts upon the criminal justice system
a problem which more appropriately belongs in the courts dealing with domestic relations
problems.”390 This perspective was indicative of the attitude held by many in the criminal
justice system – law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and jurists – that domestic
violence in its many forms was simply a “family matter,” best handled with a cooling-off
period or on-site counseling by the officers sent to the scene. When cases of domestic
violence and sexual assault in marriage did make it to family court, which was not often,
a judge was more likely to scold the male instigator for violent outbreaks in the home
than to sentence him to any jail time. A promise by the accused that he would not do it
again was often enough to appease the court.
Similarly, the CACJ, joined by the California Trial Lawyers Association (CTLA),
acknowledged the importance of addressing domestic violence, but argued that a spousal
rape statute was not the solution. They argued that passing such a law would “interject
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the criminal courts into the privacy of the marital bedroom.”391 Four days after the CTLA
expressed their concern, Assemblyman Mori countered: “Rape is not a sex act to be
confused with consented sexual activity. Each couple is free to work out their own sexual
relationship, and this bill is not going to affect that relationship. Rather, it applies when
the marriage relationship had fallen apart and when trust and caring have ceased.”392
Similarly, the Los Angeles Section of the National Council on Jewish Women argued:
“rape is not a sexual crime. It is a crime of violence. Marriage is a sexual relationship, but
a sexual relationship does not negate the right [of a partner in that marriage] to consent or
not to consent.”393
Earlier that year, an editorial in the San Francisco Chronicle had raised the same
concern about A.B. 546 that the CACJ had: “The problem here is that such a law
constitutes an invasion by the government of the marital bedroom; a place from which we
have been largely successful in removing its prurient eye. Those old laws forbidding
‘crimes against nature’ even between married couples no longer operate. And we are the
more civilized for that.”394 Assemblyman Mori responded to the editorial with a letter of
his own, arguing that A.B. 546 did not constitute “an invasion by the government of the
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marital bedroom.” He added that, “There will be no proverbial policeman under every
bed, nor would anyone know what goes on in the privacy of the home unless an occupant
found it necessary to speak out.”395 In further support, legislative analyst Patti Jo McKay
noted: “the state has an obligation to protect all citizens from crimes of violence and this
protection should not be withheld because the victim and the perpetrator were legally
married at the time of the incident.”396 If that meant responding to a claim of spousal rape
in the marital home, that is what the criminal justice system should be obligated to do.
The CACJ and the CTLA raised another argument against Mori’s proposed bill,
contending that current laws provided for recourse in a case of sexual assault by a spouse:
assault and battery. Neither group referred to such an incident as sexual assault or spousal
rape, preferring to use terms like assault, battery, or assault with a deadly weapon. One
has to wonder if this preference was borne out of practicality or avoidance. From a
practical perspective, the alternate charges of assault and battery had a long history in the
legal system with plenty of case law behind them; at the same time, falling back on
preexisting terms made it possible for these groups to avoid addressing the idea of rape in
marriage. A private citizen, who identified himself only by first name, in a letter to
Governor Brown, provided a more politically-charged example of this argument:
“Legislative passage of this bill is just another example of the power that groups which
claim to be oppressed have in this state. This bill is simply a device by feminists who
look upon the penis as a tool of the oppressor to punish men with a bill that only applies
to them. As such it should be vetoed and use of force in marital acts should be handled
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under assault and battery laws.”397 Of note, the letter’s semi-anonymous author does not
deny that men sometimes use force in intimate relations with their wives. His only
concern seems to be that feminists and their supporters in the legislature were acting
“unreasonably vindictive” by holding men responsible for their behavior.
Countering the use of assault and battery statutes to prosecute spousal rapists,
private citizen Barbara Debuse sent a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
expressing her strong belief that the only present alternative to a spousal rape law was to
prosecute the sexual assault as “a battery in which it is classified as ‘offensive touching.’”
She went on to say that this option “is offensive to the dignity of women who have been
raped by their husbands. . . . ‘Rape cannot be synonymous with touching . . . Rape is a
very violent crime that violates a woman’s very being.’”398 Another line of reasoning,
introduced by Patti Jo McKay, suggested that the charge should fit the actual crime.
Thus, if a man used force and violence to rape his wife, he “should be prosecuted for the
actual crime that he committed. To say that a man should not be prosecuted for raping his
wife is to adhere to that barbaric notion that a wife is a man’s property to do with as he
pleases.”399 This sentiment once again called for the overturning of archaic notions of
women as chattel.
Yet another argument in opposition to A.B. 546, raised by private citizens like
Mark Keeler, was that enforcing the bill’s provisions could present difficult problems of
proof, thereby opening the floodgates for many false claims by vindictive wives. Keeler
put it this way:
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This is the kind of charge that cannot honestly be proved. . . . Can a man deny he
has had sex relations with his wife? Hardly. Nobody would believe him. Does the
wife have bruises on her body which she claims he put there when he raped her?
Of course she has bruises. The wife can bruise herself very easily, and without
much pain. Women bruise very easily, very much easier than a man. The slightest
bump produces a big black and blue spot on a woman. So it’s easy for a wife to
manufacture false evidence of a rape, and it’s impossible for a husband to
disprove.400
Had Keeler stopped after the first two sentences, his argument would have appeared more
legitimate. Keeler fails to acknowledge that prosecutors have the discretion to decide
when to file criminal charges and when the evidence is too inconclusive to support
prosecution. This is the standard for any crime, and there is no evidence to suggest that
prosecutors would establish a separate standard for spousal rape cases. In any event, the
requirements of the bill undoubtedly would insure that some evidence other than the
victim’s testimony would be necessary for the case to advance to trial.401
Keeler was not satisfied with the legitimate proof argument. He added to it by
charging: “women are not chattels today. They can easily walk out of their husbands’
lives and get divorces if they wish.”402 In his view, to pass A.B. 546 would be giving
women a vicious weapon with which to punish their husbands. Keeler does not consider
the financial dependency of many women on their husbands and he never considers
whether rape of a spouse is possible, whether the perpetrator of rape deserves
punishment, or that women are victimized in this way.
A final strand of opposition raised a constitutional challenge to the law. Arguing
that marriage is, for the most part, a religious rite, Joseph B. D. Saraceno contended that a
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bill making it a crime for husbands to rape their wives was not only a pagan law, but also
a violation of the First Amendment establishment and free exercise clauses. He went on
to explain:
Under Canon Law of the Catholic Church, marriage consent, is mutual consent,
duly manifested, is a requirement for the Validity of a Marriage. Consent is, “an
act of the will by which each party gives and accepts a perpetual and exclusive
right over the body, for acts which are of themselves suitable for the generation of
Children.” Consent is so essential to the validity of marriage that No Human
Power can dispense from it or supply it if it is lacking.403
No matter how devout his beliefs, Saraceno failed to acknowledge that rights – even
those provided in the Constitution and its amendments – are not absolute. Rights
guaranteed under the Constitution will not allow a person to infringe unduly upon the
rights of others, nor will they insulate absolutely a person’s criminal behavior.404
Amid the plethora of public support and opposition to A.B. 546, Governor Brown
signed the bill into law on September 22, 1979.405 The spousal rape law went into effect
January 1, 1980.
Less than ten days later, Frank Martinez became “the first man in California to be
charged under the new spousal rape law.”406 On January 6, Martinez kidnapped a female
employee of an El Monte automobile dealership while test-driving a van. The victim later
testified that Martinez had sexually assaulted her in the ten hours he held her captive. The
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next day, Martinez went to the South El Monte home of his estranged wife, Rena, forced
her into the van and drove off. When police officers arrested Martinez on January 8, Rena
told police investigators that her husband had raped her four times. The Los Angeles
County District Attorney’s Office charged Martinez with four counts of spousal rape, five
counts of (non-spousal) rape and one count of oral copulation with the other woman, two
counts of kidnapping, and one count of grand theft.407 Upon being found guilty,
“Martinez was sentenced to 16 years in prison. . . . Without a spousal rape charge,
Martinez might have received a sentence of four years for the battery and kidnap of his
wife,” explained Reggie Yates, the deputy district attorney for Los Angeles County who
successfully prosecuted Martinez.408
The case of Frank Martinez, as well as other defendants charged and convicted
that year, demonstrated a need for a spousal rape law in California. According to the
Lodi, California, News-Sentinel, police arrested at least 15 men for the sexual assault of
their wives in 1980. In most of the cases, the couples were living apart at the time of the
offense and the alleged assaults were brutal.409
Despite arrests and prosecutions under the new spousal rape law, legislators and
members of the public realized that the law had room for improvement. In the years that
followed, California legislators amended P.C. § 262 eight times. These amendments
better defined spousal rape to comport with the language of P.C. § 261 (rape) and
addressed consent, sentencing, and reporting.410
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Consent
The first provision attracting legislative attention regarded consent by the victim,
determined often by the extent to which the victim resisted the attack. Over the next
fifteen years, legislators and victim advocates frequently faced off on the issue of
consent. The eventual result was an amended statute recognizing the numerous reasons
why a rape victim might not put up a fight and preventing a lack of resistance from
protecting rapists. Notably, the pace by which the legislature reached such a standard for
spousal rape victims was often out of step with that for non-spousal rape victims.
Additionally, as the following example demonstrates, some instances of sexual violence
endured by spousal victims did not meet the legal definition of spousal sexual assault
until a 1995 amendment became operative.
Mrs. S., a seventy-three year old bedridden stroke victim, lived at home. Her
husband was her primary caregiver. The home health aide that visited the family home
observed marks on Mrs. S.’s wrists and ankles. Further examination revealed unexplained
vaginal bleeding. When asked about these symptoms, Mrs. S. became agitated. The home
health aide contacted elder protective services to report possible abuse. That agency
dispatched a social worker to investigate. During the course of the interview, Mrs. S.
revealed that several times a week her husband would tie her wrists and ankles to the bed
and rape her. Upon learning this, the social worker attempted to have Mrs. S. moved to a
nursing home. Mrs. S. refused, and because she was legally competent, social services
respected her decision. However, the social worker continued to visit regularly, trying to
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understand why Mrs. S. would remain with her husband. In time, Mrs. S. revealed that
her husband was pressuring her to stay by threatening to rape the couple’s
granddaughters if she relocated. Mrs. S. truly believed that she was protecting her
grandchildren by staying with her abusive husband.411 Despite the heinous nature of her
husband’s behavior, under California law prosecutors could not classify the repeated
sexual assaults endured by Mrs. S. as spousal rape until 1995. Mrs. S.’s situation
highlights a number of issues demonstrating the complexity of consent.
Revisions to the spousal rape law began in 1980, the same year the bill went into
effect. Responding to concern raised by the Santa Monica Hospital Rape Treatment
Center, Assemblyman Mel Levine introduced Assembly Bill 2899, which sought to
eliminate the resistance element in rape legislation that was used to demonstrate an
absence of victim consent.412 In 1980, to get a conviction for rape, a prosecutor had to
prove either that the victim had resisted the attack and that resistance was overcome by
force or violence, or that the victim had been prevented from resisting because of threats
of great and immediate bodily harm that were accompanied by the apparent power of
execution.413 This last provision – apparent power of execution – later proved especially
significant, as cases hinged on whether the victim’s fear of imminent harm was
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reasonable. In other words, did the woman believe her husband had the ability to fulfill
his threats?414 From its inception, A.B. 2899 was meant to apply equally to both
California Penal Codes §261 and §262. Thus, there was no distinction made for acts
involving spousal rape.415
These proposed changes were significant, acknowledging that failure to resist
does not indicate consent to acts of sexual violence. The revisions sought by A.B. 2899
were threefold. First, the bill would redefine rape under threat. Rather than demonstrating
that the victim was unable to resist because of “threats of great bodily harm,” A.B. 2899
would require proof that the sexual assault was accomplished by means of “fear of
unlawful bodily injury.” Second, A.B. 2899 would eliminate the requirement that the
threat of injury be accompanied by the apparent power of execution and instead require
merely that the victim be in fear. Third, the bill would expand the threats of injury to
encompass threats to harm individuals other than the victim.416 A woman whose children
are asleep in a nearby room may not resist her attacker in an attempt to ensure the safety
of those children. A victim who experiences shock may be immobilized by her fear and
therefore unable to resist.
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Assemblyman Levine’s bill received local and statewide support.417 One line of
support for A.B. 2899 was that resistance is dangerous and can actually result in greater
harm to the rape victim. The Los Angeles County Commission on the Status of Women
pointed out that “resistance to attack may result in greater bodily harm or even death” for
the victim.418 The Santa Monica Hospital Rape Treatment Center cited two studies
showing that the danger of physical injury – beyond that of the rape itself – actually
doubles when the victim resists her attacker.419 Los Angeles Talk Radio station KFWB
News 98 issued an editorial in support of A.B. 2899. In that editorial, Vice President and
General Manager Frank Oxarart stated: “all of the statistics show that there is a better
chance of avoiding serious injury if the victim does not resist. But in California the law
says that the victim must resist – or, the rape may not be prosecuted.”420
Another argument in support of A.B. 2899 was that the current rape laws were
discriminatory, treating rape victims differently than victims of other crimes. The Santa
Monica Hospital Rape Treatment Center explained that the resistance provision in the
rape statutes was “discriminatory because no other criminal law, including the similar
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offenses of forcible sodomy and oral copulation, requires victim resistance as an element
of the crime in any situation.”421 To bring the rape statutes in line with the language
defining other criminal offenses, Levine modeled A.B. 2899 after the “time tested
robbery statute” that never included resistance as an element of the crime. To do
otherwise, argued the Rape Treatment Center, would preserve the arbitrary distinction
between rape and other violent crimes.422 The Los Angeles County Bar Association came
to the same conclusion after the Association’s ad hoc Rape Legislation Committee
conducted a six-month study. The Committee’s detailed report concluded that the “victim
resistance provisions in the rape statutes are discriminatory, antiquated, and may even
promote a dangerous standard of behavior by victims in some situations.”423 In a
resolution adopted May 14, 1980, the Association’s Board of Trustees posited that the
removal of the resistance requirement would “help to educate the public that a rape
victim has the right not to resist an assailant, without guilt, just as she probably would do
if she were being robbed.”424 Frank Oxarart ended his KFWB editorial by boldly
advocating jail time for rapists “regardless of whether the terrified victim risked her life
to resist.”425
Advocates for A.B. 2899 also suggested that passage of the amendment might
lead to greater reporting of and conviction for rape. California Attorney General George
Deukmejian certainly believed that this was the case. He sent a letter to the members of
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the state Senate Judiciary Committee explaining that at trial rape victims often face
questioning by defense attorneys during cross-examination that require the victims to
justify their lack of resistance. This could be a harrowing experience for a victim,
suggesting that fault remains with a victim who has not put up enough of a fight to
prevent the rape from occurring. Deukmejian suggested that removing the resistance
requirement might help to minimize a rape victim’s reluctance to report the crime and
ease her fear of testifying at the subsequent trial.426 If Deukmejian’s suggestion was
correct, the natural consequence of removing the resistance requirement would be an
increase in reporting that would lead to a greater number of prosecutions for rape.427
While an increase in reporting is important, it is noteworthy that other factors may
influence a victim’s willingness to report a crime. Therefore, the value of the proposed
amendment cannot be judged solely on its potential to cause a boost in victim reporting.
Ultimately, A.B. 2899 faced no opposition, passing unanimously in both the
Senate and Assembly. This certainly sets the bill apart from the 1979 spousal rape bill.
However, one has to wonder if members of the California legislature would have readily
accepted the bill if it applied only toward spousal rape rather than all cases of rape.
A 1981 amendment to California’s general rape statute fine-tuned the definition
of rape to further define consent. Under this amendment, rape included an act of
intercourse that “is accomplished against the victim’s will by threatening to retaliate in
the future against the victim or another person, and there is a reasonable possibility that
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the perpetrator will execute the threat.”428 The bill further defined “threatening to
retaliate” to encompass kidnapping or false imprisonment, the inflicting of extreme pain,
causing serious bodily injury or death. Recognizing the incongruity between these
statutes, Levine introduced Assembly Bill 3458, the purpose of which was to provide the
same protection for wives from coerced sexual intercourse by threats of future violence
as for all other victims.429 The key questions before the California legislature were
whether spousal rape should include coerced intercourse with a spouse by threat of future
harm, and if so, whether the criminal justice system should treat that offense as a felony
under the spousal rape law.
Again, while there was significant support for A.B. 3458, there was no
opposition.430 The bill moved though the Assembly and Senate with little debate before
receiving unanimous approval in both houses. Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. received
the bill on August 23, and signed it into law twenty-four days later. However, the law did
not yet go far enough in addressing coercive circumstances in a marriage that may result
in spousal rape.
In the 1990s, state legislators further revised the definition of spousal rape in
recognition of a need to expand the understanding of threats to others and threats of
future harm. Such amending was necessary, as can be seen in example of Mrs. S.
presented earlier in this discussion. In 1994, legislation introduced by Senator Milton
Marks and Assemblyman Diane Martinez, modified P.C. § 261 concerning the issue of
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consent.431 Additional legislation passed that year “was designed to remove all remaining
disparities between Penal Code Sections 261 and 262 as they are referenced in other
sections of the law.”432 Unfortunately, the two amendments relating to consent
“inadvertently escaped the attention of” the bill designed to do just that. In 1995, S.B.
208, a bill introduced by State Senator Hilda Solis addressed this omission by forwarding
the legislative intent “that survivors of rape receive the same protections, whether they
are married to their perpetrators or not.”433
Once again attempting to bring the state’s rape laws into accord with the
experiences of rape victims, S.B. 208 refined the definition of spousal rape to include two
provisions, both of which related to victim consent. For the purpose of both rape statutes
(§ 261 and § 262), consent meant “positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an
exercise of free will” where the individual must “act freely and voluntarily and have
knowledge of the nature of the act or transgression involved.”434 The first provision
amended existing law “to include a situation where the accused knows or reasonably
should have known that the victim is unable to resist because they are under the influence
of an intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or a controlled substance.”435 Previously, to
negate victim consent, the prosecutor had to prove that the defendant was the one who
had administered the substance.436 The second provision added spousal rape to the list of
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sex offenses in which consent is at issue, noting that any evidence “that the victim
suggested, requested, or otherwise communicated to the [perpetrator that he] use a
condom or other birth control devise, without additional evidence of consent, is not
sufficient to constitute consent.”437 S.B. 208 passed unanimously in both the Senate and
Assembly, followed by Governor Pete Wilson signing it into law.438 The result was, at
least for the purposes of consent, spousal and non-spousal rape were the same under
California sexual assault laws.
Sentencing
The second area of concern in the 1979 spousal rape law subject to controversy
and eventual revision was the provision that allowed flexibility at the point of prosecution
and sentencing. The law designated marital rape as a wobbler, meaning that those
arrested for marital rape could be charged with either a felony or a misdemeanor,
determined solely at the discretion of the prosecutor. If the defendant was charged with a
felony, sentencing would follow in line with P. C. § 261 (rape), which carried a penalty
of three, six, or eight years in state prison. In contrast, a defendant charged with a
misdemeanor would face up to one year in county jail. Critics raised concern about the
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misdemeanor option, seeing it as a fall back charge when the case was too weak for the
prosecution to prove the felony offense. Others argued that this provision made it more
likely that a vindictive spouse could use a rape charge for harassment purposes.
Additionally, the law provided that men convicted under the spousal rape statute would
not have to register as sex offenders, although they could be referred for mentally
disordered sex offender proceedings to determine if they were deemed sexually violent
predators who should be committed to a mental facility for the protection of the public
safety.
Events that occurred just two months after the law went into effect demonstrate
the flexibility of the spousal rape law. In March 1980, Shasta County law enforcement
officers in the northern California town of Redding arrested Hughlen “Cliff” Watkins on
suspicion of “spousal rape, penetration with a foreign object, and sodomy” after receiving
a call from his wife.439 Catherine Watkins, who had called the police from a women’s
shelter, reported, “her husband had choked her and forced her to have sex.” He then
taunted her, challenging her to “call the cops if you want,” before “dropping off to
sleep.”440 Calling his bluff, Catherine sought the safety of the Shasta County Women’s
Refuge, reported the rape to police, and filed for divorce from her husband.
After initially claiming his innocence, Watkins changed his plea to guilty,
claiming that he did not want his children exposed to the controversy a public trail would
cause. Even then, however, he was not convinced that what he had done was rape. After
consideration, he decided that his actions “could be called ‘rape,’ if it’s possible to rape
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your own wife.” The Court sentenced Watkins to 240 days in county jail, which was
slightly less than two-thirds the maximum sentence for misdemeanor spousal rape. He
also received three years’ probation.441 Had Watkins been charged with felony spousal
rape rather than the misdemeanor charge, he could have faced up to eight years in prison.
While the prosecutor acted within the discretion granted by P.C. § 262 when charging
Watkins with the lesser crime of misdemeanor spousal rape, such decisions would later
be called into question as activists challenged the legality of the wobbler provision.
Circumstances like the one highlighted above were a primary reason that thenAssemblywoman Hilda Solis worked to amend California Penal Code §262 in 1993. That
year, Solis introduced Assembly Bill 187, the stated purpose of which was to amend the
definition of spousal rape in order for it to match more closely the definition of rape.442
Both public policy and constitutional considerations favored the passage of A.B. 187.443
Within the California legislature, A.B. 187 was one of only two bills that the California
Women’s Caucus officially endorsed in 1993, an occurrence requiring support from at
least two-thirds of both Democratic and Republican members of the Caucus. The coauthorship of the bill by thirty legislators further illustrated this bipartisan support.444
Public support of the bill was abundant.445
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One objective of A.B. 187 was to eliminate the wobbler provision, thereby
making all rape cases, including spousal rape, a felony, punishable by three, six, or eight
years in state prison.446 The League of Women Prosecutors promoted A.B. 187 as manner
by which to “eliminate the disparity married women raped by their husbands experience
under existing California law” since a “misdemeanor prosecution does not provide
adequate sanctions for this crime.”447 The Peace Officers Research Association of
California supported the passage of A.B. 187, noting “The crime of rape should be the
same whether the victim is, or isn’t, the spouse of the perpetrator,” promoting the
elimination of the wobbler provision for spousal rape.448
The Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office also supported the elimination of the
wobbler provision. The City Attorney’s Office sent a letter to Assemblyman Bob Epple,
Chair of the Public Safety Committee, advocating the passage of A.B. 187. In that letter,
Alana Bowman explained that when her office had prosecuted spousal rape cases before
a jury, “the crime is incomprehensible as a rape when tried at the misdemeanor level.

Association; Laura X, individually and as a representative of the National Clearinghouse on Marital and
Date Rape; the World Institute of Disability; California Women’s Law Center; the Coalition for Family
Equity; Los Angeles Women’s Leadership Network; the Junior League of California; Mountain View
School District; Vera Valdiviez, Vice Mayor of the City of El Monte; Wayne Clayton, Chief of Police for
the City of El Monte; the City of Azusa; Men Evolving Nonviolently; San Diego Domestic Violence
Council; the Northern California Coalition for Battered Women and their Children; Marin Abused
Women’s Services; Los Angeles Commission on Assaults Against Women; and Sandra Blair, Family Law
Specialist.
446
Senate Committee on Judiciary overview of A.B. 187 as used in the Committee hearing on June 29,
1993.
447
Letter to Assemblyman Bob Epple, Chair of the Public Safety Committee, from Judith Levin, Co-Chair
Legislative Committee, dated March 11, 1993. The League of Women Prosecutors represented female
prosecutors from the offices of City Attorneys, District Attorneys, and the Attorney General. The previous
year, the League of Women Prosecutors had sent a letter to Assemblywoman Roybal-Allard advocating a
different tactic, one in which they proposed the complete elimination of P. C. § 262 and the amending of P.
C. § 261 to include the married persons. Letter sent by Alana Bowman on February 25, 1992.
448
Letter to Assemblyman Bob Epple, Chair of the Public Safety Committee, from Skip Murphy, President
of the Peace Officers Research Association of California, dated February 16, 1993. A verbatim copy of this
letter was sent to Hilda Solis on 16 February; a similar letter was sent to Robert Presley, Chair of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, dated July 20, and to Senator Bill Lockyer on June 22.

157
Juries simply do not take the case seriously, believing that, if the rape had actually
occurred, it would surely have been tried as a felony.”449 She furthered her argument by
questioning the logic of the wobbler provision. “Many California citizens choose to live
together in domestic partnerships. If a rape occurs within this relationship, even though
the parties have cohabitated for years, the crime must be filed as a felony. However, if a
married couple separates but fail to obtain a divorce, a rape in that relationship could be
filed as a misdemeanor.”450 Bowman’s explanation highlighted the arbitrary nature of the
wobbler provision, suggesting that it could result in very different outcomes for similar
crimes because of nothing more than marital status, regardless of the living arrangements
of rape victims and their abusers.
Three months later, Bowman sent a letter to Senator Bill Lockyer, Chair of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, again as a representative of the Los Angeles City Attorney’s
Office. In that letter, she described disparity of treatment for the victims of spousal rape
when the state prosecutes the case as a misdemeanor, arguing that misdemeanor cases do
not receive the time, effort, or resources that are available for felony prosecutions.
“Misdemeanor prosecutors do not benefit from the resources enjoyed by felony
prosecutors, especially the assistance of [District Attorney] staff investigators, to permit a
thorough preparation for trial in these challenging cases.”451 Bowman also argued that
felony sentencing could reduce the number of future instances of rape and the need for
prosecution. Notably, she did not promote the idea of rehabilitation for the rapist while in
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prison. Rather, she contended that incarceration itself prevented future crime and reduced
the need for prosecution: “Prison terms prevent recidivism by this rapist just as
appropriate prison terms prevent other categories of rapists from repeating their crimes;
both spousal rapists and stranger rapists are among the highest recidivists.”452 Bowman
ended by arguing that passage of A.B. 187 “would simply extend to married persons the
rights over their own bodies that non-marital persons possess under the existing rape
statute.”
While the elimination of the wobbler provision sought to close the gap between
general rape and spousal rape, A.B. 187 simultaneously created yet another distinction.
The bill allowed for felony probation in spousal rape cases, a sentence not possible in the
case of rape generally. Penal Code § 261 specified that rape is an offense for which
felony probation may not be imposed. This provision within § 262 was the result of a
compromise reached between lawmakers and the California District Attorneys
Association (CDAA).453
Some supporters of A.B. 187 saw the elimination of the wobbler provision as tied
to public education on rape. The Humboldt Women for Shelter (HWS) in Eureka,
California, believed that A.B. 187 would “send a clear message that violence against any
woman, regardless of marital status, will not be tolerated. It also supports a woman’s
right to say ‘no’ and to have that ‘no’ acknowledged, regardless of marital status.” The
HWS tied spousal rape to the broader issue of domestic violence, suggesting that the bill
“would be a strong affirmation that safety begins in the home, pointing to the accelerating
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progress made by the California State Legislature regarding domestic violence and
related issues.”454 In defense of the bill, Tri-Valley Haven for Women maintained that
A.B. 187 would send “a strong and clear message to the public that spousal rape is a
serious crime that will not be tolerated or minimized,” by bringing “the definition of and
penalties for spousal rape in line with those for other kinds of rape.”455 The North County
Rape Crisis and Child Protection Center promoted the use of A.B. 187 to dispel the longheld myth that husbands “have a ‘sexual right’ to their wives at any time. . . . [By]
eliminating the distinction between rape and spousal rape, [A.B. 187] would not only
help survivors of spousal rape in reporting the crime since they would know it will be
considered a serious crime, but [would] also . . . help the general public to realize that
rape is rape no matter who the offender is.”456 Such sentiments echoed the message of
other domestic violence and sexual assault advocates within California and across the
country. However, each of these advocates acknowledged an important fact – simply
passing a law making rape in marriage a crime does not mean that all potential victims
(or perpetrators) will be cognizant of the legislation.
The personal story of Rana Lee illustrates the importance of educating the public
about all forms of domestic violence, including spousal rape. Rana Lee grew up in an
upper middle-class family in Boston. She met her first husband while a sophomore in
college. The two were together for eighteen years, during which time Lee described her
husband as emotionally but not physically abusive. Even so, she described incidents
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where he hit walls, broke doors, and threw things at Lee and their three children. Her
parents encouraged her to find a way to make the marriage work. It was only after a move
to Los Angeles and her husband’s imprisonment for selling fraudulent futures that Lee
found the courage to file for divorce. The year she divorced her first husband, Lee met
the man who would become her second. At first, he appeared charming, saying that he
would help her raise her children. Unfortunately, despite such promises, there would be
no happily ever after. Instead, he introduced Lee to cocaine and excessive drinking.457
Physical violence and sexual abuse accompanied the drinking and drug use, which
involved not only cocaine, but also marijuana and the prescription drug valium. Lee does
not remember how many times her husband raped her, but she will never forget the first
time:
On my wedding night, he threw me against the bathroom sink, pushed me onto
my knees and forced me to perform humiliating, outrageous sex for hours, pulling
my hair to the roots and slamming my head into the sink when I fought him. I
begged him to stop, but he refused, dragging me to the bed and lying on me for
what seemed ages. I fought, and I cried, and he laughed. He told me he was the
boss and I now belonged to him, and he would hurt me and my children if I did
not behave.458
For the next three and a half years, Lee suffered beatings and rape at the hands of her
husband. Unaware at the time, Lee later learned that her husband also had raped her
fourteen-year-old daughter. Finally, with the help of friends, Lee left her husband and
relocated to the San Francisco Bay Area. Although P.C. § 262 had been in effect for two
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years, Lee did not report the crime to law enforcement. She did not know that she
could.459
Despite the volatile relationships she endured, Lee considers herself a survivor.
With the support of close friends and years of therapy, she was able to rebuild her life.
She became a community education specialist, presenting programs on family violence to
teenagers and hosting a radio talk show about domestic violence. In 1987, she testified
before a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee on the topic of “Women, Violence,
and the Law.”460 One message that she shared before the House subcommittee and in
speaking engagements was the need for education. She testified that “most California
women don’t know that marital rape is against the law there. . . . Women must be
educated about their rights and the judicial system must ‘support the woman who presses
charges – not discourage her.’”461 Some variation of this message is what Lee shared in
her prevention work with teenagers across the Bay Area, and with a national audience as
she appeared on television news programs.462 Each time she spoke before a new
audience, she demonstrated that surviving domestic violence is possible with knowledge,
support, and determination.
Assembly Bill 187 also addressed the issue of sentencing fairness related to
disparities in mandated sex offender registration. When Assemblywoman Solis
introduced A.B. 187, state law did not mandate that a convicted spousal rapist register
with local law enforcement. However, the law required those convicted for other types of
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sex offenses, including non-spousal rape, to register as sex offenders. A.B. 187 “would
require persons convicted of spousal rape to register as a sex offender where the offense
was accomplished by means of force or violence.”463 The limitations imposed on the
registration provision of A.B. 187 reflected an additional compromise between
lawmakers and the CDAA. Once again, like the early wobbler statutes, the implication
was that not all spousal rapists would face the same sanctions. Those sentenced only to
felony probation, and no prison time, would be exempt from the sex offender registration
requirement.464
Amid all of the support for A.B. 187’s attempt to unify punishments between nonspousal and spousal rape, four organizations raised similar objections to the bill. These
groups wanted to empower prosecutors and judges with greater discretion to charge, try,
and sentence spousal rapists rather than eliminating the wobbler provision. The California
Public Defenders Association (CPDA) preferred that judges retain more independence in
sentencing spousal rapists. As the CPDA saw it: “judges should be allowed discretion to
view each case as unique, responding to the facts of that case and not what might be
imagined in the Halls of the State Capitol.”465 Members of the California Attorneys for
Criminal Justice (CACJ) preferred prosecutors have the discretion to charge suspects
with misdemeanors in some spousal rape cases, differentiating them from stranger rape.
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For example, a prosecutor might make such a choice when the victim is uncooperative “if
it means her husband could be sent to state prison” and the case would otherwise have to
be dismissed.466 The CACJ indicated that it would support the remaining portions of A.B.
187 if amended to retain the wobbler provision of the spousal rape law. Such an
amendment, however, would be counterproductive to the intent of the bill. The
amendment would maintain the distinction between spousal rape and non-spousal rape,
allowing the prosecutor the discretion to consider an act to be a misdemeanor that would
be a felony if the victim were not the spouse of the perpetrator. Furthermore, it would fail
to acknowledge that such discretion was not available for crimes charged under P.C. §
261, even though victims may be unwilling to cooperate with the prosecution of those
crimes.
The Committee on Moral Concerns and the Traditional Values Coalition both
opposed A.B. 187 because they found the bill to be overly broad as applied to married
couples. Both groups relied on the traditional notions of consent as forwarded by Sir
Matthew Hale: marriage requires consent of both parties, and that consent freely given
includes a general presumption of mutual consent to sexual intercourse.467 The
Traditional Values Coalition contended: “Though a general presumption of consensual
sex exists by the act of marriage, it is reasonable to assume that non-consensual sex could
occur during a substance-altered state. While lack of good judgment is not a protected
line of defense, neither spouse should be penalized for a normal act which may have or
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would have occurred under more controlled marital circumstances.”468 On a related note,
the Committee on Moral Concerns argued: A.B. 187 “would make a husband (or wife)
guilty of a felony if intercourse took place while one was ‘unconscious of the nature of
the act.’ Such a mental state would most often occur from serious intoxication, and is not
the best of circumstances, but within marriage it should not be a felony.” Notably, neither
of these objections denied that rape might happen in marriage. Rather, they proposed to
classify such actions as something other than felony rape because of the relationship
between the parties.
Additionally, the Traditional Values Coalition expressed concern that the
definition of spousal rape proposed by A.B. 187 presented the potential for manipulation
or false reporting by spouses. As they explained: “There is nothing preventing one
spouse, short of verifiable fraud, from deliberately staging or falsifying an incident of
spousal rape. As many divorces are bitter with both sides holding a personal, emotional
and financial stake in the outcome, one spouse could utilize the provision of AB 187 for
retribution of real or perceived marital injustice or for financial leverage.”469 While
acknowledging that such manipulation was not the norm, the Traditional Values
Coalition stressed that the potential did exist. They added that they fully supported
individuals whose bodies had been violated, even “spouses who have been subjected to
legitimate spousal rape.”470 In the latter case, however, the Coalition believed that current
laws would suffice.
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Despite opposition, the amendment to eliminate the wobbler provision provided
by A.B. 187 became law following a 27 to 7 vote in the Senate and a vote of 68 to 3 in
the Assembly. Governor Wilson signed the bill into law on September 29, 1993.
Thereafter, spousal rape would be a felony.471
Reporting Requirements
The third provision of the spousal rape law subject to several amendments
addressed reporting requirements. When the spousal rape law was passed in 1979, the
language of P.C. § 262 provided: “no arrest or prosecution for spousal rape may be made
unless the act is reported to a peace officer or district attorney within 30 days after the act
occurred.”472 The implementation of such a reporting requirement created a virtual thirtyday statute of limitations because crimes reported after that time would not be
prosecutable, putting victims of this crime at a serious disadvantage. In contrast, the
statute of limitations for non-spousal rape was six years. As will be discussed later in this
chapter, spousal rape was the only sexually-based offense that had a reporting
requirement. The 1997 spousal rape case of Antonio Trujillo Garcia illustrates the
importance of eliminating the reporting requirement.

and abortion. The comment proved so controversial and inflammatory that Akin withdrew from the
senatorial race. See, John Eligon and Michael Schwirtz, “Senate Candidate Provokes Ire with ‘Legitimate
Rape’ Comment,” New York Times August 19, 2012; Charlotte Atler, “Todd Akin Still Doesn’t Get What’s
Wrong with Saying ‘Legitimate Rape,’” Time July 17, 2014.
471
Despite the elimination of the wobbler provision in the spousal rape statute, other crimes involving
intimate partner violence remain classified as wobblers in California. For instance, California Penal code §
273.5 makes it illegal to injure a spouse, cohabitant or fellow parent in an act of domestic violence. While
the opening language of the statute indicates that this action constitutes a felony, a prosecutor has the
discretion to determine whether to charge the defendant with a misdemeanor or felony, weighing such
factors as the defendant’s criminal history, the severity of the offense, and the circumstances or details of
the case. Furthermore, the statute gives judges the discretion to waive the mandatory prison sentence for a
felony conviction. California Penal Code § 273.5(3).
472
Senate Committee on Judiciary overview of S.B. 635.

166
Garcia had been married to E.G., who in 1995 separated from her husband after
fourteen years of marriage. At that time, the court had issued a domestic violence
temporary restraining order (TRO) that required Garcia to stay at least fifty yards away
from E.G. and to provide at least twenty-four hours’ notice to arrange visitation with their
two children. Garcia violated the order twice the day he received the TRO by going to
E.G.’s house. Once law enforcement officers located him, Garcia agreed to comply with
the order. However, he did not. He threatened E.G., saying that she would “pay” if she
did not take him back. Thereafter, Garcia frequently violated the TRO.473
On at least three occasions, E.G. called the police to report instances in which
Garcia had violated the restraining order. The first occurred when he approached her at
church, but that attempt was thwarted when an eleven-year-old female witness called the
police. In the second instance, Garcia chased E.G. through a wooded area as she was
returning home from work, but she escaped. The third time, Garcia went to E.G.’s house,
banged on the window to get in, and again warned her that she would be sorry if she did
not take him back. In this instance, the police came to the residence, found Garcia hiding
in a crawl space, and arrested him.474
Thirty-eight days after his arrest, Garcia intensified his efforts to harass E.G. and
to make true his promise to make her pay. As E.G. walked home from work, passing the
same wooded area in which Garcia had chased her, she was struck from behind:
Someone placed a hand over her mouth and then gagged her with a handkerchief.
Her hands were bound behind her back and she was knocked to the ground. E.G.
then saw defendant and another man, whom she did not recognize, standing over
her. The two men pulled her pants down and pulled her blouse up. Defendant then
fondled her breasts and raped her. He turned to the other man and said, ‘Now
fucker this is your turn.... I don't like this woman.’ The other man then raped her.
473
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The men laughed and threatened to have a gang of ‘[C]holos’ rape her if she
reported the assault to the police. The men fled; she freed herself and walked
home.475
Scared, E.G. returned home. After showering and feeding her children, she attended an
evening class at a nearby school. Garcia showed up outside the classroom and verbally
harassed E.G. She called the police; when they arrived, she noted the TRO and asked that
the officers arrest Garcia. She did not report the rape.476 E.G. filed for divorce the
following month, but this did not end Garcia’s harassment. He was arrested twice more
for violating the TRO, once for striking her in the face when in the company of another
man, J.O.
A year later, she married J.O. She then confided in him about the rape. Thereafter,
she reported the rape to the police, fifteen months after the rape had occurred. When
Garcia was interviewed by the police, he first denied having sexual contact with E.G.
after their separation, but later revised his statement to say that they had had consensual
sex one time – a time that coincided with the date E.G. said she was raped. At trial,
Garcia admitted:
[T]hat he did not want the separation and that he had violated the restraining order
several times. He also admitted pleading guilty to three counts of violating the
restraining order and one count of assault against her. Defendant denied raping
E.G. or threatening her in any way. He said they had engaged in one act of
consensual sex soon after they had separated . . . He also explained other
violations of the restraining order as inadvertent, as when he saw E.G. . . . at the
school because he was watching his son play soccer. He insisted the girl who
testified to the incident at the church was lying, as was E.G. He also denied
striking her in the face even though he had admitted pleading guilty to the
assault.477
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The jury found Garcia guilty. Garcia later appealed his conviction based upon the
reporting requirement in place at the time of his trial.
When deliberating the 1979 spousal rape law, the California legislature relied on
historical justifications to support the thirty-day reporting requirement, noting precedent
from at least three sources. Interestingly, the sources relied upon were from thirteenth,
fifteenth, and eighteenth-century England. The first piece of evidence came from the
reign of King Henry II (r. 1216-1272), during which time the law required “that the
woman should immediately after [the rape] go to the next town, and there make
discovery to some credible persons of the injury she has suffered; and afterwards should
acquaint the high constable of the hundred, the coroners, and the sheriff with the
outrage.”478 According to Sir William Blackstone, eighteenth-century English jurist, the
purpose of this requirement was to prevent malicious accusations.479
The second form of evidence dated from the rule of Edward IV (r. 1461-1470).
During that period “a statute was adopted by Parliament requiring the rape to be reported
within 40 days, and if the victim failed to report it within that period, the crime would be
treated as a simple trespass,” reflecting the historical “woman as man’s property”
viewpoint.480 The third precedent came from the time of Blackstone. In 1769, there was
no codified reporting limitation; however, Blackstone noted: “the jury will rarely give
credit to a stale complaint,” suggesting that to be taken seriously, a victim’s report should
be made sooner rather than later.481 What is interesting about each of these examples is
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that during the five centuries they represent, rape in marriage was not a legal possibility.
Thus, the references must have applied to instances of non-spousal rape. As such, when
the California legislators chose to rely on the English examples, they made the conscious
decision to apply them to a crime that did not exist when the precedent was established.
In time, California legislators would acknowledge that each of these justifications was as
outdated as those for irrevocable consent or the spousal rape exemption remaining in
common law.
When California passed P.C. § 262 in 1979, American jurisdictions had started to
question the reasonableness of the theory of irrevocable consent in marriage. In an
attempt to bolster the confidence of jury members in spousal rape cases, California
legislators conceived a modern justification for a reporting requirement for that crime. As
approved by the legislature, the spousal rape law “added the 30-day reporting
requirement to increase the probability that the reported act of spousal abuse actually
occurred, and that the report was not merely an attempt by one spouse to injure another
during a marital or post-marital conflict.”482 On the surface, the requirement might appear
to address a legitimate state concern – that is, the prevention of alleged victims filing
fraudulent reports. However, upon closer review, the requirement effectively singled out
as untrustworthy married women, promoting the image of vengeful, mercenary wives in
search of better divorce settlements.483 A statement made by an Oregon District Attorney
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asked about California’s reporting requirement supported this proposition. Peter
Sandrock concluded: “California added the 30-day reporting requirements less out of a
concern for the problems of prosecution than out of the fear that unless some restrictions
were enacted, vindictive women would use the charge as a weapon against their
husbands.”484 At the time, legislators did not acknowledge the flaw in such reasoning.
Any criminalization of an act might lead to false reporting; however, this of course is not
a reason not to criminalize wrongdoing.
Activists saw the reporting requirement as an unrealistic barrier to the legitimate
prosecution of spousal rape. They cited examples of cases where law enforcement could
verify allegations of spousal rape; however, prosecutors could not pursue charges against
perpetrators because the reporting time had passed.485 In 1983, California State Senator
Daniel McCorquodale addressed this concern when he introduced S.B. 635, the stated
purpose of which was to “repeal the 30-day reporting requirement, and make an act of
spousal rape (as with other sex crimes) prosecutable any time within six years after its
commission . . . and to increase the number of prosecutions of spousal rape.”486 Support
for the bill was plentiful and proponents championed their cause with three general
arguments, while limited opposition relied on a single claim.

the mother” exception was amended to also cover abortions where the pregnancy was the result of rape or
incest. See, Pub. L. No. 94-439, §. 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976); Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat.
1460 (1977); Pub. L. No.101-166, § 204, 103 STAT. 1177 (1989); Pub. L. No. 103-112, § 509, 107 STAT.
113 (1993).
484
Letter to Kathy Wilcox of Senator McCorquodale’s office from Peter F. Sandrock, Jr., District Attorney
for Benton County, Oregon, dated May 9, 1983.
485
Assembly Committee on Criminal Law and Public Safety overview of S.B. 635.
486
Senate Committee on Judiciary Report. While the original intent of the bill was to eliminate the
reporting requirement, that would not be the effect of the bill that was passed by the legislature and signed
into law by then Governor George Deukmejian.

171
Supporters argued that the thirty-day reporting requirement stymied the original
intent of the spousal rape law. The California Attorney General’s Office (AGO) justified
the elimination of the reporting requirement. That office explained that in passing P.C. §
262, the state legislature acknowledged that spousal rape can and does occur, and the
legislative body had criminalized that conduct. Speaking directly to the reporting
requirement, the AGO maintained that:
Having formally acknowledged and defined the crime of spousal rape, there is no
justification for setting up different standards for arrest and prosecution; the 30day requirement makes the crime seem needlessly suspect. SB 635 will put
spousal rape on a footing with all forms of sexual assault.487
The judges of the Santa Clara County Municipal Court supported this sentiment.
Presiding Judge Nancy Hoffman explained that to impose a short reporting time for
spousal rape is unreasonable when it did not exist for any other penal code violation. She
went on to say the thirty-day reporting requirement “unfairly bars prosecutors from
introducing evidence of attacks that fall outside the reporting period.”488 Nine judges
from that court contended that the “present 30-day reporting requirement is impractical
and frustrates the effective implementation if [sic] the spousal rape law.”489 In support of
their assertion, the judges provided an example of an offender who had rendered his
victim unconscious for a period greater than a month following an instance of spousal
rape. Such a perpetrator would not be subject to prosecution under P.C. § 262.
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The Women’s History Research Center also argued for the elimination of the
reporting limit. The Center provided two examples where the thirty-day reporting
requirement effectively barred prosecution for cases of spousal rape. The first example
involved a victim who had suffered physical harm beyond rape by her husband. She “was
in a coma for 1 month and was aphasiac afterwards, [and] also suffered permanent brain
damage as a result of the sexual assault by her husband.”490 The second example involved
a victim held hostage at gunpoint in her own home by her husband. The rapes she
endured occurred continually over a long period. Her husband had previous convictions
for child abuse and assault and sexually and physically assaulted his previous two wives.
The court did convict the man; however, the charges against him involved at least ten
fewer counts of spousal rape because the earlier instances occurred more than thirty days
before the wife was able to inform law enforcement.491 Such a result could not have been
the intention of the California legislature when it passed the spousal rape bill in 1979.
Other supporters used an equal protection argument by placing spousal rape
within the context of other sexual offenses. Senator McCorquodale began the discussion
for this claim. In a statement given on April 26, 1983, McCorquodale explained the
discrepancy between the prosecution of spousal rape and other legally recognized forms
of sexual assault. He noted that it was not uncommon for a woman to endure several
instances of spousal rape before she finally reported the crime, primarily because she
feared reprisal that was more brutal from her abuser. When she did report the crime, she
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found that earlier instances might not be prosecutable despite their legitimacy because of
the reporting provision. In contrast, McCorquodale asserted: “No distinctions based upon
marital relationships are made in any sexual assault other than rape. Therefore if the
assaults include object rape, sodomy or oral copulation, prosecutions could be initiated
upon the underlying incidents.”492 In fact, the criminal laws related to those alternate
actions “punish any non-consensual act, whether or not committed by the spouse of the
victim, and contain no special reporting requirements for spouses.”493 A press release
issued by Senator McCorquodale’s office asserted: “This inconsistency in the law results
in a dangerous lack of equal protection for victims of spousal rape.”494 Once again, then,
here was official recognition that California’s spousal rape statute treated victims married
to their rapists differently than women who were sexually assaulted by a non-spouse.
As Lisa Di Silva, the coordinator of South County Rape Crisis Services, noted,
American society has perpetuated several myths about sexual assault, including the
widespread notion that a husband cannot rape his wife. Di Silva recognized California as
one of the small minority of states who had by 1983 recognized rape in marriage as a
crime. Nevertheless, she criticized the state for maintaining special conditions for the
crime that did not exist for other sexual assaults. Di Silva argued: “By mandating a 30
day reporting requirement, the law is making exceptions in the case of spousal rape,”
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where there should be none. “Spousal rape, like other sexual assaults, is a violent crime,
and needs to be recognized as such,” she concluded.495
The California Alliance Against Domestic Violence (CAADV), a statewide
organization that represented over eighty domestic violence programs across California,
offered support for the bill by highlighting the reasons that victims of spousal rape do not
immediately report such violations. Speaking for CAADV, Janet Carter explained that
the majority of women who seek assistance from domestic violence programs “do not
seek legal protection from the physical abuse the first time it happens. It is only when
they feel they have no other option available in order to protect themselves from further
violence that they turn to the legal system.”496 Carter went on to support the elimination
of the reporting requirement, explaining that it would allow prosecutors in spousal rape
trials to admit as evidence a history of repeated sexual violence. In doing so, Carter
concluded that S.B. 635 “would be another step towards ensuring that our legal system
protects everyone from violent crime, whether it occurs out on the street, or within the
home.”497
California Women Lawyers provided additional support for the elimination of the
reporting requirement, explaining that many victims do not report spousal rape promptly
because they fear for themselves and/or their families. While the members of California
Women Lawyers recognized that the “chances of a successful prosecution diminishes
where there is a delay in reporting of the offense,” they acknowledged that the absence of
the reporting requirement would not make prosecuting spousal rape unreasonably
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difficult. As with any other offense being investigated, prosecutors would have the
opportunity to evaluate a case of spousal rape to determine whether there was sufficient
evidence to move the case forward for trial.498
Opposition to S.B. 635 came from the Office of the State Public Defender and
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice. Both groups argued that the reporting
requirement provided “vital protection against groundless and vindictive charges . . .
[brought in] retaliation for a marital dispute or to gain some leverage in a divorce or child
custody case.”499 Robert Scarlett, Deputy State Public Defender, maintained that the
“area of spousal rape is one fraught with the possibility of false accusations and difficult
credibility determinations,” making a reporting requirement necessary to protect the
rights of the accused from such abuses.500 The California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
stated opposition to S.B. 635 followed similar reasoning.501 What neither group seemed
to acknowledge was that regardless of a reporting requirement, prosecutors still had the
discretion to determine when there was sufficient evidence to bring a case to trial and
when not to pursue a charge for lack of evidence.
Supporters of S.B. 635 were quick to rebut any opposition to the bill. The Los
Angeles County District Attorney’s Office explained that the original reason for
including a reporting requirement as part of the spousal rape law – the prevention of
abuse of the criminal justice system by vindictive spouses – had “been discredited and the
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continuation of the what effectively constitutes a thirty-day statute of limitations flies in
the face of reality.”502 The statistics available in 1983 supported the position that wives
were not exploiting P.C. § 262 to falsely accuse their husbands of rape. Of the fifty-two
statewide arrests for spousal rape since the spousal rape law went into effect in January
1980, very few ended without going to trial. The conviction rate for those cases that went
to trial was 75.5%, “a figure significantly higher than that of non-marital rape cases,
believed to be 2% nationwide.”503 Such numbers stand in stark contrast to those who
feared that the passage of a spousal rape law would open the floodgates to false charges
leveled by unhappy, bitter wives who sought revenge on their unwitting husbands.
The version of S.B. 635 that ultimately came before the Senate and Assembly for
a vote was different than the one originally introduced by Senator McCorquodale. The
first draft of the bill called for the complete elimination of the thirty-day reporting
requirement. At one point in the process, a one-year reporting requirement was proposed;
however, by July an amendment to the bill reduced the timing to ninety days.504
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California legislators approved this version of the bill and Governor George Deukmejian
signed it into law on September 28, 1983.
It would be ten years before the legislature further amended the reporting
requirement of the spousal rape law. As noted earlier in the chapter, Assemblywoman
Hilda Solis introduced Assembly Bill 187 in 1993 with the goal of abolishing the
distinction between spousal rape and rape to the greatest extent possible. In relation to the
reporting requirement, the proposed amendment, in its final form, would replace the
ninety-day reporting requirement with an obligation to report within one year of the
violation. However, the one-year requirement would not apply if evidence other than the
victim’s allegations would be admissible at trial. The statute of limitations for
prosecution in such cases would remain at three years. Additionally, A.B. 187 would
allow a victim to report the incident of spousal rape to a much wider pool of individuals
than police officers and district attorneys.505
The primary debate surrounding the proposed change revived concern about
groundless and vindictive charges levied by bitter and spiteful women against
constitutional claims that the reporting requirement denied equal protection to victims of
spousal rape. When considering the need for a reporting requirement, proponents argued
that the six-year statute of limitations for non-spousal rape provides time for the
identification of an unknown assailant. However, in spousal rape, the victim knows the
perpetrator. Applying the longer statute of limitations to spousal rape could allow one
spouse – all examples pointed to a wife – to use a threat of a rape charge sometime after
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the marriage has soured as advantage in a divorce settlement or a child custody case. In
response to this argument, Los Angeles County District Attorney, Gil Garcetti, countered:
Of particular importance [with A.B. 187] is the elimination of the 90-day
reporting requirement. Any such reporting requirement is offensive, serves only to
single out spousal rape victims as less trustworthy than all other persons, and
denies them equal protection of the laws. Moreover, because of the dynamics
involved in domestic violence relationships, it is less likely that a rape victim will
immediately report a spouse than a stranger to the police or the district attorney’s
office. Notwithstanding the fact that many spousal rape victims may seek medical
treatment and/or therapy, or confide in friends rather than the police, a reporting
requirement would bar subsequent charges without regard to the strengths or
weaknesses of a case. . . . A reporting requirement simply codifies existing
prejudices against victims of domestic abuse.506
While there was nothing particularly new in Garcetti’s argument, as the district attorney
for the most highly populated county and largest metropolitan region in California, his
public endorsement of A.B. 187 carried a great amount of weight. Garcetti ended his
statement by explaining that the language of A.B. 187 used the same language as the
penal code provisions for other forms of sexual offenses. As such, the change to the
spousal rape law would provide the protection due to all individuals, whether married or
not, and would bring an end to prejudice against rape victims who are married to their
rapists.507
Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard provided her support for A.B. 187.508 As
viewed by Roybal-Allard, a serious question remained as to whether the spousal rape law
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could withstand constitutional scrutiny given that it continued to provide unequal
protection for spousal rape victims. While the penalties were equivalent for spousal rape
and non-spousal rape, Roybal-Allard noted the continuing significant difference in the
statute of limitations for the two crimes:
The question raised in this connection is whether criminal statutes that deny
victims of spousal rape important protections in the prosecution of a violent crime
solely on the basis of gender and marital status would be constructed to be a
denial of Equal Protection under the United States and California Constitutions. I
respectfully submit that there is no rational basis or compelling state interest that
would support that disparate treatment.509
Roybal-Allard also addressed the argument of frivolous lawsuits filed by mercenary
women out to get their husbands. She argued that such claims were completely
unfounded, suggesting: “that 93% of the spousal rape charges filed between 1980 and
1985 resulted in convictions,” a percentage that refutes the claim of unfounded law suits
being filed under P.C. § 262. She concluded by positing: “To maintain
requirements/distinctions that are unsupported with facts is to send a message that in
California, spousal rape is seen as a lesser offense than non-spousal rape.”510 Such a

the statute of limitations for reporting spousal rape the same as non-spousal rape – six years.” In contrast,
A.B. 187 provided a one-year reporting requirement that dated from the time of the alleged violation. Bill
Analysis for A.B. 187 issued by the Office of Criminal Justice Planning.
509
Letter to Assemblyman Bob Epple, Chairman of the Assembly Public Safety Committee, from
Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard, dated April 9, 1993. In her letter, Roybal-Allard refers to studies
that documented a finding that spousal rape was often a manifest of the larger societal problem of domestic
violence. See, Finklehor and Yllo, License to Rape; Diana Russell, Rape in Marriage; and Lenore E.
Walker, The Battered Woman.
510
Ibid. The Coalition for Family Equity, which represented twenty-eight different organizations across
California, supported Roybal-Allard’s constitutional argument, noting: “the elimination of the 90-day
reporting requirement is vital to this legislation, since limiting the reporting time denies them equal
protection under the law.” Letter to Assemblyman Bob Epple, Chair of the Public Safety Committee, from
Marilyn Kizziah, Chair of Coalition for Family Equity, dated March 30, 1993.

180
message, she asserted, would be bad for California’s reputation in that twenty states had
already eliminated the distinction between spousal rape and non-spousal rape.511
Assemblywoman Solis looked to Oregon for confirmation that elimination of the
reporting requirement would not result in a flood of unsubstantiated cases. In 1977,
Oregon’s legislature eliminated the language of the state’s rape statute that defined a rape
victim as a “female person not married to the actor,” resulting in a rape law that was
“silent about the woman’s relationship to the defendant” accused of raping her.”512
According to Peter Sandrock, Jr., District Attorney for Benton County, Oregon, Oregon
learned three lessons following the 1977 amendment. First, spousal rape victims rarely
report their husbands to authorities. “Benton County (pop. 70,000) has had fewer than six
cases since 1977, an experience mirrored by other jurisdictions.”513 Second, those cases
of spousal rape that women reported to authorities usually were extremely violent in
nature, far more violent than most non-spousal rapes. Third, there was no evidence to
suggest that women had abused the law. As Sandrock explained, it was “the seriousness
of the reported cases, not the number, that justifies Oregon’s Law.”514
Evidence like that provided by Sandrock alleviated some unease held by members
of the legislature, but did not eliminate it entirely. Passage of A.B. 187 resulted in three
changes to the reporting requirement of P.C. § 262. The new law extended the reporting
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restriction to one year after the date of the violation instead of ninety days; however, the
one-year requirement would not apply if evidence other than the victim’s allegations
would be admissible at trial. The statute of limitation for prosecution in such cases would
remain at 3 years. Additionally, the statute drastically expanded the pool of whom a
victim could contact to report the violation. No longer was reporting limited to a police
officer or district attorney.515
In 2001, the California Court of Appeals for the Sixth District addressed a
challenge to the provision of P.C. § 262 regarding corroborating evidence. In that appeal,
the aforementioned Antonio Trujillo Garcia appealed his conviction for spousal rape,
claiming that the trial court unfairly allowed corroborating evidence used to waive the
reporting requirement in the case against him. The Court of Appeals disagreed and
upheld his conviction. Garcia’s case influenced the final amendment to P.C. § 262 in
2006.516
Garcia’s appeal raised several challenges to the validity of his conviction for
spousal rape; however, his challenges boiled down to the argument that E.G.’s allegation
of the rape was not corroborated by independent evidence as required under P.C. § 262;
and therefore, the State should not have pursued a prosecution due to the late reporting of
the rape. Specifically, Garcia asserted that the trial court should have granted his motion
to dismiss the charge against him due to insufficient corroborating evidence; the judge
should have instructed the jury “to determine whether sufficient corroborating evidence
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brought the prosecution within the statute of limitations”; and the evidence of his
violations of the TRO were irrelevant and prejudicial, and therefore should not have been
admissible at trial.517
On appeal, the Court reviewed the procedural actions of the trial court,
specifically the decision to allow the introduction of evidence that would corroborate
E.G.’s accusations. During pretrial motions, Garcia (through his attorney) moved to
dismiss the charge of spousal rape on the grounds that E.G. had not reported the offense
within a year of its occurrence. The prosecutor stipulated that the one-year reporting
requirement had not been observed, but maintained that the reporting requirement did not
apply since corroborating evidence was available to support the victim’s assertions.518 In
support of this assertion, the prosecutor noted Garcia’s repeated violations of the TRO
and the statements he gave to police officers. The presiding judge found the evidence
highly relevant and admissible, thereby denying the motion to dismiss. At the conclusion
of the trial, Garcia renewed his motion to dismiss, but once again, the court denied his
motion.
Garcia’s primary argument on appeal was that “the trial court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss the charge of spousal rape based on the lack of corroborating evidence.
He insists the evidence put forth by the prosecutor did not meet appropriate standards for
corroborating evidence,” and therefore warranted a dismissal of the charge. Both parties
to the appeal acknowledged that no case law existed that spoke directly to the issue of
corroborating evidence in a spousal rape case; hence, the Court of Appeals had to
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evaluate the situation in light of arguments that were indirectly or tangentially related to
corroborating evidence in spousal rape cases. The Court of Appeals began its discussion
with a review of People v. Williams, a 1997 case that involved corroborating testimony
provided by an accomplice.519 In that case, the California Supreme Court noted that
evidence given by an accomplice need not corroborate every fact, but is:
‘sufficient if it does not require interpretation . . . [and] tends to connect the
defendant with the commission of the offense in such a way as reasonably may
satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth; it must tend to implicate the
defendant and therefore must relate to some act or fact which is an element of the
crime but it is not necessary that the corroborative evidence be sufficient in itself
to establish every element of the offense charged.’. . . Moreover, evidence of
corroboration is sufficient if it connects defendant with the crime, although such
evidence ‘is slight and entitled, when standing by itself, to but little
consideration.’520
The Court continued, stating: “[U]nless a reviewing court determines that the
corroborating evidence should not have been admitted or that it could not reasonably tend
to connect a defendant with the commission of a crime,” the decision by the court or jury
regarding the admission of corroborating evidence will not be overturned on appeal. 521
The Court next addressed the type of evidence that a prosecutor could introduce as
corroborating evidence. Garcia argued that only “physical evidence, witness statements,
or the defendant’s statements made near the time of the crime” were appropriate to
corroborate, and that such evidence was not present in his case.522 The Court dismissed
this argument because the cases Garcia relied upon did not address spousal rape – nor in
fact, did they concern evidence in cases of domestic violence. Additionally, the Court
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explained that the cases forwarded by Garcia involved situations where corroborating
evidence was necessary to uphold a conviction, rather than “corroboration required for a
prosecution to proceed,” which was the basis of Garcia’s appeal.523
The People’s arguments, with which the Court agreed, reasoned that the evidence
introduced at trial was appropriate to corroborate E.G.’s claim of spousal rape, supporting
the trial court’s decision not to grant Garcia’s motion to dismiss.524 The People argued
that cases brought under P.C. § 262 allowed evidence of other acts of sexual misconduct
to be introduced as independent corroborating evidence.525 Acknowledging that spousal
rape was a form of domestic violence, the People further argued that prosecutors could
introduce evidence of a defendant’s earlier instances of domestic violence to prove a
disposition to commit such acts.526 The People presented Garcia’s violations of the TRO
as evidence of this disposition. The Court concurred that recent case law supported the
People’s argument. In People v. Yovanov, the Court held: “when a defendant is charged
with a sexual offense, evidence of his or her uncharged sexual misconduct is no longer
subject to the general prohibition against character evidence.” Rather, when the
Legislature enacted section 1108 of the Evidence Code, it “declared that the willingness
to commit a sexual offense is not common to most individuals; thus, evidence of any
prior sexual offenses is particularly probative and necessary for determining the
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credibility of the witness.”527 The California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of Evidence Code § 1108 in People v. Falsetta, in which it explained:
By their very nature, sex crimes are usually committed in seclusion without third
party witnesses or substantial corroborating evidence. The ensuing trial often
presents conflicting versions of the event and requires the trier of fact to make
difficult credibility determinations. Section 1108 provides the trier of fact in a sex
offense case the opportunity to learn of the defendant’s possible disposition to
commit sex crimes.528
The Court further reasoned that Garcia’s record of repeated violations of the TRO and
admitted assault was admissible under Evidence Code § 1109, which “permits the
introduction of evidence of the commission of prior acts of domestic violence in a
criminal action charging the defendant with an offense involving domestic
violence.”529 Based upon the reasoning established in Yovanov, Falsetta, and Brown, the
Court concluded that the trial court acted appropriately in using Garcia’s prior acts of
domestic violence to corroborate E.G.’s allegations. Finding no error in the trial court’s
actions, the Court affirmed Garcia’s conviction.
The Court’s decision in Garcia would stand as the State’s view on the reporting
requirement until 2006 when Senator Sheila Kuehl introduced S.B. 1402, which sought to
eliminate the reporting requirement of the spousal rape statute.530 Kuehl presented the bill
as a way to “ensure that all victims of rape are afforded equal protection under the law by
eliminating an additional reporting requirement that only applies to marital rape.”531 In
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addressing this issue, the legislature had to evaluate a few key questions, among which
was whether there was objective policy rationale for retaining a reporting requirement in
the spousal rape statute which is not required for non-spousal rape. A second question
was whether the reporting requirement imposed a practical obstacle to marital rape
prosecutions, and if it did not, was it nevertheless a vestige of a legislative compromise
nearly thirty years old which no longer is relevant or necessary.532 Proponents of S.B.
1402 answered these questions: No, there was no objective policy reason to maintain the
reporting requirement solely for spousal rape; yes, the reporting requirement served as a
hindrance to spousal rape prosecutions; and yes, the reporting requirement embodied a
compromise nearly three decades old that was archaic and no longer relevant.533
Support for S.B. 1402 was plentiful and strategically coordinated among interest
groups across California. Letters poured in to Senator Kuehl, other members of the
Senate and Assembly, and Governor Schwarzenegger; however, the verbiage of that
correspondence often conformed to prescribed language.534 The arguments presented fell
into two broad categories: refutation of the spurned-wife-will-file-a-false-claim fear and a
constitutional argument, neither a novel line of debate.
Proponents of S.B. 1402 reiterated arguments raised in support of A.B. 187 in
1993. Nancy Lemon, a lecturer at Boalt Hall School of Law and a lobbyist for marital
rape reform explained that the “one-year reporting period effectively shortens the
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limitation period for bringing spousal rape prosecutions.”535 She went on to say that while
great efforts had been made to remove most distinctions between P.C. § 261 and § 262,
the reporting requirement remained a glaring distinction. While both statutes operate with
a six-year statute of limitations, “the reporting requirement under section 262 effectively
diminishes that parameter to one year for spousal rape.” As she explained: “Besides
misconceiving the nature of marital rape, the reporting provision of section 262, in
Lemon’s view, serves as a legislative reflection of the myth that ‘vengeful wives will lie’
and that husbands, therefore, need protection.”536 Lemon found both the disparity and the
implication troubling, as did many others who supported S.B. 1402, and by extension the
rights of spousal rape victims.
Proponents relied on constitutional arguments found in the language of People v.
Garcia, where the court in dicta pronounced that the reporting provision in Section 262
ought to be repealed: “The Attorney General points out that California is one of the few
states to impose such a reporting requirement and that several states recently have
repealed similar statutory reporting requirements. The Attorney General also notes that
other states have found any distinction between marital and nonmarital rape to be
unconstitutional.”537 The Court’s statement recommended that the time had come for
California to eliminate the reporting requirement. The California Partnership to End
Domestic Violence advanced this argument, explaining: “California is one of the few
remaining states to impose a reporting requirement for spousal rape. The states of
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Pennsylvania and South Dakota recently repealed similar statutes. Courts in other states
have found any distinction between marital and nonmarital rape to be
unconstitutional.”538 The constitutional arguments used by those states argued that any
statute that treated victims of spousal rape differently than those of non-spousal rape
denied spousal rape victims equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.539
Opposition for S.B. 1402 came from three primary sources: the California Public
Defenders Association, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, and California Alliance
for Families and Children. While each addressed their opposition in distinct ways, they
all focused on the continuing fear that innocent, unwitting men would find themselves
charged falsely by unstable, greedy, vindictive wives. The California Public Defenders
Association (CPDA) suggested a connection between increased divorce rates and women
filing false claims of spousal rape:
Given the increase in the divorce rate and the resulting decrease in the standard of
living for most women and their children, the specter of a woman threatening or
falsely accusing her former spouse of rape is an unfortunate reality. The current
law carefully and thoughtfully provides a system of checks and balances that
protects both parties.540
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Conspicuously absent from the CPDA assertion was any evidence of the validity of the
statement. A lack of statistics or results of academic research on divorce rates and
fraudulent spousal rape claims severely weakened the argument. The claim of increased
divorce rates stands in stark contrast to the figures compiled by the United States
National Center for Health Statistics, which indicated that in 2006, national divorce rates
had reached a low point not evidenced since 1970. While divorce rates peaked in the
decade between 1975 and 1985, after that time they began a slow, but constant decline.541
Furthermore, while the CPDA did not offer evidence of false claims, proponents of S.B.
1402 relied on the evidence forwarded by prominent scholars in the field of domestic
violence and rape in marriage.
On the surface, opposition raised by California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
(CACJ) appeared to raise a reasonable constitutional claim, noting the need to balance
victims’ rights with the due process rights of the accused. At the same time, CACJ
opposed any changes to the reporting requirement, for fear of unsupported claims being
leveled by wives and prosecuted by the State:
The current requirements of witnesses or evidence provided by Penal Code
section 262 still allow charges to be filed well past one year. The requirements
carefully . . . ensure that only meritorious allegations are prosecuted. They also
consistently encourage any victims to come forward to seek protection,
counseling and/or criminal justice. Removal of these requirements will permit
prosecution in cases with little or no supporting evidence, years after the alleged
acts, and are very difficult accusations to defend. The existing balance in the
statute carefully protects due process and the fair trials California is known to
provide.542
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There are several flaws in the position taken by CACJ. While physical protection,
counseling, and justice represent ideal assistance for spousal rape victims, what CACJ
fails to take into account is the myriad reasons why victims of spousal abuse, whether
physical or sexual, fail to seek protection or counseling. Victims fail to report abuse out
of fear: fear that others will not believe their claims; fear that reporting will be futile; fear
of losing their children; fear of financial instability; and fear of future abuse. A second
weakness in the argument raised by CACJ is the failure to acknowledge that absent a
reporting requirement, prosecutors still have the discretion to evaluate the validity of
victim claims. Regardless of how promptly a victim reports a crime, a prosecutor will not
move forward if there is not sufficient evidence to substantiate the claim.
The California Alliance for Families and Children (CAFC) opposed the bill for
three reasons:
First, there is no evidence of a significant problem with the existing procedures –
if it’s not broke, don’t fix it. Second, numerous independent researchers in the
field have documented an already high rate of false allegations of rape, including
spousal rape. . . . Third, eliminating the protections under (current law) will only
contribute to the excessive conflict now in our family law courts where false
allegations already occur in high conflict cases over custody and financial
issues.543
In a March 23, 2006 letter to the Senate Committee on Public Safety, CAFC Executive
Director Michael Robinson cited two prosecutors, Linda Fairstein from New York and
Craig Silverman from Colorado, who maintained that about fifty percent of all rape
allegations are false. He also referenced studies conducted in Indiana and Washington,
D.C., which concluded that rape allegations are false twenty-four to forty percent of the
time. Robinson also alluded to Phyllis Schlafly, long-time opponent of the feminist
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movement, who spoke out against spousal rape laws.544 Committed as Robinson was to
the validity of his sources, he did not address apparent weaknesses in their findings.
There was no indication whether the reporting statistics he quoted even considered
spousal rape victims. Additionally, he failed to account for the significantly lower rates of
false reporting indicated by the Uniform Crime Report (UCR), published by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation that called into question the results of his experts.545 Even more
troubling was Robinson’s reference to the one-year reporting limit, which he dubbed a
“modest requirement,” the upholding of which resulted “in no harm to legitimate
victims.”546
Two weeks later as the bill moved forward with no apparent revisions, Robinson
showed disappointment with the California legislature’s apparent dismissal of CAFC’s
opposition to S.B. 1402. In an email to Cory Salzillo, Consultant to the Senate Committee
on Public Safety, Robinson commented:
We are saddened to see that it appears that there was no real debate on Sheila’s
SB 1402 spousal rape. I also notices [sic] that the bill analysis quoted part of our
position letter but left out the quotes by nationally known prosecutors on the
suggest [sic]. . . . We are about to open Pandora’s box even wider in family law
destruction if this bill passes and is signed into law. Unfortunately, I am spread
way to [sic] thin and was not able to make the hearing. We don’t have the money
that womens [sic] groups have because of feminist pork they get from
government.547
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While such remarks reflected opponents’ disenchantment with the progress of S.B. 1402
through the legislature, the comments suggested frustration with the women’s movement
in general and Senator Kuehl specifically, if Robinson’s reference to Kuehl by first name
only is any indication.548 Overall, Robinson presented an unconvincing connection
between protection for victims of spousal rape and the destruction of the family, all the
while failing to acknowledge that evidence of sexual assault in a marriage in itself signals
the breakdown of the family unit.
Despite the strong opposition posed by the California Public Defenders
Association, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, and California Alliance for
Families and Children, S.B. 1402 passed unanimously in both houses of the California
legislature. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger received the bill on June 16, 2006. After
consideration of position papers from both the Assembly and Senate and letters of
support from no fewer than sixteen interest groups from around California,
Schwarzenegger signed S.B. 1402 into law twelve days later, thereby eliminating the
reporting and/or corroboration requirement for spousal rape prosecutions.549
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The changes brought by S.B. 1402 symbolized the end of a struggle by women’s
rights advocates that had been ongoing for nearly thirty years. Beginning with the
adoption of a spousal rape law in 1979, eight amendments were required to bring spousal
rape legislation in line with non-spousal rape. Those amendments were possible only
because of the dedication of legislators, both female and male, and dozens of interest
groups across California that represented the interests of thousands of individuals who
believed the time had come to treat all victims of rape with the same level of protection.
Unlike Dianna Green, Mrs. S., Rena Martinez, Catherine Watkins, Rana Lee, and E.G.,
spousal rape victims now have recourse under California law that parallels that of nonspousal rape victims.
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CHAPTER 4
SEX, LIES, AND VIDEOTAPE: GETTING AWAY WITH RAPE IN MARRIAGE
IN SOUTH CAROLINA
While earlier chapters have chronicled the progress of legislation aimed at
protecting women from sexual assault within marriage, this chapter presents a step
backward in that progress. A case of marital rape that should have ended in a conviction
instead saw a rapist set free to continue his violent behavior. Integral to this account is a
discussion of rape shield statutes, which emerged parallel to state marital rape laws.
On June 2, 1992, NBC’s Dateline, known for its true crime and human-interest
stories, aired a segment titled “Husbands, Wives, and Rape.” The focus of the episode
was a marital rape case in South Carolina – a case prosecutors thought they could not
lose.
Dale and Trish Crawford had been married just over a year in December 1991.
While both had been married before and had children from their previous unions, Dale
and Trish had known each other since they were in their early teens. Trish had described
Dale to friends as “a gentle, kind, caring person,” but on the evening of December 7,
1991, that view changed. That night, according to Trish, the police report, and the
prosecution that would follow, Dale “tied [his wife’s] hands, waist, and legs to [a] bed,
taped her eyes and mouth shut, raped her and sexually assaulted her with foreign objects
while threatening her with a knife.”550 By capturing the event on videotape, Dale
unintentionally provided a visual testimony of what happened. After viewing the
videotape, James Metts, a twenty-year veteran of the Lexington County Sheriff’s
Department, said it was clear that Dale forced Trish to have sex against her will.
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According to Metts, “It’s obvious . . . that she [was] not a willing participant . . . that she
[was] really in a lot of pain.”551
In his own defense, Dale acknowledged tying up his wife and having sex with her
that night, but he claimed that it was not against her will. Nevertheless, he became the
first husband tried under South Carolina’s 1991 law that made rape between a husband
and wife a crime. Months later, he maintained the position that he did not rape his wife.
“Dale Crawford [said] that his wife said ‘no’ to sex, but that he knew she meant ‘yes.’”552
During the trial, Dale testified that his wife had enjoyed sex games and that they had
videotaped earlier lovemaking. Despite arguments by the prosecutor that the tape of the
December 7 event showed rape, not a consensual sex game, it took the jury of eight
women and four men less than an hour to find Dale not guilty – that regardless of Trish
saying no, she was a willing participant in the events of that horrific night.553
At the time the Crawford case went to trial, forty-eight states had some kind of
law that addressed marital rape. By 1992, only Oklahoma and North Carolina maintained
the common law exemption that insulated a man from such a charge. One need not look
too closely at the laws of some of those forty-eight states, including that of South
Carolina, however, to question whether those laws were stringent enough. In over half of
the states, “a woman [had] less legal protection from [sexual] assault if the attacker [was]
her husband than if [he was] a stranger.”554 In a minority of states, wife-victims were
required to report the incident within thirty days or prosecution would forever be barred.
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The laws of several states provided for spousal prosecution only when the victim and
assailant were living apart under a written separation at the time of the alleged crime. A
few states required evidence of force or use or threat of violence and that the victim
believed that the perpetrator would carry out the threat against the victim or another
person (generally, a child or other loved one).555
South Carolina’s approach to spousal rape serves as a valuable case study. Not
only was South Carolina one of the final states to pass a marital rape law, but when that
law was passed, it provided marital rape victims less legal protection than non-spousal
rape victims. In 1986, the National Organization for Women (NOW) released a study that
ranked states based on how well or poorly their laws improved the status of women,
considering the areas of employment, education, home and family, and community. 556
According to that report, South Carolina ranked dead last.557 Concerned with how the
NOW report would influence national public perception, making it difficult to “attract
quality people and businesses” to their state, the South Carolina Commission on Women
(SCCW) issued a response to the NOW report in 1990 (hereafter McSwain report). It was
the hope of the SCCW that “the Governor will be able to use [the] report to identify those
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areas in which the legal status and economic opportunities for all South Carolina citizens
may be improved, particularly for South Carolina women.”558
Four statements made in the McSwain report regarding marital rape in South
Carolina are particularly telling. First, “Marital rape is the only form of family violence
that is currently legal in South Carolina.” Second, a study by the Medical University of
South Carolina cited in the report noted that “victims were physically injured in 46
percent of rapes committed by spouses, and 42 percent of the victims feared for their
lives.” The third acknowledges that the “South Carolina marital rape statute [as it existed
at the time] permits a man to sexually batter a woman if that woman [was] married to him
and if she [had] not obtained a court order formally recognizing their living separately
from each other.” The fourth statement indicated that South Carolina rape crisis centers
estimated that only one in ten rapes are ever reported to the police.559 Such admissions
leave no room for interpretation. The culture of South Carolina perpetuated an
environment in which there were very few resources available to marital rape victims.
The SCCW recommended that the current South Carolina law be amended,
allowing a woman, without condition, to accuse her husband with rape (or as the
language of the statute reads, criminal sexual conduct). The following year, in 1991, the
South Carolina General Assembly passed the state’s first marital rape law. It is within
this context that Crawford serves as a pivotal case for South Carolina. Not only was it the
first case to be tried under South Carolina’s marital rape statute, but the outcome of that
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trial led to a 1994 amendment which addressed South Carolina’s rape shield law in the
context of marital rape.
However, in 1991 when State Representative Lucille Whipper introduced the bill
that would make marital rape a crime; she knew that she was fighting an uphill battle.
She explained that the bill was very important – a necessity if the state was ever going to
change the idea that men are in charge of women and women’s bodies. She
acknowledged that marital rape bills in South Carolina faced opposition from legislators
of both political parties who saw such legislation as a threat to male privilege.560 More
precisely, the proposed legislation faced opposition from the predominantly male state
legislators who held 88.8 percent of the seats in the South Carolina legislature in 1991.561
Whipper’s 1991 legislative proposal was actually the sixth marital rape bill introduced in
the state legislature.562 In each of the previous years, the Senate had passed a similar bill,
but those bills had died in the House. In 1991, however, when the vote came in the
Senate, the House had already passed its own bill.563
Three main obstacles stood in the way of passing the marital rape bills introduced
between 1986 and 1991: fear of false reporting, disbelief in the possibility of marital rape,
and a misunderstanding of existing laws. First, opponents believed the passage of a
marital rape bill would open the floodgates to such claims. Senator Ryan Shealy strongly
opposed the bill, explaining, “sex is something that’s expected, anticipated and presumed
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when you get married.” He believed that a marital rape bill would “encourage women to
file false reports after marital squabbles or when they seek divorces, custody of children
or property settlements.”564 Representative Phil Bradley also voiced concerns about false
charges, noting that “once someone is charged with [marital rape], his life is totally
ruined.”565 Such fears were unfounded, however, as recent studies have shown that there
are no more false reports of marital rape than for any other type of crime.566 Nevertheless,
the “issue of false reporting may be one of the most important barriers to successfully
investigating and prosecuting sexual assault, especially with cases involving nonstrangers.”567
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Several misconceptions about rape and the behavior of rape victims reinforced the
fear of false reporting. Most sexual assault cases involve victims who do not meet
societal expectations of the characteristics of a typical sexual assault victim. One widely
held belief is that most sexual assaults involve strangers wielding weapons who
unwittingly leave a great amount of evidence behind, while the reality is that the majority
of attacks are made by those known to the victim without the use of a weapon and
without overt signs of physical injury. Another stereotype is that a rape victim will
always cooperate fully with investigators and prosecutors, providing specific details that
do not change. In reality, very few victims report an attack immediately, but rather wait
hours, days, or weeks, if they report at all. Even then, details may change in subsequent
retellings or a victim may recant her testimony all together. Inconsistent or incomplete
testimony may be the result of trauma or confusion based on memory impairment, a
victim believing that no one will believe her account, an attempt to protect the perpetrator
if it is someone known to the victim, feelings of guilt or shame.568 Unfortunately, many in
society, including crime investigators and prosecutors, hold these stereotypes of rape
victims. As long as those involved in the criminal justice process believe that most
reports of sexual assault are false, “efforts to improve the criminal justice response to
sexual assault will have only limited impact. Only those cases that look like our societal
stereotype of ‘real rape’ will be successfully investigated and prosecuted.”569
The second obstacle to passing a marital rape law derived from a general disbelief
in the possibility of rape in marriage. Senator J. M. “Bud” Long, the only member of the
Senate Judiciary Committee to vote against the bill in 1991, stated: “Why in God’s name
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we’re going to punish a man for having sex with his wife when she says, ‘No, not
tonight,’ I don’t know.”570 Long was not alone in his belief, nor were such ideas limited
to South Carolina. In 1979, then California State Senator Bob Wilson questioned: “But if
you can’t rape your wife, who can you rape?”571 Also that year, Charles Burt, defense
attorney in Oregon’s Rideout case, held the position that marital rape cases were
frivolous and unnecessary: “It points out the absurdity of bringing the crime of rape as a
law into marriage.”572 In 1981, in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Alabama Senator Jeremiah Denton argued that rape in marriage was less serious than
rape by a stranger. He noted: “Damn it, when you get married, you kind of expect you're
going to get a little sex.”573 Such arguments demonstrated that when it came to weighing
women’s safety against male privilege, many men across the nation stood behind the
right of free access to women’s bodies.
The third obstacle to the law’s passage was the belief that laws were already in
existence that prosecutors could use in cases of marital rape. As noted by South Carolina
Representative Charles Sharpe, there are “laws already on the books to govern that kind
of thing . . . I just feel like this [new law] is not needed, and we need to stay out of a
man’s bedroom.”574 The common understanding of “laws already in existence” was
assault and battery, a charge not specific to rape.575 Such an attitude diminished the
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severity of marital rape by implying violent force was needed to meet the metric of “real
rape.” This approach was not unique to South Carolina; in fact, it was a common
argument used across the nation to oppose the elimination of the marital exemption.
Advocates of the new law were quick to criticize the use of assault and battery to cover
marital rape. Activists repeatedly explained rape was rape, no matter who committed it,
and that is how the law should address marital rape. One aspect of their argument
highlighted the penalty differential in sentencing: In South Carolina, the crime of
criminal sexual conduct (rape) in the first degree carried a maximum thirty-year sentence,
while assault and battery in the first degree carried only a ten-year maximum sentence.576
The practical implication: a man who sexually assaults his wife and is charged with and
convicted of criminal sexual conduct faces up to thirty years in prison. In contrast, if
prosecutors charge the same individual with assault and battery for the sexual assault of
his wife, a conviction will result in no more than ten years’ imprisonment. Thus, by
categorizing marital rape as assault and battery, prosecutors could effectively limit
sentencing of husband-rapists to one-third that of non-husband-rapists, undermining the
seriousness of the act.
Nevertheless, according to Whipper, the social and political climate had changed
enough by 1991 for the marital rape bill to pass, particularly because of lobbying efforts
by women’s organizations. When asked why South Carolina took so long to pass the law
and eliminate the absolute protection of married men, Whipper suggested that South
Carolina “holds on to things for a long time, even when they are not good things.”577
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Gilda Cobb-Hunter, an expert on the issue of combating domestic violence, reinforced
this explanation. Cobb-Hunter hoped to see marital rape treated the same as other rape,
but agreed that advocates of that position needed to remain realistic about what they
could convince the General Assembly to pass. “We realize that we are in South
Carolina,” she said several months before Governor Carroll Campbell signed the bill into
law.578 Thus, Cobb-Hunter and others had to settle for less than they hoped. The result
was two separate statutes that applied to rape in marriage, depending on whether the
couple was living together or not at the time of the offense. If the couple was still
married, but legally separated, the criminal sexual conduct law applied, and a husband
found guilty would face up to thirty years in prison. In contrast, if the couple shared a
residence, the applicable crime was the new offense of spousal sexual battery, which
required physical evidence of violence and only carried a sentence of up to ten years.579
This then was the status of the law when prosecutors charged Dale Crawford with
“four counts of marital rape and one count of kidnapping.”580 The verdict in that trial was
instrumental to the 1994 changes to South Carolina’s rape shield law as it applied to
marital rape. As noted in the chapter’s opening vignette, Crawford was a case that
prosecutors thought they could not lose. Deputy Solicitor Knox McMahon, prosecutor for
the case, referred to Crawford’s “videotape as a ‘lesson on How to Rape Your Wife.’”
Visibly shaken by the verdict, McMahon went on to say, “If this isn’t marital rape . . . it
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doesn’t exist.”581 When interviewed by Dateline, Sheriff James Metts admitted that he
was shocked that the jury acquitted Crawford, explaining that the jury was unduly
influenced by testimony regarding Trish’s sexual past. According to Metts: “What they
[the Crawfords] had done previously, or what they may do in the future, [was] not
relevant to” the present case.582
How, then, could the jury reach a not-guilty verdict?583 What had the jury heard
that led them to such a surprising conclusion? Under South Carolina law at the time, the
defense attorney could not introduce evidence of a rape victim’s prior sexual behavior if
her attacker was someone other than her spouse. However, when the charge was marital
rape, “witnesses [could] testify about the victim’s sexual history.” 584 Ironically, in most
cases, the prosecutor could not introduce evidence of the defendant’s sexual history.
What this meant in Crawford was that the jury heard Dale testify that “his wife enjoyed
sex games and that they had made [a] videotape of their lovemaking in the past.” They
also heard Trish’s ex-husband testify that she enjoyed “unconventional sex,” and that she
had allowed him to tie her up many times during sex. What the jury did not learn was that
her ex-husband had a motive to paint a bad picture of her – they were in a battle for
custody of their four-year-old child. Additionally, the judge would not let the prosecution
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introduce testimony from Dale Crawford’s ex-wife. Had she been able to testify, the jury
would have heard that she, too, had been a victim, and that Dale had tied her up with a
rope and raped her. Had Dale’s sexual history been fair game like Trish’s, the jury also
would have learned of police reports alleging that Dale had assaulted Trish and his exwife many times.585
We will never know if this additional evidence would have swayed opinions of
the jury members. What is clear, however, is that the not guilty verdict reverberated
across South Carolina and the nation, causing many to question whether marital rape laws
in that state – in fact, across the country – were adequate to protect a wife from sexual
assault by her husband. Activists sounded a call to reform the marital rape law almost
immediately. Those involved wanted to see revisions that would outlaw testimony on the
victim’s past sexual history; in other words, the promulgation and implementation of a
rape shield law that protected victims of marital rape.586
In part due to public disbelief in the justice of Dale Crawford’s acquittal, in 1994
South Carolina amended its rape shield law to include protection for victims of marital
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rape. The amendment to South Carolina’s rape shield provision was among the last in the
nation and drew upon substantial legislative, judicial, and social history.
Historically, testimony about the sexual history of a rape victim during a trial
emerged from the traditional view of rape as a crime that spoiled “the chastity and value
of a woman by a man who had no legal claim to sex with her.”587 Rape laws, then, were
“designed to protect men from the destruction of their interests in women’s bodies by
other men, somewhat like the theft of household objects in a robbery.”588 The echo of this
perspective – the chastity and corresponding value of a woman – prevailed well into the
twentieth century. We can see this in the case of rapes in which “only a victim who was
‘respectable’ and could show that she did not have a reputation for loose morals or casual
sex stood a reasonable chance of seeing the conviction of her attacker.”589
The traditional use of a victim’s sexual history as evidence was to show consent
and to show a propensity for dishonesty. The practice of connecting consent with sexual
experience followed the reasoning: “a sexually experienced woman supposedly casually
selects sexual partners and was thus more likely to have consented to the act in
question.”590 In People v. Abbot, an 1838 New York case, the judge distinguished
between a woman “who has already submitted herself to the lewd embraces of another,
and the coy and modest female severely chaste and instinctively shuddering at the
thought of impurity,” implying a natural consent from the first and refusal by the latter.591
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Seventy-seven years later, a Tennessee judge embraced the same reasoning, concluding:
“No impartial mind can resist the conclusion that a female who had been in the recent
habit of illicit intercourse with others will not be so likely to resist as one who is spotless
and pure.”592 The belief that a sexually experienced woman was more likely to consent
was still pervasive in the American legal system when the anti-rape movement arose in
the 1970s.
Also prevalent was the belief that a woman who had sexual experience outside of
marriage was inherently untruthful. As Vivian Berger, Columbia University law
professor, explained in 1977: “A few courts believe that evidence of unchastity [sic]
bears not only on the substantive issue of consent but also on the woman’s credibility;
promiscuity imports dishonesty.”593 While chastity – or lack thereof – reflected a
female’s self-worth and honesty, sexual experience had no effect whatsoever on men’s
veracity.594 The questioned reliability of a woman’s testimony in a rape case traces back
to a statement by Matthew Hale: “rape . . . is an accusation easily to be made and hard to
be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused.”595 Hale’s statement,
emphasizing the unreliability of rape victim testimony, led to the legal assumption “that
rape victims were more likely to be liars than other witnesses or victims.”596 Legal
writing on the credibility of rape victims in the twentieth century continued to challenge
the character of women. In his widely respected legal treatise, Evidence in Trial at
Common Law, legal scholar Henry Wigmore contended: “no judge should ever let a sex
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offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant’s social history and mental
makeup have been examined . . . by a qualified physician.” Lisa M. Cuklanz, professor of
Communication Studies at Boston College and notable scholar of gendered violence,
explained that Wigmore’s statement deepened the warning of Hale’s pronouncement:
“Hale’s meaning was clearly echoed, but with intensified meaning. Now it was not
simply the social circumstances that promoted false accusations of rape but also the
actual psychological makeup of female victims.”597 Challenging the female character in
this manner furthered legal protection for men accused of rape.
Prior to rape shield laws, rape victims were fair game for defense attorney
attempts to undermine their credibility, attempts that used the victim’s intimate
experiences as a form of character assassination. Sexual history evidence generally falls
into three categories: testimony that describes specific instances of the victim’s conduct,
generally fact-based details of particular occurrences; opinions of the victim’s sexual
practices, where witnesses provide statements of their own beliefs about the victim’s
prior sexual activity; and evidence of the victim’s reputation, or the community view of
the victim’s character and sexual experience.598
In the late 1970s, pressure for evidentiary reform came from an uneasy coalition
between law enforcement officials and feminist organizations. Among the issues this
unlikely alliance argued was that “sexual morality had changed since the adoption of the
common-law doctrine which allowed evidence about the victim’s unchaste character.”599
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By the time advocates proposed rape shield laws, many young women engaged in
consensual sexual relations outside of marriage. Thus, both popular culture and action by
the federal government supported efforts to reform the rules of evidence that governed
trials.600
Significantly, the Food and Drug Administration’s approval of the birth control
pill as a form of contraception in 1960 fueled the emerging sexual revolution.601 As a
result, a growing number of unmarried women exercised the right to engage in
recreational sex quite separate from procreation and marriage.
Beginning in 1974, the resulting “rape shield laws were designed to protect rape
victims from embarrassing questions about their private sexual lives,” generally
forbidding testimony about the victim’s prior sexual history and ensuring “that the rape
defendant, not the rape victim, was on trial.”602 Advocates suggested that the character
assassination rape victims faced in open court weakened victim credibility and often
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resulted in a high-level of acquittal rates in those cases that went to trial.603 Opponents
suggested that those same provisions prevented a defendant from presenting a full
defense, specifically by restricting the right granted under the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause. As jurist Gerald E. Rosen explained, “To deprive the defendant of
the right to present material evidence contradicting the victim is not only to deprive the
defendant of his constitutional rights to cross-examine his accuser and to mount an
effective defense, it is also to potentially undermine the jury’s fact-finding
responsibilities.”604 Despite such concern and any potential legal detriment to defendants,
state legislatures began to pass rape shield laws in 1974.
Between 1974 and 1980, forty-five states and the federal government “made
efforts to protect rape victims from the humiliation of public disclosure of the details of
their prior sexual activities” in the form of rape shield laws. In all but one of these
jurisdictions, legislators passed rape shield statutes; in the remaining state, an appellate
court ruling instigated change.605 According to the National Center for Victims of Crime,
rape shield laws “limit the introduction of evidence about a victim’s sexual history,
reputation or past conduct,” as a response to “the practice of discrediting victims by
introducing irrelevant information about their chastity.”606 Such laws were enacted to
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serve five basic purposes: to protect the privacy of rape victims; to encourage victims to
come forward; to enhance the accuracy of outcomes in rape trials by excluding irrelevant
or prejudicial evidence; to serve as a deterrent to would-be rapists; and, to protect the
autonomy of women.607
Before the enactment of rape shield statutes, victims often faced humiliating and
intrusive questioning about the smallest details of their private lives. Facing such
questions at trial would often exacerbate the trauma of the sexual assault, implying that
the victim was somehow to blame for the rape. To avoid being “assaulted” a second time
by criminal justice officials, many women were reluctant to report the crime and subject
themselves to a barrage of personal questions in open court. Rape shield statutes
attempted to insulate victims from this type of secondary violation. They also reflected
the growing consensus that a woman’s sexual past has a low probative value in a rape
trial.608 Advocates for rape shield laws argued that the provisions keep jurors’ attention
on the behavior of the defendant and away from the victim’s reputation, making it clear
that the defendant, not the victim, is on trial.609 As such, the statutes promoted the
empowerment of women, giving them the freedom to embrace their choice of sexual
lifestyle without the fear of diminishing the legal protection against unwanted sexual
advances.
While most rape cases are governed by state law and heard in state courts, rape
shield laws are embedded in the Federal Rules of Evidence as well. In late October 1978,
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then President Jimmy Carter signed into law H.R. 4727, which created Rule 412, the
federal rape shield statute. In doing so, Carter issued a presidential statement regarding
the purpose and value of Rule 412 as addressing the myriad concerns listed above and
serving as a model for state and local criminal practices. In part, Carter noted:
This bill provides a model for state and local revision of criminal and case
law. It is designed to end the public degradation of rape victims and, by
protecting victims from humiliation, to encourage the reporting of rape. . .
. Too often rape trials have been as humiliating as the sexual assault itself.
By restricting testimony on the victim’s prior sexual behavior to that
genuinely relevant to the defense, the rape victims act will prevent a
defendant from making the victim’s private life an issue at trial.610
That is not to say, however, that H.R. 4727 passed without controversy. In fact, Rule 412,
like many state rape shield statutes, was the result of lengthy conflict and debate between
respected groups on both sides of the issue. The resulting legislation was more
conservative in nature than some feminist activists would have liked, but it did reflect the
mixed coalition that supported the bill – traditionally conservative law-and-order types
and liberal feminists. As adopted, Rule 412 prevented the introduction of opinion and
reputation evidence of the rape victim’s sexual history, thereby quashing the notion that
once a woman consents to sexual activity, she has given up the right to withhold consent
in the future.
Like many state rape shield laws, including South Carolina’s amended 1994
statute, the exclusions provided by Rule 412 are not absolute, but rather include
exceptions to the protective nature of the law. As related to criminal proceedings, Rule
412(b) provides that a court may allow into evidence testimony:
of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior, if offered to prove that
someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or
President’s Statement on Signing H.R. 4727 into Law, 14 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1902 (Nov. 6,
1978).
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other physical evidence . . . [or] evidence of specific instances of a
victim’s sexual behavior with respect to the person accused of the sexual
misconduct, if offered by the defendant to prove consent or if offered by
the prosecutor.611
Such exclusions demonstrate the delicate, but necessary balance between protecting a
victim’s privacy and maintaining the legal rights of a rape defendant.
Even if evidence falls into one of these two categories, for a party to utilize these
exceptions, he or she must abide by the terms of Rule 412(c), which sets forth a noticeand-hearing requirement. If a party intends to offer such evidence, a motion detailing the
evidence and the purpose for which it will be used must be filed at least fourteen days
prior to trial. A copy of the motion must be delivered to all parties; the victim must also
receive notice. Before any evidence of this type may be admitted, the court must then
hold an in camera hearing, providing both the victim and interested parties the
opportunity to present information regarding the motion.612 The court must then
determine whether the proffered evidence is both relevant and more probative than
prejudicial.613 In instances where defense attorneys did not follow these procedural
requirements, federal courts ruled against parties attempting to introduce evidence of a
victim’s sexual conduct.614
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In 1974, Michigan became the first state to enact a rape shield statute as part of an
effort to improve the treatment of rape victims. Additional reform efforts “included
establishing a scale of degrees of criminal sexual conduct, doing away with the
requirement that the prosecution show resistance by the victim, and eradicating
interspousal immunity to charges of criminal sexual conduct.”615 The Michigan law
prohibits the use of character evidence in rape trials, including a victim’s sexual history,
except for “[e]vidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct” with the defendant or
evidence “of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen,
pregnancy, or disease.” For a defendant to enter such evidence at trial, he must first file a
written motion and offer proof of its veracity, after which time the judge may hold an in
camera hearing to determine if the “proposed evidence is material to a fact at issue in the
case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative
value.”616
Twenty years later, when South Carolina amended its rape shield law, legislators
adopted this language nearly verbatim.617 In fact, a large majority of states followed
Lowery, “The Sixth Amendment, The Preclusionary Sanction, and Rape Shield Laws,” note 84. As
Lowery explains, related state reform efforts “dispensed with the requirement that the complainant’s
testimony be corroborated and with the mandatory jury instruction that her testimony be scrutinized with
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mandatory emergency treatment for post-rape victims, reimbursement schemes for victim’s medical
expenses, and programs to raise the consciousness of police and prosecutors in their treatment of rape
victims.”
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Michigan’s lead, but some carved out specific uses for the admission of character
evidence. Delaware, for instance, prohibits the use of “opinion evidence, reputation
evidence and evidence of specific instances of the complaining witness’ sexual conduct”
for the purpose of proving consent by the alleged victim of rape.618 At the same time, the
Delaware statute provides that similar evidence may be introduced to attack the
credibility of the complaining witness.619 Nevada law allows the admission of “evidence
of any previous sexual conduct of the victim [of sexual assault] to prove the victim’s
consent.”620 However, evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct to prove her
credibility as witness is inadmissible unless “the prosecutor has presented evidence or the
victim has testified concerning such conduct, or the absence of such conduct, in which
case the scope of the accused’s cross-examination of the victim or rebuttal must be
limited to the evidence presented by the prosecutor or victim.”621 New York law prohibits
the admission of a victim’s sexual conduct in a sexual offense case, except in four
situations where the court determines that the evidence is “relevant and admissible in the
interest of justice.” The exception that sets New York apart from other states is where the
proffered evidence would prove or tend to prove that that victim had been convicted of
prostitution, falsely suggesting that one who engages in prostitution will not or cannot
withhold consent.622
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While there was (and remains) wide variation to state rape shield laws, nearly
every state’s rape shield law contains an exception in one form or another that relates to
the prior sexual behavior between the victim and the defendant. The implication of such
an exception is that “evidence of prior sexual behavior between a rape defendant and a
complainant was relevant and admissible when he claimed the defense of consent.”623
Whether intended or not, the implementation of the exception had the effect of
resuscitating Matthew Hale’s assumption that a woman, having once “given her body” to
a man, thereafter continues to consent to sexual intercourse. Thus, a man charged with
raping a woman with whom he had a previous intimate relationship may not enjoy
immunity from prosecution, but “he does have the benefit of presenting evidence of their
sexual history to prove his defense of consent.”624 The extent of this benefit can be great,
in that it often deters women from reporting rape when their attacker is a current or
former intimate partner.
When South Carolina amended its rape shield law to cover marital rape in 1994, it
too had exceptions. According to the relevant statute, “Evidence of specific instances of
the victim’s sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, and
reputation evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct is not admissible.”625 However, it
allowed for plenty of exceptions that a defense attorney could rely on to make sure the
jury heard about the victim’s sexual history. The judge’s determination of admissibility
of such evidence would arise following an in camera hearing.626 The in camera hearing
Anderson, “Marital Immunity,” 1524, indicating that by 2003, 48 states and the District of Columbia
had passed some sort of rape shield law either by statute or judicial decree; See also, Michelle J. Anderson,
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and the judge’s discretion would appear to protect the victim from unnecessary intrusions
into her personal life that would constitute inflammatory or prejudicial testimony that
could erroneously sway the opinions of the jury. Still, there was one type of evidence for
which the statute did not protect the witness: “Evidence of specific instances of sexual
activity which would constitute adultery and would be admissible under rules of evidence
to impeach the credibility of the [victim] witness may not be excluded.”627 This provision
alludes back to the proposition derived from eighteenth-century legal treatises that
promiscuity imports dishonesty, suggesting that a woman who cheats on her husband is
fundamentally dishonest and is thus more likely to lie about rape.628
Notably, the exclusionary nature of rape shield laws is controversial because of
the competing interests involved. The court must balance the privacy interests of the rape
victim with the due process rights of the defendant. As noted above, legislators designed
rape shield statutes to insulate the sexual assault victim from invasive and humiliating
questioning about her sexual history. Advocates believe that excluding such testimony
would reduce gender bias in the courtroom, especially as related to determinations of
consent where the sexual assault victim acted passively rather than resisting (putting up a
fight).629 This would encourage more victims to report sexual assault. Opponents suggest
that those same provisions prevented a defendant from presenting a full defense,
specifically by restricting the right granted under the Sixth Amendment.630 One result of
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balancing the interests of the victim and the defendant is that the jury may still hear about
the sexual history of the victim despite rape shield provisions if the defense can
successfully persuade the judge that the proposed evidence is relevant to establishing his
innocence.
Since the late 1970s, the Federal Courts have addressed the balancing act required
when rape shield laws conflict with the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. One
early case was United States v. Kasto, issued prior to Rule 412 going into effect.631 The
underlining events of the case occurred in the spring of 1977 when Beth Renee Jennings,
an Iowa State University student, participated in an exchange program on the Cheyenne
River Indian Reservation in South Dakota. Late one evening, Abraham Kasto awakened
Jennings.632 After talking for about forty-five minutes, Kasto asked Jennings to take a
ride with him. A few minutes into their ride, Kasto stopped the truck. At that time,
Jennings asked Kasto to take her home. Instead, Kasto pulled Jennings out of the vehicle
and raped her. He then took Jennings to his home where he raped her two more times.
Thereafter, she fled the house; a neighbor took her to the hospital to seek treatment for
injuries and to report the sexual assault.633 The police subsequently arrested Kasto on
charges of rape.
Prior to trial, the government filed a motion asking for the court to prohibit the
defense from introducing testimony – or making any reference at all – to any sexual
activities that Jennings may have had with men other than Kasto and from making any
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reference to the form of birth control Jennings used. Notably, the “District Court granted
the motion on the basis that a rape victim’s reputation for unchastity and evidence of their
specific acts of sexual intercourse with men other than the defendant are irrelevant to
either her general credibility as a witness or to the issue of her consent to intercourse with
the defendant on the date charged.”634 At the end of the trial, Kasto appealed his
conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, challenging the
District Court’s order that prevented the aforementioned evidence. Kasto argued that by
denying him the opportunity to introduce evidence of unchaste behavior on the part of
Jennings, he was unable to mount a complete defense under the terms of the Sixth
Amendment and the application of Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 402.635 In its opinion, the
Eighth Circuit stated:
[A]bsent circumstances which enhance its probative value, evidence of a
rape victim’s unchastity, whether in the form of testimony concerning her
general reputation or direct or cross-examination testimony concerning
specific acts with persons other than the defendant, is ordinarily
insufficiently probative either of her general credibility as a witness or of
her consent to intercourse with the defendant on the particular occasion
charged to outweigh its highly prejudicial effect.636
“[C]ircumstances which enhance probative value” might include such evidence as the
presence of semen, pregnancy, or the victim’s physical condition indicating intercourse,
or where the evidence tends to establish bias, prejudice, or an ulterior motive surrounding
the charge of rape. The Court went on to conclude:
Our examination of the record in the instant case satisfies us that the ruling
by the District Court prohibiting any reference to any sexual activity
634
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which Jennings may have had with men other than Kasto, and to the fact
that she was wearing an intrauterine contraceptive device at the time of the
incident, was not an abuse of discretion. Any relevance which this
evidence may have had to the issue of her consent to sexual relations with
Kasto was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.637
The Court thereafter affirmed the judgment of the District Court, thereby upholding
Kasto’s conviction.
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court heard a case based on notice-andhearing requirements of Michigan’s rape shield statute. Michigan v. Lucas involved a
defendant/appellant who had been convicted of two counts of criminal sexual misconduct
for using a knife to force his ex-girlfriend into his apartment, where he beat her and
forced her to engage in several nonconsensual sex acts.638 At the time of the violation,
Michigan had an operating rape shield law that provided, in part, that if a defendant
proposes to introduce evidence of a prior sexual relationship between himself and the
victim, he must file a written motion to offer proof of that relationship within ten days of
his arraignment. Within its discretion, the court would then hold an in camera hearing to
determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible.639 At trial, Lucas’ lawyer asked
to be able to introduce evidence of a prior relationship between his client and the victim,
despite a failure to file a written motion to do so. The trial court denied the motion and
proceeded with a bench trial. The court did not find Lucas’ defense of consent persuasive.
Thereafter, the court found him guilty and sentenced him to a prison term of forty-four to
one hundred and eighty months.

637

Ibid., 272.
Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991).
639
Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.520j.
638

221
When Lucas appealed, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s
decision, holding that the notice-and-hearing requirements of Michigan’s rape shield
statute was “unconstitutional in all cases where it was used to preclude evidence of past
sexual conduct between a rape victim and a criminal defendant.”640 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the Michigan Court of Appeals’
decision was consistent with Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court began
its analysis with a review of prior cases in which it had upheld notice requirements in
similar situations. Anecdotally, the court explained that notice requirements by
themselves did not violate a defendant’s decision to call witnesses, but rather simply
accelerated the timing of that disclosure. Acceleration of this type was not a
constitutional violation, the Court stated, because a criminal trial is not “a poker game in
which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played.”641 In a
later decision, the Court explained that notice requirements enhanced the fairness of the
adversarial system by increasing the evidence available to both parties.642 In light of this
string of cases, the Court found that the Michigan Court of Appeals erred in adopting
their per se rule that the notice-and-hearing requirement violated the Sixth Amendment as
related to the rape shield law.643 In doing so, the Court acknowledged a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights “to present relevant testimony is not without limitation. The right
‘may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal
trial process.’” Those restrictions, however, “may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to
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the purposes they are designed to serve. In applying its evidentiary rules a [court] must
evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed on the
defendant’s constitutional right to testify.”644
The following year, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Alaska’s rape
shield law in a case that clearly balanced the interests of the victim and the defendant. In
Wood v. Alaska, an Alaska state court had convicted the defendant/appellant of firstdegree sexual assault.645 Kenneth Wood and the victim, referred to only as M.G., offered
contradicting accounts of their relationship at the time of the incident. Wood claimed that
he and the victim had been in a tumultuous relationship that wavered between fighting
and make-up sex. In contrast, M.G. claimed that their relationship had always been
platonic. Before trial, the state moved for, and was granted, a protective order under
Alaska’s rape shield statute to prevent Wood from introducing evidence of M.G.’s prior
sexual conduct.646 Following his conviction, Wood appealed on the grounds that the
exclusion of M.G.’s prior sexual conduct violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses against him and to present an adequate defense. The Alaska Court of Appeals
upheld the conviction, concluding: “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the evidence because it had limited probative value, and whatever value it had
was outweighed by its probable prejudicial effect.”647 Wood then appealed to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, basing the appeal once again on alleged violations of his Sixth
Amendment rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.
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The evidence the jury had not heard was that M.G. had previously posed for
Penthouse, had appeared in X-rated movies and other sexual performances, and that she
had shared her experiences with Wood, showing him the Penthouse photographs. In its
decision, the Ninth Circuit weighed the interests of both victim and defendant, noting that
while elements of M.G.’s past sexual conduct might be relevant to the case at hand, even:
relevant evidence can be excluded in certain circumstances. The right to
present relevant testimony “may, in appropriate cases, bow to
accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” . . .
[A] state has a legitimate interest in protecting rape victims against
unwarranted invasions of privacy and harassment regarding their sexual
conduct. Also, “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on . . .
cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things,
harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”648
Based on these legal grounds, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision,
explaining that Wood had not successfully proven a violation to his Sixth Amendment
rights. The Court reasoned that the relevant facts were more prejudicial than probative,
contending that if the jury members had heard the facts of M.G.’s sexual history the jury
might:
feel hostility for her as an immoral woman, and it could base its decision
on that hostility rather than on the actual facts of the case. The proffered
evidence in this case is particularly prejudicial because it indicates not
only that M.G. had extramarital sex, but also that she posed nude and had
sex both for money and for the purpose of making pornography. Because
many people consider prostitution and pornography to be particularly
offensive, there is a significant possibility that jurors would be influenced
by their impression of M.G. as an immoral woman. They could also
conclude, contrary to the rape law, that a woman with her sexual past
cannot be raped, or that she somehow deserved to be raped after engaging
in these sexual activities. In light of these considerations, we conclude that
the risk of confusion and prejudice is substantial.649
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By making such a statement, the court ensured that the jury focused on the facts at hand
and not the victim’s past, fulfilling the purpose of Alaska’s rape shield statute.
As these three cases demonstrate, when hearing cases involving Federal Rule of
Evidence 412, federal courts have been sensitive to the apparent conflict between the
interests of the victim and the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused. In Kasto¸ Lucas,
and Wood, the Court used a balancing test to protect the privacy of the victim, while
maintaining the right of the accused to launch a complete defense by introducing
evidence to contradict the statements of the victim. The Courts concluded that when the
evidence proposed by the defense had no probative value or would unduly prejudice the
jury against the victim, that evidence would not be allowed. Following these examples, in
recent years, federal courts and many state courts have acted more consistently with
regard to rape cases, providing more protection to and justice for victims.
In contrast, South Carolina continues to demonstrate attitudes that privilege
accused (marital) rapists over victims. While it is true that there have been some
amendments to laws relating to criminal domestic violence, criminal sexual conduct, and
spousal sexual battery since 1994, the more important question is whether these laws are
in fact protecting women and eliminating rape in marriage. Research conducted in
Columbia, South Carolina in 2011 suggests that when it comes to protecting its female
residents from marital rape, the Palmetto State falls short. Four common themes emerged
from interviews with current and past legislators, state prosecutors, and those who work
with victims of sexual assault and domestic violence. These common themes explain
South Carolina’s hesitation in implementing protective measures for women that match
dominant views in other states.
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First, according to many female legislators and social advocates, South Carolina
remains a patriarchal environment controlled by wealthy, white, heterosexual men of
privilege. This social structure, which has prevailed since statehood, often marginalizes
women, children, and minorities.650 Rebecca Williams, Policy and Prevention Specialist
for the South Carolina Coalition Against Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault,
explained that there is within this culture, a deeply rooted and prevailing attitude that the
family is a closed environment; what happens within the family is private and closed to
public observation.651 Gilda Cobb-Hunter explained this in 1994, when she said: “in an
area like family violence, because it is so personal, and it is so private . . . you have a lot
of folks who are just opposed to government intervening in their bedroom.”652
As described by Ginny Waller, Executive Director of the Sexual Trauma Services
of the Midlands in Columbia, South Carolina, the majority of people in South Carolina do
not consider sexual violence to be an appropriate topic for conversation. People simply
do not like to talk about it or acknowledge that there is a problem with sexual assault at
all. If that is the attitude about sexual assault in general, addressing marital rape will be
far more difficult.653
Waller went on to stress that things would not change simply because state
legislators passed a new law. Lasting change will require educating the population and
changing deeply ingrained attitudes if any real change is going to happen. To this end,
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Waller explained that those groups most influenced by lessons on sexual assault and
domestic violence include students, those in the medical field, and law enforcement
officers.654 Another avenue of education was possible because of a STOP grant funded by
the Violence Against Women Act. The grant funds a position within the South Carolina
Attorney General’s Office (AGO), staffed by prosecutor Kelly Wilson Hall. In an
interview, Hall explained the multifaceted responsibilities of her job: in addition to
prosecuting cases involving domestic violence, criminal sexual conduct, and other crimes
against women, she is responsible for state-wide training of law enforcement officers,
victims’ advocates, and judges on the protocol established by the AGO to deal with
domestic violence and sexual assault.655
Finally, while the state legislature passed the marital rape law in 1991, the
criminal justice system has rarely utilized the statute to protect victims. While Hall
accepted the job with the AGO with the understanding that she would prosecute domestic
violence cases, she indicated that after three years in that position, not a single spousal
sexual battery case had crossed her desk.656 Hall offered a few theories. She suggested
that law enforcement officers arresting suspects do so on other charges – i.e. criminal
domestic violence. Second, she believed that women simply do not report incidents of
rape in their marriages. This, she said, could reflect their dependence on their abuser. She
also postulated that they do not see marital rape as a crime; rather, they see sex as a part
of marriage, even when the man uses force. Those interviewed, whether from the
criminal justice system or victim advocacy groups, all echoed Hall’s explanations. In
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fact, only Assistant Deputy Attorney General W. Allen Myrick knew first-hand of a case
of marital rape prosecuted as such.657 Instead, Suzanne Mays, a sex crimes prosecutor in
Lexington, South Carolina, indicated that very few marital rape cases have come to her
attention – perhaps one or two in fifteen years of practice. Mays suggested that criminal
domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature is a more common charge. Marital
rape, explained Mays, is simply more difficult to prosecute, and prosecutors choose a
more likely conviction over risking a full acquittal.658 The decision to pursue prosecution
for criminal domestic violence has sentencing implications that downplay the harm to
marital rape victims. Spousal sexual battery (marital rape) carries a sentence of up to ten
years. In contrast, a defendant convicted for a first offense of criminal domestic violence
faces a sentence of a fine of $1,000 to $2,500 or imprisonment for up to thirty days. A
second conviction carries a sentence of a fine of $2,500 to $5,000 and imprisonment for
between thirty days and one year. For a third conviction, a defendant faces between one
and five years in prison.659 This decision by law enforcement and prosecutors may be
based on practical and efficient considerations: there is a greater likelihood of a
conviction for criminal domestic violence, and a conviction is better than an acquittal,
even when the conviction is for a crime carrying a lesser sentence.
Each of the above responses points to the long-standing political culture of South
Carolina. Daniel Elazar has described South Carolina’s political climate as one steeped in
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traditionalistic culture that holds tightly to a paternalistic and elitist conception of the
state, and one which passes legislation that “places a great deal of importance upon
privilege of the elite, and upon maintaining programs that serve the interest of this
group.”660 This culture attempts to use government in very limited ways, seeing “the
development of a bureaucratic structure as a threat to the value of interpersonal
relationships.”661 The laws of South Carolina relating to domestic violence reflect the
dominance of the traditionalistic political subculture in at least three ways. First, family
courts, rather than higher courts, have jurisdiction over the issuing and enforcement of
orders of protection against domestic assault, suggesting that such matters are not of
grave legal concern. Second, these orders, or in fact the criminal domestic violence laws,
do not protect those persons in non-cohabitating or same-sex relationships, “suggesting
that traditionalistic views do not support such protection because this would be a threat to
traditional social ideas and statutes.”662 Third, domestic assault (including sexual assault)
is statutorily defined, prosecuted, and sentenced separately from regular assault – often
less severely – which reinforces the desire of traditionalist subcultures to maintain
traditional patterns even when doing so is contrary to legal and cultural changes
occurring elsewhere in the nation.663
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Unfortunately, the state of South Carolina’s laws allowed Dale Crawford to go
free and, unsurprisingly his pattern of marital rape and domestic violence continued. In
late 2004, Dale Crawford was once again the focus of legal and media attention. While
twelve years had passed since he had been acquitted of raping his then wife Trish, details
of that event resurfaced as Crawford faced criminal charges, this time for kidnapping,
murder, and rape in Virginia. On November 22, 2004, police found the body of Sarah
Louise Crawford, Dale’s third wife, in a Charlottesville, Virginia motel room, four days
after she had gone missing.664 Dale Crawford quickly became the prime suspect as
evidence of the couple’s volatile relationship came to light. Two years before they
married in 1999, a court had convicted Crawford of assault and battery against Sarah. At
the time of her death, Sarah had a restraining order against her husband and had recently
moved out of their marital home. Crawford had threatened Sarah when she moved her
belongings from their house.665
When the case moved to trial, the jury was not allowed to hear about the earlier
charges involving Trish since Dale had been acquitted of that crime. However, they did
hear testimony that Crawford had purchased a handgun and bullets in the weeks prior to
Sarah’s murder. Witnesses testified that police had found Sarah’s blood on the seat
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covers of her car. Prosecutors suggested that Sarah had been shot in the northern Virginia
city of Manassas and then driven to Charlottesville, over ninety minutes away. The
medical examiner testified that given her injuries, Sarah may have lived an hour after
being shot, but that she would have been paralyzed instantly. Finally, forensic experts
testified that there was less than one in six billion odds that the semen found on Sarah’s
body came from someone other than Crawford. The jury heard from investigators that
Crawford had driven Sarah’s car to Florida shortly after she had been killed, and that he
told family members in Gainesville that he was in the area on vacation, mentioning
nothing about Sarah’s death. Finally, the jury heard of Crawford’s interview by the
police, in which he contradicted himself several times about the events and timing of
those events leading up to his wife’s death.
After eight hours of deliberations, the jury of six men and six women found
Crawford guilty of the “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of Sarah Crawford.”
In fact, they found him guilty of six of the seven counts he faced, including “abducting,
killing, and raping her, stealing her car, and using a firearm in the commission of an
abduction. The one not guilty verdict – the use of a firearm in the commission of rape –
was perhaps an even grimmer indictment of Crawford’s actions.”666 The finding of not
guilty on this count was because the jury concluded that the rape occurred after Sarah
was dead, making the use of the weapon unnecessary. The court sentenced Crawford to
two consecutive life sentences plus sixty-seven years.
For the next seven years, Crawford appealed his conviction. The result of those
appeals closely resembled a ping-pong match in which he prevailed and then lost ground.
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The appeals, which finally reached the Virginia Supreme Court, argued that Crawford’s
Sixth Amendment right under the confrontation clause had been violated. Evidence
introduced at his original trial included an affidavit accompanying Sarah’s petition for a
restraining order against Crawford. In her affidavit, Sarah had told police officers that her
husband had “told [her] that [she] must want to die. He also said that he [understood]
why husbands kill their wives.”667 Crawford’s attorney argued that since his client was
unable to cross-examine Sarah, the court should not have allowed her recorded testimony
from the affidavit to be introduced at trial. Thus, the argument continued, his conviction
hinged on inadmissible evidence, requiring that his conviction be overturned. In 2008, a
three-judge panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed his convictions on all charges
except the stealing of Sarah’s car. The following year, the Court of Appeals, reversed the
three-judge opinion, upholding the original convictions and the admission of the
affidavit. Crawford’s attorney filed a subsequent appeal with the Virginia Supreme Court,
which agreed to hear the appeal.668 The Court released its decision in January 2011,
upholding Crawford’s original convictions. The Court reasoned that while the admission
of the affidavit technically violated his Sixth Amendment rights, the violation was
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”669 The Court when on to explain that the case
against Crawford was strong without the affidavit and would have nevertheless led to a
conviction in the absence of the affidavit.
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While the opinion of the Virginia Supreme Court represented the upholding of
justice, questions linger about the crimes committed by Dale Crawford. Had he been
convicted of raping his second wife, Trish, would Sarah Crawford still be alive? Had that
rape case been heard in a Virginia state court – or the court of a state other than South
Carolina – would it have led to a conviction, thereby protecting women like Sarah from
the violence of Dale Crawford? If Crawford faced charges of marital rape in South
Carolina today, would the jury reach a different verdict?
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CONCLUSION
HOW FAR WE HAVE COME: OR, “THE IDEA THAT COERCION MIGHT
OCCUR BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE REQUIRES ACCEPTING THE
IDEA THAT WIVES ARE INDEPENDENT PEOPLE WITH RIGHTS OVER
THEIR OWN BODIES.”670
Marital rape is a concept that many find difficult to comprehend. The confusion
often takes one of two paths: disbelief that marital intimacy would rise to the level of rape
or an inability to comprehend how the law could have insulated a husband from
prosecution for compelling his wife to have sex against her will. Then there are
individuals who maintain the belief that rape in marriage is not possible because of the
concept of irrevocable consent. This belief forms the basis for the “legitimacy” of the
marital rape exemption. This project has evaluated the argument from both sides of the
debate, as it analyzes the criminalization of marital rape in the United States in the years
between 1975 and 1993. The evidence demonstrates that the decision to remove the
common law protection for husbands was the result of coordinated effort by legislators,
jurists, activists, and community participants.
Despite jurisdictional variation, by the end of the twentieth century, all fifty states
had eliminated the marital rape exemption. However, even a cursory review of those laws
suggests that victims of marital rape are not provided the same protections, nor are their
abusers subject to the same level of punishment, from one state to the next. Furthermore,
in a number of states, the criminal justice system continues to address spousal rape
differently than non-spousal rape. The primary differences are evident in reporting
requirements, the statutorily-defined elements of the crime, and sentencing requirements.
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Notwithstanding the number of men arrested and convicted for raping their wives,
support for a marital rape exemption remains. In the past year, over twenty years since
the last state eliminated the marital rape exemption, several events have called into
controversy universal acceptance of the suppositions found in the above title: sexual
coercion might occur in marriage and that a woman’s right over her own body includes
the right to say no to marital sex. Those events, separately and collectively, revive the
theory of irrevocable consent. They also provide evidence that there is a need for further
development in social and legal attitudes toward rape in marriage.
Michael Cohen, attorney and top aide for businessman turned presidentialhopeful, Donald Trump, raised controversy on July 27, 2015, when he responded to rape
allegations brought against Trump regarding an incident in 1989. Trump’s ex-wife, Ivana,
described the episode as rape in a deposition given during the couple’s divorce case in the
early 1990s. She later clarified her statement and rescinded the assertion that rape had
occurred. Journalists breathed new life into the episode after Trump announced his run
for the 2016 Republican presidential nomination. Cohen defended his boss: “You’re
talking about the frontrunner for the GOP, presidential candidate, as well as a private
individual who never raped anybody. And, of course, understand that by the very
definition, you can’t rape your spouse.”671 Thinking that he was adding credibility to his
argument, Cohen argued: “there’s very clear case law,” to support this position. What
Cohen didn’t consider was that New York, the state in which Trump resided in 1989 and
in which his divorce was filed, struck down their marital rape exemption in the 1984 case
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People v. Liberta, thirty-one years prior to Cohen’s statement.672 Cohen has since
apologized for his comments and the difficulties he might have caused for Trump’s
campaign.
Unlike Cohen, the Christian blogger who posts under the pseudonym Larry
Solomon remains unapologetic for posts that have spurred significant controversy. The
stated purpose of Solomon’s blog, BiblicalGenderRoles.com, is to advise couples on how
to follow biblical gender-role standards. In an October 2015 post, Solomon contended
that men “should not tolerate refusal” when their wives say no to sex. Throughout his
blog, Solomon presents his unique version of women-blaming for sexual difficulties
within marriage. He claimed in a post titled “How a Husband Can Enjoy Sex That is
Grudgingly Given by His Wife,” that sex within marriage is a wife’s duty, and to refuse
that duty or to fulfill grudgingly that duty is sinful. 673 Solomon had argued in an earlier
post titled “Christian Husbands – You Don’t Pay For the Milk When You Own the
Cow!” that, from a biblical perspective, there is no such thing as marital rape. A wife’s
body belongs to her husband, he insists, and a wife should present any request for
deferment – not refusal – of sex in a humble and gentle way.674
Addressing men’s motivation for marital intimacy, Solomon explained that men
want to connect both physically and emotionally with their wives during sex. Yet, a
woman who seems uninterested in her husband’s sexual demands makes that emotional
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connection impossible. Instead of cautioning his male readers to postpone marital
intimacy until their wives are interested participants, Solomon suggested that they
“ignore [their wives’] lack of desire and have sex . . . anyway.”675 To avoid potential
emotional conflict of their own in such situations, Solomon suggested that husbands
concentrate wholly on the physical connection. The way to do this, Solomon suggested,
was to “Focus your eyes on her body, not her face. Focus on the visual pleasure you
receive from looking at her body and physical pleasure you receive from being inside
your wife.”676
While Solomon claimed that his comments do not endorse marital rape, his critics
are not convinced. Some critics have demonstrated their disbelief by responding to his
blogs with links to domestic violence and sexual assault laws. Others have attempted to
reach a wider audience through alternate blogs and online news magazines.677 Solomon
responded by posting another article on his blog, “The Frustrated Feminist Wife,” in an
attempt to match wits with those critics he referred to as “Rape Accusers.”678 With
neither side backing down, the debate continues.
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Given the swiftness and quantity of opposing responses, Cohen and Solomon
represent the minority within American society. As such, it is improbable their views on
the possibility of rape in marriage will have an impact on statutory provisions that have
criminalized spousal rape. Certainly, controversies will arise that challenge our current
notion about rape and which actions the law will define as rape, even between individuals
who are married. In fact, as the following example illustrates, future amendments to
spousal rape laws will likely involve nuanced interpretations of the laws and their
application to specific situations not previously considered.
In August 2014, Henry Rayhons, 78, was charged with third-degree sexual assault
of his wife Donna, who suffered from dementia/Alzheimer’s disease. Following
instructions from daughters of a previous marriage, Donna was living in a residential care
facility when the alleged sexual assault occurred. A care plan developed by facility
employees, Donna’s daughters, and her treating physician, recommended cessation of
activities that might result in undue stress or physical harm to Donna. In mid-May 2014,
care facility personnel reviewed the care plan with Rayhons and informed him that his
wife was no longer able to consent to sexual activity. Events leading to Rayhons’ arrest
began when Donna’s daughters shared their concerns with health care providers, alleging
inappropriate sexual contact between Henry and Donna. After care facility staff informed
the police about the daughters’ suspicions, a formal investigation ensued. At issue in the
case was whether Donna had the mental wherewithal to consent to sexual activity.679
While the majority of recent debates about consent and sexual assault have revolved
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around the influence of drugs, alcohol, and the culture on college campuses,
Rayhons’s trial presented a unique examination of the aspect of consent: “When is a
previously consenting spouse suffering from dementia no longer able to say yes to
sex?”680 The jury found Rayhons not guilty, yet it is uncertain why they reached that
verdict. They may have concluded that Donna did give consent, despite her severe
cognitive impairment, or that the prosecutor had not proven the charges against Rayhons.
In the alternative, ambiguity within the state statute may have influenced the jury’s
decision. Iowa law defines sex with a person suffering from a “mental defect or
incapacity” as sexual assault but provides no guidance about what is meant by the term
“mental defect.”681
Experts suggest that the “conclusion of the trial is unlikely to end the national
conversation the case launched about sex and dementia.”682 As the life expectancy for
Americans continues to increase and rates of dementia rise, medical, ethical, and legal
issue of consent will become even more significant. The complexity of dementia make
legal assessment of consent difficult. Symptoms fluctuate unpredictably. A patient might
be lucid in the morning, yet impaired that same afternoon. What is appropriate one day
might be inappropriate the next, depending on the patient’s condition. A lack of
consensus within the medical field further complicates this uncertainty. Even among
Alzheimer’s experts, there is no agreement on whether the disease really does preclude
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people from being able to give consent. It is possible for a physician to conclude that a
patient is too cognitively impaired to consent to any sexual activity, while at the same
time acknowledging that physical intimacy can benefit dementia patients by calming
agitation and easing loneliness.683
The current controversy surrounding consent and dementia patients will not be the
only concern that causes society to reinterpret the legal definition of (spousal) rape. The
people of this nation – whether legislators, activists, or simply interested citizens – will
certainly be called upon to address future nuanced conditions that arise and demand
subtle clarifications.
As with any project, there are additional avenues of inquiry about social attitudes
and legal analysis regarding spousal rape that remain to be considered in further research.
The influence, if any, which race and ethnicity had on the promulgation of spousal rape
laws is one area fruitful for investigation. For instance, Laura X argued that African
American legislators in California, Ohio, and South Carolina “suffered paternalism by
unsupportive white male liberals who said that marital rape was only a problem in the
African American community . . . [that] would be cured by ending poverty for African
Americans.”684 While such evaluation may not have made it into the legislative history of
other jurisdictions, the possibility is ripe for further investigation. Further examination of
domestic violence and sexual assault activism in relation to that of LGBT activism would
also provide an opportunity for critical analysis, especially in light of Supreme Court
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decisions that have held anti-sodomy law unconstitutional and invalidated state laws that
banned same sex marriage.685 Popular culture both influences and reflects changes in
societal norms and expectations. Therefore, a close reading of novels, movies, and music
that reference sexual assault and physical violence within marriage would provide yet
another lens by which to evaluate changing social and legal views on spousal rape.
While there are clearly still questions to be asked and critical analyses to be made,
this study demonstrates several of the important victories that women made in terms of
personal autonomy that led to the criminalization of rape in marriage. Over the course of
nearly one hundred and fifty years, those hard won victories were dependent on the
dedication of women’s advocates, the determination of legislators, the activism of jurists,
and the support of an involved public. Social and legal attitudes toward spousal rape –
actually, sexual assault in general – have resulted in greater legal protection for the rights
of married women. The elimination of the marital rape exemption, better trained law
enforcement, increased services provided by advocates, and a more informed public all
promote the legitimacy of marital rape claims. This sense of legitimacy promotes the
belief that victims today will receive more support and justice than did Greta Rideout,
Diana Willis, Dianna Green, and Trish Crawford.
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